Land ownership patterns as determinant of the availability and accessibility of urban land for residential use : case study ; city of Merida, Venezuela by Flores-Rangel, Maria Graciela
Land Ownership Patterns as Determinant
of the Availability and Accessibility of
Urban Land for Residential Use
Case Study: City of Merida, Venezuela
by
Maria Graciela Flores-Rangel
Architect, Universidad de Los Andes
Merida, Venezuela, 1974
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEGREE OF
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
January 1981
Volume I
() Maria Graciela Flores-Rangel
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to
reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis
document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Certified by
Accepted by
Lisa R. Peattie
Thesis Suoervisor
Chairman', Depattment Graduate Committee
Rof
MASSACHUSETTS INSTiTUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
MAR 19 1981
UBRARIES
Aar
100,
400011:::: / P
ABSTRACT
Land Ownership Patterns as Determinant
of the Availability and Accessibility of
Urban Land for Residential Use
Case Study: City of Merida, Venezuela
by
MARIA GRACIELA FLORES-RENGEL
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the
Degree of.
Master of City Planning
January 1981
This study will be focused on the economics and
historical aspects of land markets in Merida, a city of
112,0000 inhabitants (in 1977) in Venezuela, and will
call for a new dimension to the classical economic view
where the introduction of institutional history will join
the former as the way to explain cases where a semi-feudal
structure of land ownership persisted through time and
where oligopolistic systems of land property are
commonplace.
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. Lisa R. Peattie
Professor of Urban Studies and
Planning, M.I.T.
Dr. William A. Doebele
Professor of the Graduate School
of Design, Harvard University
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are many to whom I am indebted for helpful
comments and criticisms during the preparation of this
project. Those who were at one time or another members
of my thesis committee - Professors Lisa R. Peattie,
William A. Doebele, Marcial Echenique and Ralph
Gakenheimer - deserve special thanks for their patient
reading of many preliminary drafts and for their many
useful suggestions.
To Professors Lisa R. Peattie and William A. Doebele
I owe an even further expression of thanks. They gave
freely of their time and were a constant source of
encouragement. I am also grateful for their editorial
assistance.
I am also indebted to the School of Architecture of
the University of Los Andes in Venezuela for the
scholarship that allowed me to complete the Master Program.
For their help and support during the first phase of
my research I am grateful to the Instituto de Estadisticas
y Computacion Aplicada and to the Instituto de
Investigaciones Economicas of the University of Los Andes,
The Cadaster Direction of the Municipal Council of the
Libertador District of Merida, The National Direction of
Planning of the Ministery of Urban Development of
Venezuela, The Technical Direction of the Instituto
Nacional de la Vivienda in Merida, Dr. Edda de Chavez,
Ms. Gloria Flores de Picon, Miss Astrid Flores-Rangel,
and to the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano for the
financial support of the field work.
For help in the preparation and translation of the
legal and historical material I am grateful to Clara
Villalba and Carlos Escobar Armas, and Oscar Grouer and
David Gouvernier deserve my special thanks for their
invaluable help in the preparation of the graphic material,
and Evelyn Tracey for her skillful typing.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my
friends, especially Dr. Adolfo Moreno for constantly
supporting me in the way they know best - understanding
and love.
M. Graciela Flores-Rangel
Cambridge, Massachusets
January, 1981
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . .
CONTENTS . . . . . .
LIST OF CHARTS . . .
LIST OF TABLES . . .
LIST OF MAPS . . . .
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER II: MATERIAL AND METHODS.
CHAPTER III: MERIDA - PATTERNS OF
A. Introduction
UR
B. Merida: Historical Evolut
Patterns of Urban Growth
C. Merida: Population Growth
BAN DEVELOPMENT
ion of its
D. Merida: Its Development Dynamics
CHAPTER IV: MERIDA - LAND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS . . . .
A. Introduction
B. Venezuela: Historical Framework
C. The Case Study
CHAPTER V: MERIDA - THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION AND
ASSEMBLING OF LAND FOR URBAN USE. . . . . .
A. Introduction
B. Theoretical Introduction to Case Studies
C. The Case Studies
1. The "Hacienda Las Paoias" Case
2. The "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de
Los Curos" Case
D. Statistical Analysis
1. Hypothesis
2. Data Source
3. Method
4. Discussion
5. Some Conclusions
6. Further Statistics
CHAPTER I: . . . . . . . . . .12
. . . . . . . . . . . . -
. . .
Table of Contents, Volume I, Continued
Page
CHAPTER VI: LAND POLICY ISSUES DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A. Introduction
B. Land Policies
1. Taxation
a. Property Taxation
b. Valorization Charges to Capture
Betterment
c. Land Value Taxation
2. Direct Public Participation in the Land
Market (Public acquisition of land or
development rights)
a. Land Banking
b. The Land Readjustment System
3. Land Use Regulations: Codes & Ordinances
a. Zoning Ordinances
b. Subdivision Control
c. Building Codes
d. Urban Planning
C. Discussion and Recommendations
1. Cadastral Surveys and Taxation Systems
2. Public Acquisition of Land for Urban
Development
3. FONDUR as a Real Estate Trust Fund
4. FONDUR and its Research Program
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME II
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
APPENDIX 3
APPENDIX 4
APPENDIX 5
APPENDIX 6
Economic Theories and Models About
The Determinants of Land Values . . . . .
Compilation of Some of the Legal Acts
Enacted by the Spanish Crown which had
a Major Influence on the Patterns of
Land Property in the Hispanic Colonies
Established in the American Continent
Basic Historical Elements that Shaped
The Economic, Political and Social
Development of Venezuela and Determined
Its Territorial Structure and Land
Tenure System . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Merida: Libertador District - Urban
Permits from 1963 to 1975 . . . . . . . .
La Punta: Patterns of Inheritance of
the Major "Haciendas" and Legal Glossary.
Merida: Statistics Related to Land
Prices and Area of the Plots by Years
and by "Urbanizaciones" ..* .. .. .. ..
Page
3
103
LIST OF CHARTS
Chart 1 Land Ownership Patterns and Their Relations 17
to Socio-economic and Political Structures
as Determinants of the Availability and
Accessibility of Urban Land for Residential
Use
Chart 2 Relationships Among Socio-economic and 18
Political Structures as Determinants of
Land Prices
Chart 3 Interrelation of the Variables Affecting 24
Real Physical Supply of Land and the
Accessibility to Residential Land
Chart 4 Merida: Population Growth 38
Chart 5 Merida: Genealogy of the Major Landowners 66
Since Foundation Date: 1558 through 1975
Chart 6 Merida: Patterns of Inheritance of 67
Property Rights and Land Subdivision:
Families/"Haciendas"
Chart 7 Merida: Land Owners and Their Relation to 74
the Political Structure
Chart 8 The Formation of the Real Estate "Holding" 76
Chart 9 Changes in Annual and Capital Values of 85
Land with Changes in Land Use
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Merida: Characteristics of Land Structure
and Land Ownership
Table 2 Venezuela: Population Growth
Table 3 Merida: Population Growth
Table 4 Merida: Population Growth of the University
of Los Andes and its Relation to the
Population of the City
Table 5 Present and Future Distribution of the
Population of Merida Provided with Water
by Areas: 1970-2010
Table 6 Merida: Distribution of the Population
provided with Electricity by Areas and by
Type of Subscribors, 1975
Table 7 Merida: Distribution of the Population
Subscribing to the Service Provided by the
Telephone Company by Areas, 1974
Table 8 Merida: of Total Areas and :-of Total
Prices by Years and by "Urbanizaciones"
(aggregate data)
Table 9 Merida: X Price per Unit of Land by
"Urbanizaciones" and by Years
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
Table 13
Merida: Average of Unitary Prices and
Unitary Prices by Years
Merida: Number of observations by Years
and by "Urbanizaciones"
Merida: Application of the Laspeyres Index
between 1968 and 1978 Using the Aggregate
Data for all the "Urbanizaciones" Contained
in Tables 8, 9, and 10
Merida: Application of the Consumer Price
Index to Relative Prices for Selected Years
29
39
40
42
51
52
53
99
100
102
105
106
List of Tables, Continued
Table 14 Correlation between Price per Unit and
Years
Table 15 Merida: Total Area and Total Prices:
Basic Statistics
Table 16 Regression Analysis
112
113
114
LIST OF MAPS
MAP 1 Venezuela and the Location of the City of 28
Merida
MAP 2 Merida: Historical Growth 33
Map 3 Merida: Location of the Major "Urbanizaciones" 34,
(Residential settlements for middle and high 44
income groups)
Map 4 Merida: Location of the Major Squatter 35,
Settlements 45
Map 5 Merida: Income Distribution, 1975 48
(Approximation)
Map 6 Merida: Supply of infrastructure Services 49
Map 7 Merida: Density of Population 50
Map 8 Merida: Distribution of Land Owners by Zones 56
(Undeveloped and developing land)
Map 9 City of Merida: Land Ownership Patterns 68
(Traditional city-urbanized "haciendas")
Map 10 La Punta: Andres Bello Avenue (original and 88
Actual Design)
Map 11 La Punta: 1960: Land Development 90
Map 12 La Punta: 1975: Land Development 91
12
LAND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AS DETERMINANT
OF THE AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF URBAN
LAND FOR RESIDENTIAL USE
CASE STUDY:
CITY OF MERIDA, VENEZUELA
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important problems confronting all the
Latin American countries is the scarcity of urban land for
residential use, particularly as it affects low and middle
income groups. The rapid urban development experienced by
these countries in the last twenty years has resulted in
the deterioration of the patterns of urban life, and limited
urban land available for residential use. For instance, in
San Salvador city between 1975 and 1977, the cost of
residential land represented 40% of the housing costs. In
Caracas, Venezuela, land prices for residential use
increased 17 times between 1970 and 1975.1
These are some of the reasons for which an
understanding of the processes and relationships involved
1Geisse, Guillermo, Renta de la tierra, heterogeneidad
urbana y medio ambiente (unpublished), Proyecto CEPAL/PNUMA,
Santiago de Chile, Chile, 1979.
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in this problem will be very important for planning and
policy purposes.
At this point, one question will arise: Why is an
increase in land price so important in governing its
supply for residential use and as a component of the
housing cost? At the same time that increases in land
prices are generally related to increases in housing demand
and housing prices, there is a multiplier effect on total
construction costs. As the value of housing goes up, the
value of both occupied and potentially occupied land also
goes up. To the extent that land speculation is financed
by mortgage borrowing, lenders contribute to and profit
from increased land values. 2
From the economic point of view many authors have been
trying to explain the role of the different components of
land markets.
The Eighteenth Century Physiocrats, and the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Century writers such as: Adam Smith (1776),3
2Further details will be given elsewhere in the text.
3
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1976.
Thomas Malthus (1815), David Ricardo (1817),5 Karl Marx
(1867),6 H. Von Thunen (1826), as well as E. W. Burgess
(1925),8 H. Hoyt (1933),9 London Wingo (1961)10 and William
Alonso (1965),11 among others, determined and explained the
different elements that generate the rent and values of
land. The work of the Physiocrats and classical economists
only related to problems on agricultural land. Later,
another group of authors: Burgess, Hoyt, Harris and Ullman,
Alonso, etc., tried to focus on the variables that determine
4Malthus, Thomas, Essay on the principle of population,
6th ed., London, 1826; and An Inquiry into the Nature and
Progress of Rent and Principles of Political Economy,
William Pickering, London, 1836.
5.
Ricardo, David, On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation (Spanish translation), Fondo de
Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1959.
6Marx, Karl, El Capital, Fondo de Cultura Economica,
Mexico, 1946.
7Von Thunen, H., cited by Darin-Drabkin, H., Land
Policy and Urban Growth, Pergamon Press, Great Britain,
1977.
8Burgess, E. W., The Growth of the City, American
Sociological Society, 1927.
9Hoyt, H., One Hundred Years of Land Values in
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933.
10Wingo, London, Transportation and Urban Land,
resources for the future, INC., Washington, D.C., 1964.
11Alonso, William, Location and Land Use, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
urban land values and rents. However, their works were
focused on very specific elements and variables such as the
incidence of transportation, location and accessibility with
reference to the CBD (Central Business District). Many
conclusions should be derived from their postulates: land
values for instance, are functions of land uses; land
price is related to macro-economic trends, and on the other
hand, prices can be understood through the mechanisms of
pure market competition, elasticities of demand, etc. (A
brief summary about these authors' works is presented in
Appendix 1). However, recognizing the valuable contribution
made by these authors to the Land Economics field, it is
possible to observe for very specific cases where a semi-
feudal structure of land ownership persisted through the
time and where oligopolistic systems of land property are
common place. These are factors not sufficiently discussed
in the classic books on economics.
For that reason, this study will call for a new
dimension to the classical economic view where the
introduction of institutional history will join the former
as the way to explain such cases, recognizing at the same
time, that the measure of such variables is more subject to
bias because of their inherent subjectivity.
This study will be focused on the economic and
historical aspects of land markets in Merida, a city of
112,000 inhabitants (in 1977) in Venezuela. As an
introduction, a historical framework of Venezuela will be
presented as a background.
The main reason for these historical and specific
studies is to understand:
1) the formation afoligopolistic land markets, in
which property ownership is highly concentrated;
2) the relations of marriage and inheritance in
maintaining concentrated ownership and controlling
supply, and hence price;
3) the relation between the political/decision-making
structures and land ownership and land values;
4) overlapping relationships between the capital and
credit markets and land ownership;
5) the permanence of oligarchical patterns in land
ownership that limit the accessibility to land
and shelter by persons outside the controlling
group;
6) the gap between sophisticated land use and
taxation policies supposed to control land
development, and their actual effectiveness when
ownership is very concentrated.
Graphic summaries are contained on Charts 1 and 2.
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Finally, taking into consideration that the data
used for the statistical analysis presents a number of
problems (which will be discussed in Chapter V) that
will make it difficult to arrive at conclusions - they
do present a problem of interpretation - it will be
proved that there was a very strong oligopolistic land
market in Merida supported by an economic and political
structure. With such a small number of actors (land
owners) we should expect a sharp increase in land prices
or more profitable earnings for these actors. However,
there is no evidence that these were produced. Then,
since a very strong oligopolistic group was controlling
land markets in Merida why did they not increase land
prices?
Theoretical writings of both global economists and
Latin American specialists would indicate quite a
different result.
We do not venture to say why the oligopolistic
market in Merida did not behavOw in a more exploitative
way. However, from the data we have been able to obtain,
it appears (although we cannot prove it) that from 1968 to
1978 the actors who controlled the Merida land market did
not act in a way which their economic and political power
would have permitted.
The last Chapter will make a brief review of feasi-
bility of different alternatives and/or corrective
20
instruments that may be implemented to improve the
efficiency and equity of the land markets in Merida and
Venezuela.
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD
The material compiled for this study comprise:
a) A review for the city of Merida of historical
records since the original Spanish land grants up to 1970.12
Data from 1,004 land transactions in 44 major "urbaniza-
ciones" or neighborhoods, since 1969 up to 1980 by area,
price, per unit price and ownership.13 Data related to
urban land reserves with feasible residential use (1974)
12Sources:
Arzobispado de Merida, Historical Records (all years).
Brito Figueroa, Federico, Historia Economica y Social de
Venezuela, Vol. 1 and 2, Universidad Central de Venezuela,
Caracas, 1975.
Hidalgo, Beatriz, Merida: Relaciones espaciales a nival
urbano y a nivel de la vivienda del migrante rural
(unpublished), Universidad de Los Andes, Merida, 1977.
Registro Subalterno de la Ciudad de Merida: Register of
Deeds (all years).
Suarez, Ramon Dario, Historia Genealogica de los Febres-
Cordero y algunas de sus alianzas, Ediciones Euroamerica,
Merida, 1969.
13Sources:
Consejo Municipal del Distrito Libertador: Direccion de
Catastro, Cadastral (taxation) records, 1969-1980.
Registro Subalterno de la Ciudad de Merida: Register of
Deeds, 1969-1980.
Universidad de Los Andes I.I.E. Vivienda e Ingreso Familiar
de la ciudad de Merida, Universidad de Los Andes, Merida, 1972.
Universidad de Los Andes/CORPOANDES/Consejo Munipal del
Distrito Libertador, Plan de Desarrollo Integral del Area
Metropolitana de Merida (unpublished), Universidad de Los
Andes, Merida, 1974.
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given by land ownership, area and physical location. 1 4 A
double checking of information with data from: construction
permit forms (144 forms),15 Registry of deeds in the
cadastral (taxation) records and Loan and Savings Banks
(243 forms). 16
b) Data about supply and maintenance of infrastructure
services in the city of Merida by years and estimation of
14 Sources:
Viloria Otilia, ,et. al., Analisis de las reservas urbanas
y las areas factibles de urbanizar dentro del area
Metropolitana de Merida (unpublished), Universidad de Los
Andes, Merida, 1974.
Universidad de Los Andes; Direccion de Planeamiento,
Analisis de las reservas de tierra propiedad de la
Universidad de Los Andes (unpublished), Universidad de
Los Andes, Merida, 1972.
15 Sources:
Briceno Haydee, et. al., Analisis de la demanda del area
de construccion en viviendas unifamiliares en la ciudad de
Merida (unpublished), Universidad de Los Andes, Merida,
1976.
Consejo Municipal del Distrito Libertador; Direccion de
Planeamiento Urbano, Register of Construction Permits,
1968-1978.
Consejo Municipal del Distrito Libertador: Direccion de
Catastro, Register of Cadastral (taxation) records,
1968-1980.
1 6Merida: Entidad de Ahorro y Prestamo. Housing
Loans Forms, 1968-1978.
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future demand for water supply, sewers, electricity,
telephones and construction roads. 17
c) Historical, demographic, and socio-economic data
for Venezuela and Merida.18
d) Juridical structure: The "Derecho Indiano" and
the laws related to property of land for the Spanish
colonies in general, and the Venezuelan legislation (related
to the subject) since the Colonial Period.19
Method
Supported by an historical, juridical and economic
general framework, a descriptive and analytical presentation
of one case study will be developed through the inter-
relations of the variables affecting real physical supply
of land and accessibility to residential one as it shows
again on Chart 3.
17Source:
Instituto Nacional de Obras Sanitarias: Memorias del
Acueducto de Merida.
Compania Anonima Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela: Memoria
y Cuenta, 1975.
CADAFE: Empresa Nacional de Energia Electrica: Memoria y
Cuenta, 1974, 1975.
18Source:
Banco Central de Venezuela: Informes Economicos 1970-1979;
Inter American Development Bank; Basic Statistics 1970-1978;
Ministerio de Hacienda; Direccion Nacional de Estadisticas y
Censos Nacionales; Censos de Venezuela.
Universidad de Los Andes, I.I.E. Merida en Cifras 1978
(unpublished), Universidad de Los Andes, Merida, 1978.
19For the description and discussion about this subject,
see Appendixes 2 and 3.
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Finally, statistical data and a simple regression
analysis (characterizing the variables as it shows on
Chart 3), will be used to explain the formation of land
prices over time, and by means of graphic presentation
much of the material will be summarized.
Availability
Copies of all documents cited, original maps, and
additional related background and statistical material are
available at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 26
Trowbridge Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138.
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III. MERIDA: PATTERNS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
There has existed in Latin America a social structure
built on a distinctly agrarian basis, and the nation's
entire lives have been molded by relations to the land.
The landowner has commanded, a landless people has
obeyed. A man's status has been determined by whether
or not he owned an estate, or, at least, by whether he
belonged to a land-holding family. Position in life,
occupation, opportunity depended mainly on this.
Possession of ability, attainment in education,
achievement in any line, even acquisition of wealth
has meant less than being born into a circle that
monopolized the land resources of the nation.2 0
The main objective of this Chapter is to try to
explain the patterns of urban development in the city of
Merida as they occurred over time.
This presentation will be carried on through the
description of the principal socio-economic characteristics
of the city of Merida.
There are four sections to this Chapter:
A. Introduction
B. Merida: Historical Evolution of Its Patterns of
Urban Growth
C. Merida: Population Growth
D. Merida: Its Development Dynamics
20Quoted from: Glassman, Roland M. Political History
of Latin America, Funk and Wagnell, New York, N.Y., 1969,
p. 211.
A. Introduction
Merida is one of the most important secondary cities
in Venezuela. For almost 200 years it has been the site
of a university, which is today the second in size in the
whole country. Located high in the Andes, it is a popular
place for tourism, and is a center of government, having
always been the capital of the State of Merida (See Map 1).
Because it is on a high mountain plauteau (with very
special topographical conditions and flanked on opposite
sides by two mountain ranges and two rivers), land area is
limited, being about 12 kilometers in length and no more
than 900 meters in width. About 52% (922.88 Ha) of its
urbanizable land has been developed, and most of the rest
has been provided with major infrastructure services (see
Table 1). Like almost all Latin American cities, it has
a scarcity of land for residential use, particularly for
low and middle income families.
CARIBB EAN SEA
T L A N T I C
0 C E A N
R E P U B L I C 0 F \/E N E Z U E L A
Merida
COLOMBIA
GUYANA
MAP 1
Venezuela and the location of
the city of Merida.
BRASIL
TABLE 1
MERIDA: CHARACTERISTICS OF LAND STRUCTURE AND LAND OWNERSHIP
Urbanized or
developed land
Private
922.88 Ha
52 % 91 %
Municipal
5 %
University
4 %
Undeveloped land
supplied with
infrastructure
490.72 Ha
52 %
21 It is important to note that even though the
University of Los Andes appears as one of the major land
owners of the city, all its land is actually developing
for the expansion of its own academic, administrative,
and governmental activities.
83 % 17 %21
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B. Merida: Historical Evolution of its Patterns of Urban
Growth
Since its foundation in 1558 until 1853, Merida
maintained a very slow growth, which is explainable because
of its function as transit settlement for the coffee
market. It was only after the year 1893 when the city
expanded a little in the southeastern direction to
incorporate the settlement known as the "Hoyada de Milla."
From 194'0 on, although the city's layout remained
intact, a slight expansion in the southwestern direction
became noticeable. This development took place in linear
form up to the zone known as "Glorias Patrias" after the
airport was constructed and followed the natural limits
imposed by the topography of the plateau.
During the period between 1955 and 1960 growth was
oriented toward the North with the construction of the
"Chorros de Milla" highway. During the same period the
city expanded in transversal direction toward the "Otra
Banda" (other side) across the "Albarregas" River. The
neighborhoods "Pueblo Nuevo," "El Llanito," and "Santa
Barbara" appear during this period. The "Tulio Febres-
Cordero" Avenue was built. This avenue connected the
old city downtown with all the nuclei of the South-west
zone.
From the year 1960 on, the city's layout grew at a
pace without precedent. The development of agricultural
land led to the so-called "URBANIZACIONES." The original
layout of the city broke down and new development and urban
schemes appeared. During this same period, a large part
of the unregulated urban settlements, located on the
borders of the "Albarregas" and "Milla" rivers and on the
hills around the urban perimeter, consolidated. Among
these we can cite "El Amparo," "Santa Ana," "Simon
Bolivar," 23 de Enero," and "Vuelta de Lola." At the same
time, the Venezuelan government sponsored the construction
of some "urbanizaciones" with dwellings of social interest
in the zone of "Los Sauzales" and "Pinto Salinas." The
first "urbanizaciones" with private character also appeared
during these years. (See Appendix 4.)
From the year 1970 on, and in only 5 years, the city
doubled its physical size, breaking the urban continuity
established during former periods. The "Andres Bello"
avenue and the 25th street "Viaducto" could be considered
as the elements promoting this development because they
permitted the city's expansion toward the settlements called
"La Parroquia" and the sector of "La Otra Banda." Also,
during this period the city became polycentric. This
implied the loss of much of the traditional city structure
and the transformation of its downtown area. The density
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in the central zone increased and peripheric or suburban
commercial centers appeared. It is very important to note
a construction boom that occurred since 1973 and which
resulted in several new "urbanizaciones" located near
"La Parroquia:" "El Carrizal," "Las Tapias, " "Belensate,"
"Alto Chama," "San Antonio," "La Linda," "La Pedregosa, "
and, recently (1979), in "Los Corrales." It is important
to notice, also, the construction of large multifamily
dwellings in the zone adjacent to "Las Americas" Avenue.
We will later show how this "boom" in urban
infrastructure (1970-1975) benefitted major landowners,
and made possible the extremely large number of
"urbanizaciones" by these owners in this same period.
The following map (2, 3, and 4) explains with more
detail how this urban expansion process has been occurring.
MAP 2
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-MAP 3
PL ANO ]DE LA CIUDAD. DE MERIDA
MERIDA. LOCATION OF THE MAJOR "URBANIZACIONES"
7 LAS TAPIAS
8 LA PEDREGOSA
9 LA HACIENDA
10 HUMBOLDT
11 SAN ANTONIO
12 SAN CRISTOBAL
13 LAS DELIAS
14 SANTA JUANA
15 RAMOS DE LORA
16 JOHN KENNEDY
1 7 SAN JOSE
18 LOS SAUZALES
EL ENCANTO
LOS EUCALIPTOS
DON PANCHO
POMPEYA
EL PAROUE
LAS MARIAS
2 5 SANTA ANA
2 6 SANTA MARIA
1 MARA
2 ALTO CHAMA
3 LOS CUROS
4 LA MATA
5 EL CARRIZAL
6 LA SABANA
MAP 4
PLANO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA
JAJA
LOCATION OF THE MAJOR SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS
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EXPLANATION OF MAP 4
MERIDA: SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
La Pedregosa Norte
Interseccion
Central
La Pedregosa
Lomas del Emperador
San Isidro
Pie del Llano
Santa Juana
Bella Vista
Santa Barbara
Las Flores
Lomas de San Jose
Urdaneta
Campo de Oro
Los Infiernitos
23 de Enero
San Jose Obrero
Vegas del Hospital
El Llanito
Sucre
El Campito
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda; Division de
Equipamiento de Barrios
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C. Merida: Population Growth
The following Tables (2 and 3) and Chart 4 show the
population growth in a period of 30 years in the city of
Merida and the whole country; and the population growth of
the whole State of Merida since the first decade of the
17th century.
Chart 4 shows the accelerated growth of the urban
population, beginning in the decade of the '70s, which in
the last six years grew considerably more than in the last
decade. This situation is reflected as well in the growth
of Venezuela as a whole (Table 2).
CHART 4
MERIDA: POPULATION GROWTH
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TABLE 2
VENEZUELA: POPULATION GROWTH
Year Total Population
3,850,771
5,034,833
7,523,999
10,714,560
Urban Population
1,206,746
2,411,811
4,705,288
8,400,216
% Increment
31.0%
48.0% 1,215,065
62.0% 2,293,477
78.0% 3,692,928
SOURCE: Ministerio de Hacienda: Division Nacional
de Estadisticas y Censos Nacionales.
1941
1950
1961
1971
TABLE 3
MERIDA: POPULATION GROWTH
lst Decade of
the 17th
Century
Second half of
the 18th
century
1771-1784
1800-1810
1822
1825
1839
1847
1873
1881
1891
1920
1926
1936
1941
1950
1961
150 families
3,500 indians
2,000
500 in
5,500
11,500
50,000
41,687
62,116
84,843
67,849
78,181
88,521
123,232
150,128
179,122
192,994
211,110
270,668
the city Oviedo y Banos
Marti
Marti
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
NOTE: Data is given for the whole state of Merida.
SOURCE: Brito Figueroa, Federico: Historia Economica y
Social de Venezuela, Vol. 1 and 2, Caracas, 1974-
1975; Ministerio de Hacienda: Division de
Estadisticas y Censos Nacionales.
D. Merida: Its Development Dynamics
Until the 1930s, Merida was little integrated with the
rest of the nation, performing as a center of coffee and
sugar production activities oriented to the international
market but isolated from the rest of the national activities.
The expansion of the University of Los Andes (See
Table 4) on the other hand, has generated a demand that
permitted structuring a more diversified economy. One of
the main components of this process has been the expansion
of commercial activities with an ever increasing degree of
diversification and sophistication.
The expansion of activity in the University of Merida
has caused a substantial increase in the city population.
This population is not randomly distributed through urban
space. The price of land, as we shall argue, is determined
primarily by a group of oligopolistic suppliers. However,
urban residents must locate themselves within the various
locations, differentially priced in this way, according to
their own capacity to pay. In this form, the profile of
urban structure will be defined by the income levels, and
therefore effective demand, of the different social groups
of the city.
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TABLE 4
EXPANSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOS ANDES
Total Popu- Number of
lation of Students
Year the City Enrolled
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
11,510
14,018
18,541
25,064
33,164
43,881
46,409
48,902
51,520
54,291
57,215
60,288
63,518
66,136
68,907
71,831
74,214
77,444
212
317
528
747
1,073
2,066
2,628
3,021
3,078
3,476
4,068
4,432
5,582
6,217
7,077
8,365
9,861
12,967
Percentage
1.86
2.26
2.85
2.98
3.12
4.71
5.66
6.18
6.0
6.40
7.11
7.35
8.47
9.40
10.3
11.7
13.3
16.7
Total Popula-
tion of the
University* Percentage
a
a
a
a
1.422 4.3
2,613 6.0
3,225 7.0
3,840 7.9
3,964 7.7
4,389 8.1
5,098 9.0
5,562 9.2
6,707 10.6
7,677 11.6
8,663 12.6
10,209 14.2
11,935 16.1
15,492 20.0
*
NOTE: This total
professors
population includes the number of
and employees at the University.
aNo information.
SOURCE: Hernandez de Padron, Maria, Acerca de la conformacion del
Espacio Urbano en Merida, Universidad de Los Andes, Merida,
1978.
students,
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The following maps (3, 4, and 5) show again the
spatial location of different income groups and the
different typologies of urban residential settlements that
were generated by them.
Although this housing market system is the dominant
mode of access to the urban dwelling system, there are two
forms of access which have grown up beside the dominant
system, and which serve to deal with social groups which
are unable to enter the market in its dominant form.
These are the government-subsidized "low income" housing
market, and the "barrios" or irregular settlements.
However, some explanations have to be made about the
Maps before we discuss the process of land occupation.
On Map 3, for example, the "Urbanizaciones" with
number 3, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 18 have to be differentiated
from the rest, because they were partially or totally
financed or subsidized by the national government. That
means that a wider accessibility to land and housing units
directed to low-middle low income groups was allowed in
those cases.
On Map 4, on the other hand, there are some settlements
which are located either on marginal land or on public land.
The former group includes the following subdivisions:
a) Settlements located on Ravines: 31, 32, 33, 37, 38
b) Settlements located on River Beds: 19, 21, 22, 25, 27
c) Settlements located on Sloping Land: 5, 6, 10, 17, 23, 26.
MAP 3
PLANO DE LA CIUDAD DE MER[DA
MERIDA. LOCATION OF THE MAJOR "URBANIZACIONESU
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11 SAN ANTONIO
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MAP 4
PLANO DE LA CIUDAD DE MIERWA
LOCATION OF THE MAJOR SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS
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EXPLANATION OF MAP 4
MERIDA: SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
San Jose de las Flores
Vegas del Glorias Patrias
San Juan Bautista
Pueblo Nuevo
10 de Mayo
Simon Bolivar
Cuesta de Belen
Santa Anita
Santa Ana
La Milagrosa
Los Molinos
Andres Eloy Blanco
Cristo Rey
La providencia
Miranda
El Amparo
La Hoyada de Milla
San Pedro
Union
5 de Julio
Vuelta de Lola
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda
Division de Equipamiento de Barrios
La Pedregosa Norte
Interseccion
Central
La Pedregosa
Lomas del Emperador
San Isidro
Pie del Llano
Santa Juana
Bella Vista
Santa Barbara
Las Flores
Lomas de San Jose
Urdaneta
Campo de Oro
Los Infiernitos
23 de Enero
San Jose Obrero
Vegas del Hospital
El Llanito
Sucre
El Campito
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To the latter the following cases are related:
12, 13, 14 and 15. Finally, a group of cases such as
number 28 located in a deteriorated urban area and
numbers 3, 8, and 9 that were consolidated by the
government through improvements in the supply of public
services and building materials, have to be set aside in
order to avoid misunderstanding in the general analysis.
These Maps (3, 4, and 5) on the other hand, related
to Maps 6 and 7 and Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize the
process of land occupation in Merida by different income
groups.
As can be noted, the City has experienced a breakdown
of its traditional land uses. New developments have a
marked, sharp segregation of residential use along
socioeconomic lines.
Economic segregation in Merida is an important motive
in the actual formation of urban patterns even though such
segregation has little effect on land use in general
because it affects only certain kinds of "urbanizaciones"
(mainly private developments).
In the same way, serviced urban land is mainly
directed to middle-high and high income groups, even
though some squatter settlements located in high income
areas are supplied with most of the services. In general,
housing for the poor, although physically more substantial
MAP 5
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TABLE 5
MERIDA: PRESENT AND FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION PROVIDED WITH
WATER BY AREAS
LOCATION 1970 1990 2010
Area Area Density of Popula- Density of Popula- Density of Popula-
Code (ha) Population tion Design tion Saturation tion
-1 100 --Inh/ha --Inh. 40 Inh/ha 4,000 80 Inh/ha 8,000
0 120 20 Inh/ha 2,400 60 9,600 120 14,400
1 130 10 1,300 80 7,800 120 15,600
2a 100 10 1,000 80 8,000 120 12,000
2b 60 10 600 80 4,800 180 10,800
3 100 20 2,000 120 12,000 250 26,000
4 70 40 2,800 120 8,400 250 17,500
5 120 100 12,000 150 18,000 300 36,000
6 70 150 10,500 250 17,500 450 31,500
7 60 250 15,000 600 36,000 800 48,000
8 50 180 9,000 250 12,500 400 20,000
9a 80 60 4,800 150 12,000 250 20,000
9b 50 40 2,000 80 4,000 150 7,500
10 30 60 1,800 120 3,600 200 6,000
10a 30 50 1,500 120 3,600 200 6,000
11 100 20 2,000 80 8,000 150 15,000
12 40 - - 80 3,200 100 4,000
13 40 - - 80 3,200 100 4,000
IIIa 90 20 1,800 60 4,200 100 4,000
IIIb 70 - - 100 9,000 200 18,000
IVa 80 10 800 80 6,400 150 12,000
IVb 60 - - 40 2,400 80 4,800
Va 90 10 900 100 9,000 200 18,000
Vb 40 10 400 60 2,400 100 4,000
Vc 30 - - 40 1,200 80 2,400
VIa 50 20 1,000 100 5,000 200 10,000
VIb 20 10 200 60 1,200 100 2,000
VIc 20 - - 40 800 80 1,600
VId 50 - - 40 2,000 80 4,000
VII 70 20 1,400 80 5,600 150 10,500
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Obras Sanitarias
Memoria del Acueducto de Merida, Caracas, 1969.
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TABLE 6
CITY OF MERIDA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION PROVIDED WITH ELECTRICITY
BY AREAS AND BY TYPE OF SUBSCRIBERS, 1975
Total Sub- Residential Commercial Industrial Municipal &
Location scribers Users Users Users Official Users
MUNICIPIO EL
SAGRARIO
MERIDA
SAN JACINTO
MUNICIPIO EL LLANO
LA OTRA BANDA
EL ARENAL
SANTA BARBARA
PUEBLO NUEVO
EL LLANITO
SANTA ANITA
URB. SAN ANTONIO
7,430
7,350
2,374
177
18
213
483
492
173
69
6,582
6,503
476
467
82 Municipal: 20
Official: 274
82 Municipal: 20
Official: 274
2,295
160
18
196
469
474
170
67
MUNICIPIO MILIA 5,345 4,900 389 57
MERIDA 3,012 2,629 341 42
LOS CHORROS 457 445 8 4
SANTA ANA 262 260 2
VALLE GRANDE 287 276 7 4
LA MILAGROSA 255 247 7 1
LA PEDREGOSA 822 796 21 5
MUNICIPIO LA PUNTA 568 527 38 3
SOURCE: CADAFE. Empresa Nacional de Energia Electrica, Poblaciones
servidas. Codigo de la division politico territorial.
Caracas, 1975.
TABLE 7
CITY OF MERIDA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION SUBSCRIBED
TO THE SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE TELEPHONE COMPANY BY AREAS:
1974
Location:
Area Code
ADS 02
ADS 03
ADS 04
ADS 05
ADS 06
ADS 07
ADS 08
ADS 09
ADS 10
ADS 11
ADS 12
ADS 13
ADS 14
ADS 15
ADS 16
ADS 17
No. of Actual
Subscribers
165
194
164
137
222
139
108
116
81
141
209
54
154
182
116
223
Demand of Subscribers
to Install
108
142
64
57
127
53
82
123
40
311
143
178
142
121
115
87
NOTE: Population with the Service -- 15.45%
SOURCE: CANTV. MEMORIAS, 1974.
than "invasion" homes typical in some other Venezuelan
cities is however characterized by over-crowding and lack
of some essential services.
In relation to the distribution of densities it can
be said that the upper socio-economic class is residing in
the lower ranges of population densities. Middle, and
upper-lower income groups live in areas of highest density
and the lower socio-economic group occupy areas of both
maximum and minimum densities.
Finally, it could be inferred that a high degree of
correlation between the price of land and the socio-
economic class residing in it should be found. However,
as will be presented in the following chapters, the
expansion of Merida - as has been shown - was and is
governed by the alliance of four oligopolistic factors:
land property, financial system, construction firms and
mercantile alliances. This fact means an absolute control
over the land-dwelling market by middle and high income
groups within an urbanization and construction structure
defined by this alliance. While there are no specific
location or type selection abilities by the demand side of
the market, the supply is rigid and does not offer
feasible housing alternatives. Therefore, the location,
type of dwelling, prices, etc., are determined by the
oligopolistic groups without consideration to the
necessities or expectations of the potential demands.
This situation has arisen thanks to the fact that
there is not an atomized or competitive land market, where
free competition could play a role in the determination
of the patterns of location, prices, etc.
The oligopolistic market still remains firmly
established by the fact that the existing urban reserves
are concentrated in the same hands that, until now, have
defined the expansion of the City (see Map 8). It can be
noted that -269.19 hectares out of a total of 490.72
hectares - and without taking into account the amount of
land belonging to charitable foundations (see explanation
of Map 8) - remains in the same hands of the leading
families that will be introduced in the next chapter:
Davila, Celis, Uzcategui, Febres, Briceno, Davila-Celis,
Lares, etc.
In short, it can be said that political and economic
power are the factors which dictate the essential patterns
of urban development of this city.
PLANO DE LA CRTDAD DE hERIDA
MERIDA. DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERS BY ZONES
(UNDEVELOPED AND DEVELOPINU LAND)
ZONE 1
ZONE 2 & 3
ZONE 4
ZONE 5
ZONE 8
ZONE 7
PROPERTY OF UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES
MAP 8
M
EXPLANATION OF MAP 8
SECTOR 1 Land Owner's Name Area (Hectares)
Diego Teran 30
Succession of Vicente Davila 25
Sucession of Altagracia Davila 20
Enrique Rodriguez 20
Succession of Elias Araujo 15
Hipolito Saracha 15
Group Albornoz Berti 12
Publio Leal 10
Jesus A. Lares 9
Constructora Grespan 8.5
Curia de Merida 8.5
Ruben Avendano Monzon 8
Eloy Davila Celis 8
Pausolino Martinez 7
Francisco Uzcategui 7
Bernardo Celis 6
Rafael Pena Pena 5
Faustino Uzcategui 5
Marcial Davila 4
Atilio Graterol 4
Felix Lobo 3
Hernan Yepez 3
Unibal Lopez Lucena 3
Luis Rangel 2
TOTAL 238
SECTOR 2
San Luis School 10
Pedro Pineda Leon 4
J. de Uzcategui 3
Constructora Grespan 2
Zacarias Diaz 2
Abdel Fuenmayor 1.5
Manuel Padilla 1
Carlos Febres Poveda 1
Julio Monzon 0.6
TOTAL 25.10
SECTOR 3
Amable Sanchez 0.23
Avelino Briceno 2.09
Non information 9.00
TOTAL 11.32
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Explanation of Map 8, Continued
SECTOR 4
Alfonso Davila 37.6
Rafael Salas 2.4
Constructora Yohama 1.3
Municipal Council 1.0
TOTAL 42.30
SECTOR 5
Rafael Uzcategui 110.00
Rafael Pena Pena 1
Francisco Arias 1
Humberto Ocariz 1
TOTAL 113.00
SECTOR 6
Urbanizadora Santa Ana 13.5
Rafael Uzcateguie 12
Gonzalo Salas 9
Vivas Teran 4.5
Fundacion San Jose 4
Succession Celis Davila 4
TOTAL 47
SECTOR 7
Group Carbonell 10
Alcira de Davila 2
Amadis Canizales 1
Abelardo Ramirez 1
TOTAL 14
TOTAL PRIVATE PROPERTY = 490.72 Hectares
SOURCE: Viloria, Otilia, et al., Analisis de las Reservas
Urbanas y las areas factibles de Urbanizer dentro
del area metropolitana de Merida (unpublished),
Facultad de Arquitectura, Universidad de Los Andes,
Merida, Venezuela, 1974.
IV. MERIDA: LAND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
La incomprension del presente nace fatalmente
de la ignorancia del pasado. Pero seria vano
agotarse en compren er el pasado, si no se sabe
nada del presente.2
There are four sections to this Chapter:
A. Introduction
B. Venezuela: Historical Framework
C. The Case Study
D. Discussion and Conclusions
A. Introduction
This Chapter will be focused on the special system of
land ownership in the city of Merida, and why land control
is centered in a few families.
Land ownership patterns were traced back through to
the original Spanish land grants, which occurred between
1558 and 1637. On the other hand, by checking historical
records, it was possible to relate the political offices
held by the major land owners in both the Spanish period,
and the period of Venezuelan independence.
22Quoted from: Brito Figueroa, Federico, Historia
Economica y Social de Venezuela, Volume 1, U.C.V., Caracas,
1974. Introduction.
An historical national context and background, to
which the Case Study will be referred, will be presented
in order to explain and understand how and why the patterns
of land ownership and urban growth of Merida were set from
the very beginning in a very special way.
B. Venezuela: Historical Framework
An historical framework is necessary in order to
understand how the evolution of the patterns of land
ownership and land tenure -- built on a distinctly
agrarian basis -- have been conditioned by and molded
the economic, social and political structure of almost
all the Spanish colonies in Latin America. The Venezuelan
case displays the basic elements.
Five periods will be identified in the historical
context. The first period covers the last decades of the
Fifteenth century (before 1492), and was characterized by
a primitive economy based on land cultivation, harvest,
hunting, and fishing. The social structure was mainly
that of a homogeneous native population. Production
relations were uniform and characterized by the natural
division of labor. There was no private property in land
and only collective usufruct forms of its tenure were
allowed. The population was thinly spread out over the
territory.
The second period, the Colonial Period, goes from the
Sixteenth century to the Eighteenth century and can be
characterized by a primitive capitalist economy based on
land exploitation and the incorporation of banking and
mercantile capitals primarily managed by the Catholic
Church through the "diezmos."
Even though land was the primary factor of wealth
and the basis of social and political prestige; its value
was mainly represented by the exploitation of human capital
through the relationships of slavery, servitude and
subjection to land and the land-owner instead of its gross
productivity and/or Rent. Private property in land was
very strongly established and protected by many juridical
forms such as the "Mercedes Reales," "Repartos,"
"Encomiendas," "Composiciones," "Confirmaciones," etc.,
and the familiar and inheritance relations.2 2
During the third period focus was on the Independence
war (first half of the Nineteenth century). The Venezuelan
economy was supported by the banking and mercantile capital,
and the basis for free trade and the free market economy
were created. Linkages between landowners and banking
capitalists were also established. The primary factor of
wealth continued to be land. Its value was supported by
23For definitions, see Appendixes 2 and 3.
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economic rents, especially after the abolition of slavery
giving way to the relations of servitude through the
establishment of the patterns of "peonaje" and the
"enfeudada" labor force. Private property was maintained
even though there was a transfer of land ownership from
one oligarchic group to another represented by the
Independence heroes. Land concentration in few hands was
represented by the "Latifundios" form.
After the Independence war, this pattern in some way
was disarticulated but by no means was structurally
transformed. Political power by law was a privilege of
land owners as well as electoral and citizenship rights.
The two representative forms of land tenure during this
period were the "Aparceria" and the "Minifundio."
The fourth period that covers the second half of the
Nineteenth Century (Federal war) did not introduce so many
variables in the context of the Venezuelan economy.
However, in terms of land ownership patterns, a new
transfer of property rights was observed, this time to the
liberal group which supported the Federal side. Public
properties -- represented by "Baldios" and "Ejidos" -- were
transmitted to the new ruling class that supported a
structure of dependency to the land through the
collection of rents either by means of personal work,
species or money. From the well established "Latifundio"
system two important arrangements of land tenure were
derived: the "Medianeria" and the "Conucos" that remain
semi-feudal structures supported by renters and landlords.
Dramatic changes in the Venezuelan economy came
during the Fifth Period which began in the first quarter
of the twentieth Century until now.
During the first two decades of this period,
a) the primitive communal economic system; b) the
mercantilist one; and, c) the pre-capitalist with semi-
feudal elements were all simultaneously key elements in
the configuration of the actual Venezuelan capitalist
system dominated by foreign monopolies that reinforced a
highly dependent economy through investments in the
services and manufacturing industry out of the mining
exploitation. High level of imports -- even of the daily
products produced in other periods -- are supported by
the financial oligarchy that joined the commercial
bourgeoisie constituting the new Venezuelan social
establishment. However, a new social class appears for
the first time in the history of the country -- the
wage-earner labor force, that having migrated from the
rural areas to the oil exploitation centers produced the
decline of the old "Latifundista" system. The usurpation
of the remaining "Baldios" and "Ejidos" through royalties
primarily given to the foreign oil exploitation companies
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and further transferred to different forms of private
property, atomized -- because of the complexity of the
newly established economic system -- the relations between
landowners -- wealth, political power, etc. However, it
will not be reckless to talk about a process of "mimesis"
where the basic relations survive. Land owners joined the
financial, commercial, and political institutions modifying
the economic value of the land that (when not valuable for
mineral exploitation) should be to support holding structures
waiting for valorization through the incorporation of new
economic activities, mainly urban ones.
Parallel to these factors there was consolidated a
Central-Periphery model of national development where
spatial and regional inequalities are common. For further
detail about this subject see Appendix 3.
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C. The Case Study
As it has been shown, the social structure which
characterizes the whole country was a direct result of the
colonial period having brought as a consequence:
- unbalance of opportunity of choice, wealth and
access to social goods and services;
- a sharply defined, stratified and stable family-
based class system even in terms of physical
configuration within the urban structure and,
- the control of the most valuable resources of the
city in a few hands.
The typical owner of the "hacienda" which controlled
in a medieval way the land of the peasants and in many
cases the only available land for expansion of the ever
growing problematic cities of Latin America is the
descendant of the Spanish official who received his
"Encomienda" and his "Repartimiento" long ago.
In this sense, following four original grants from
the King of Spain it was possible to trace the patterns
of land ownership in Merida until recent times.
These results are summarized on Charts 5 and 6, and
the physical location of the land is shown on Map 9.24
A description of the patterns of inheritance by
"Haciendas" and a legal glossary are contained in
Appendix 5.
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CHART 5
GENEALOGY OF MAJOR LAND OWNERS
SINCE FOUNDATION DATE: 1558 THROUGH 1975
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CHART 6
INHERITANCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND LAND SUBDIVISION: -.FAMILIEShaciendas'
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However, because of the disputes and rivaly among the
followers of the two founders of the city, Juan Rodriguez
Suarez (supported by the Garcia Gaviria group), and Juan
de Maldonado (supported by the Cerradas group), many
contradictions about the "Repartimientos" and "Ejidos"
were established.25
As a matter of fact, on January 23, 1589 the
"Procurador" of the city, Pablo Garcia, in representation
of some of the neighbors of Merida, introduced a proposal
to the "Ayuntamiento" in order to divide some portion of
the Ejidos, giving special attention to those located near
la Punta and straight down "Las Tapias." The original
document presents as the idea behind this petition, the
necessity that so many poor neighbors should have had some
parcels of land for cultivation.26
25Special attention -- and for further information --
should be given to the multiple complaints among Antonio
de Reinoso and Pedro del Castillo. See for a vast
discussion, Febres-Cordero, Tulio, Obras Completas, Volume
1, Editorial Antares Ltda, Bogota, 1960, pp. 118-20.
2 6Cited by Febres-Cordero, Tulio, op. cit.., pp. 118-
120. This document is very important because it is the
only one that has some references about the original
"Ejidos" of the city.
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This division of the "Ejidos" was approved by the
"Real Audiencia" of Bogota on December 22, 1589, and from
that moment, all the prior "Concesiones" of land were
annulled, even though it is possible to observe that only
the principal "vecinos" or neighbors -- mainly the members
of the "Cabildo" -- were favored by the decision. This
was cancelled by themselves on January, 1590 when new
personnel were introduced.2 7
Even though it seems that "Concesiones" of land were
definitively given since 1569, on the files there are only
registers from April 18, 1589, and until April, 1590.28
To enumerate all the "Repartimientos" of land and
"Encomenderos" should be a very long work because they were
all the principal conquerors and pioneer settlers.
However, the most important should be indicated: Garcia
de La Parra, Pernia, Garcia de Gaviria, Garcia de Carvajal,
Pernia, Aguado e Izquierdo, Crzo, Castro, Lopez de Mejia,
Surbaran, Gomez de Orozco, Gonzalez Hermoso, Cerrada,
Camacho, Celi de Alvear, Rangel de Cuellar, among others. 29
Good examples about the subject can be found in all
the "Concessiones" of land done from Dec. 22 to Dec. 30, 1589.
A mutilation of the files of 272 pages can be also
found along the period prior to 1832. For details see:
Febres-Cordero T., op. cit., p. 116.
29Brito Figueroa (op. cit., p. 571 and quoting Julio C.
Salas) on the other hand, pointed out that "It was not by
accident that some of the last names that in the Andes Region
and during the colonial period conformed the 'Latifundista
They were the principal "vecinos" or neighbors of the
city and as Febres Cordero pointed out: "they managed all
the public business during the last forty years of the
Sixteenth century. Then, when they died, the primitive
"Encomiendas" were inherited by their sons and sons in
love." 3 0 , 31
In addition, on Chart 7, the relations between major
landowners and the holding of important Municipal, State
and National offices were displayed taking as reference
the chronologies of the "Corregidores" and Governors of
Merida among others. 3 2
29, continued group' such as the Parra, Picon, Rivas,
Davila, Briceno, Godoy, Ruiz, Manzaneda, Troconis, Sanchez,
Useche, Maldonado, Colmenares, Cardenas, Chacon, Nucete,
Angarita, Vivas, Cordero, Casanova, Carrillo, Pimentel,
Gabaldon, Chuecos and Saavedra (related to each other
through marriages or familiar relationships), were the same
that those corresponded to the first 'Encomenderos' and
then to the landowners of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and
Nineteenth century which took off from the native population,
communal land." Further references about the subject can
also be found in: Febres-Cordero, Tulio, Obras Completas
Volume 1, Editorial Antares Ltda, Bogota, 1960, p. 80, and
Suarez, Ramon Dario, Historial genealogico de los Febres-
Cordero y algunas de sus alianzas, Ediciones Euroamerica,
Merida, 1969.
3 0Quoted from Febres-Cordero, Tulio, op. cit., p. 112.
It is interesting to note at that point that 1) from
many of these familiar lines it is possible to follow some
of the strongest political powers in Latin America; espe-
cially those located in Colombia and Ecuador, and 2) it
should be inferred that during this period, it could be
existed the "Mayorazgo" structure -- first-born son or
primogeniture. However, there are no references about such
matters.
32As an example (and using references from Suarez Ramon
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So, recognizing the facts that:
a) It is little risky to develop geneologies following
the simple succession of last names (because it was usual in
the Sixteenth Century that the descendents of a family took
either the paternal or the maternal name).33
b) Not all the descendents were placed on the Charts
because of the consideration that it was not important,
given the fact that the Charts are only approximation.
c) All the files and registers previous to 1577
disappeared by no very clear circumstances, and
d) It was not always possible to obtain direct
references along the family lines because of the problem
with the sources and files.
It was assumed (based on the different established
laws in the country at that time, as it was shown on
Appendixes 2 and 3) given the political role, that the
patterns of inheritance of land by familiar lines were
not broken.3 4
32, continued. Dario, op. cit., all pages and Febres-
Cordero, T., op. cit., p. 138, 171-178) some Governors of
Merida were: Nicolas Hernandez Portero, Sebastian de Rosales,
Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza (1593), Alvaro Gonzales Sanguino
(1598), Arroyo de Guevara (1598-1600), Diego Prieto Davila,
(1600), Juan Trujillo de Sarria (1589-1590), Juan de Aguilar
(1611), Juan Pacheco Maldonado (1625-1634), Alonso Fernandez
Valentin (1635-1637), among others. Some "Corregidores" or
Lieutenants of Major Justice were, among others, the follow-
ing: Bravo de Molina (1561), Telles de las Penas y Cerrada
(1577), Andres Varela (1577-1578), Francisco Trejo (1581).
33Thus custom can be explained because of economical
interest-sometime involved-such as the inheritance through
testament of different kinds of economic rents in favor of a
specific familiar line.
D. Discussion and Conclusions
In this way, the following set of conclusions can be
derived:
1) Historically, the high concentration of land
ownership in the hands of a few families, the inbreeding
relations, the juridical status and the monopoly of the
fundamental political institutions among seven families3 5
dominated the major expansion areas for the city of Merida
lasted from 1558 until the 1970s.
2) With the oil boom that came to Venezuela in the
late 1960s, and even more in the 1970s, these families saw
land prices beginning to move up, both because
of the general economic prosperity and the continuous
increase of the population of the city. The first families
began large scale sales in 1968 (when the "Hacienda San
Antonio" was divided in 193 plots). Between 1971-1975, sales
were greatly accelerated. From 1976-1980, they continued,
but at a slower rate. (The biggest jump in prices occurred
in 1974-75, when the oil boom really "hit" Venezuela, and
all salaries in the country were greatly increased.
34 It is necessary to recall that by law, the political
power was supported by the amount of land owned by the
person in charge of the political role. For details, see
Appendix 3.
It has to be noted, on Charts 5, 6, and 7, that
although there are seven families, they are in fact more
or less one very large family because of the many inter-
marriages. In fact, it is especially interesting to note
at the end of the Charts that the families are reunited again
in Bernardo Celis-Parra, coming from both the paternal and
maternal line.
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Therefore, the period of most rapid land sales coincided
with the time of greatest "boom" in the national economy.3 6
Thus, in the space of about one decade, a great
transformation of land wealth, which had existed for more
than 400 years, is being converted into monetary, capital
wealth. It is not known at this time what will be done
with the large amounts of capital gained by these families
in the last 10-12 years. It is possible to see that urban
land in Merida has now been "atomized" among hundreds of
small owners of single parcels, and will never be
reassembled again.
3) A relationship which is also very significant is
the growth of families who had previously only been
landholders into a) land developers (subdividers or
"urbanizers"); b) banks and insurance companies financing
land development; c) constructors of buildings; and d) real
estate companies which sell and manage the finished product
(see Chart 8). In Merida, this was presumably done for
three purposes: a) to increase financial profits; b) to
multiply the control of the market; and c) to spread taxes
among many companies, making a lower total tax. 37
36Further details about the evolution of land prices
since the division of the original "Haciendas" will be
presented in Chapter V.
37Two important points have to be presented at this
time: a) the permanency of this kind of relationship between
the landowners and the real estate market and the capital
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4) The large landowners had considerable power over
the agencies which invested in infrastructure,38 and in a
few cases it should be possible to trace the holding of
public office with the provision of transportation or other
public services to specific "haciendas." On the other hand,
the participation of landowning families in leadership
position in banks and other credit institutions undoubtedly
assured their easy access to capital and credit. Making
credit more difficult for other potential borrowers may have
occurred, but would be difficult to prove.
37, continued market is direct evidence to support the
concepts given by Geisse Guillermo, op. cit., p. 1-20, in
which he pointed out that this trend, which has been occurring
in Merida for some time, is now becoming common in many major
Latin American cities. However, in some of the cases this
relationship is not led by the landowners. b) Specific
evidences about how this process is taking place in Merida,
are contained on the following documents: for the "Hacienda
Las Tapias," see Register of Deeds No. 71, May 23, 1973,
p. 226, Vol. 3, Protocol 1; Register of Deeds No. 8, March 30,
1974, p. 30, Vol. 3, Protocol 1; Register of Deeds, No. 8,
April 3, 1974, pp. 6-17, Protocol 1; and Register of
Commerce, No. 904, May 10, 1973, Juzgado de Primera Instancia
en lo Civil y Mercantil del Estado Merida. For the Hacienda
San Antonio see: Register of Deeds No. 102 and 103, August 17,
1965, pp. 199-200 and 201-204, Vol. 3, Protocol 1; Register
of Deeds No. 29, January 24, 1966, pp. 47-55, Protocol 1, and
Register of Commerce No. 54, August 24, 1965, pp. 63-69,
Tribunal de Primera Instancia en lo Civil y Mercantil del
Estado Merida. Hacienda El Carrizal, see: Register of Deeds
No. 51, February 18, 1970, pp. 121-24, Vol. 4, Protocol 1;
Register of Deeds No. 11, July 12, 1972, pp. 42-46, Protocol
1; and Register of Commerce No. 51, January 12, 1966, pp. 85-
92, Vol. 15, Juzgado de Primera Instancia en lo civil y
mercantil del Estado Trujillo; and Register of Commerce No. 13,
February 15, 1965, pp. 10-84, Juzgado Segundo de Primera
Instancia en lo civil, mercantil y del trabajo del Distrito
Iribarren del Estado Lara.
A good example about this subject will be presented in
the next Chapter.
5) The close relation between political power and land
ownership probably limited the possibility of land use
controls and taxation policies that would have adversely
affected the patterns of concentrated land ownership.3 9
6) The fact that these "Haciendas remained essentially
intact for four centuries implies that persons outside the
controlling group had limited access to land for shelter or
other purposes until the controlling families decided to
sell. The fact that these lands were bought very rapidly
when they were put on the market is evidence that there was
a "pent-up" demand. However, it is interesting to note
that public housing agencies were able to acquire some
major parcels in 1974 and 1979 in the "Hacienda Los Curos"
and "La Otra Banda." It is worth noting, however, that the
39For a good example, see the following documents
(related to the "Barrio Jardin Cardenal Quintero" Case):
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council: Document
of the Presidency: DMPU 35-74, February 12, 1974.
Merida, Libertador District, Minicipal Council, Direction
of Urban Planning: Letter to Simon G. Salas, March 11, 1974.
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council, Direction
of Urban Planning, Letter to "Central Cooperativa de
Vivienda," September 12, 1976.
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council, Direction of
Urban Planning, Letter to Faustino Barrios, November 26, 1976.
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council; Document of
the Presidency: DMPU 237-78, October 30, 1978.
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council; Memo from the
Sindico Procurador Municipal to the Municipal Chamber,
November 28, 1978. Descriptive Memory of the project "Barrio
Jardin Cardenal Quintero" (unknown date).
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council, Direction of
Urban Planning: Document DMPU 282-78, December 12, 1978.
Merida, Libertador District, Municipal Council; Document of
the Presidency PREI 5/4, Dec. 13, 1978; Document of the Presi-
dency PREI-029, Jan. 24, 1979, and: Document of the Presidency
PREI-03O, January 24, 1979.
prices paid by these public agencies were very close to the
prices the owners were receiving in private, free-market
sales. 4 0
7) The relation of marriage and inheritance succeeded
in keeping land supply concentrated in a few families.
Thus, there was certainly a potential of controlling price.
8) Speaking of prices in general, there are so many
variables, especially in an economy as dynamic as the
Venezuelan in the last 20 years, that it would be almost
impossible to prove that the controlling families of
Merida were able to charge "oligopolistic" prices that were
much higher than would have been produced by the private
market.
However, it was shown that their highly concentrated
control did permit them to hold vast areas off the market
for many centuries, and that the potential for controlling
supply and raising prices was present.
9) Finally, it should be possible to conclude that
neither land use controls, such as zoning of subdivision
regulations, nor any taxation policies, had much effect on
these lands. Taxes were minimal, and zoning and other
controls were changed as land became desirable for
development.
A discussion about this subject will be presented in
the next Chapter.
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V. LAND AND THE PROCESS OF PREPARATION AND ASSEMBLING
OF LAND FOR URBAN USE
This Chapter has four major sections:
A. Introduction
B. Theoretical Introduction to the Case Studies
C. The Case Studies:
1. The "Hacienda Las Tapias" case
2. The "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de Los Curos"
case
D. Statistical Analysis
1. Hypothesis
2. Data Source
3. Method
4. Discussion
5. Some Conclusions
6. Further Statistics
A. Introduction
The objective of this Chapter is to present, through
two specific case studies, how the process of changes in
land use, and changes in land values due to investments
on infrastructure services, works. For this presentation
two of the already mentioned "Haciendas": "Hacienda Las
Tapias" and "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de Los Curos"
will be used as examples of the process of preparation
and assembling of land for urban use (mainly residential)
either when the Private Sector performs as a land developer
or the Public Sector does.
In the second part, there will be presented a simple
statistical analysis which relates data about land prices
(either total prices or unitary prices), Areas and Years
- from the Cadastral Records - derived from the
different plots or land subdivisions of the major
"Haciendas" presented in the Case Study.
B. Theoretical Introduction to Case Studies
The shortage of serviced land dedicated to urban
activities (mainly residential) has been one of the most
serious problems confronted by almost all the developing
countries. This shortage of serviced land is reflected
in the high price that such land will reach in the open
market. Commonly this price will exceed the sum of the
price of unserviced land and the price of the services.
This process should be explained in the diagrams
below.
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Parallel to the process of changes in land use, jumps
41in land value can be observed (See Chart 9), following
the levels described below.
"In a stable price environment, these prices and
rents must be such that the annual rate of return on
holding serviced land is equal to the rate of return of
unserviced land. Consequently, the price of land will rise
rapidly before the services are installed, since the
landowner will get only the very low rent from the
unserviced land. Thus the capital appreciation due to the
rise in the price of land must be sufficiently steep to
compensate him for the lack of any substantial income.
After the services have been installed, however, the rental
value of the land will rise suddenly and so the capital
appreciation will cease: the price of serviced land will
again be constant." Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al.,
Urban Land Policy Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working
Paper 283, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1978, Vol. 1, p. 88.
CONVERSION OF RURAL
LAND AT THE PERIPHERY
OF THE EXISTING BUILT
UP AREA
Level a -- Changes on land value due to the transfer
from rural to urban land.
Level b -- Changes of value due to investment on
infrastructure.
Level c -- Changes in land use restrictions that
allow more variable land use.
However, this process is accelerated (especially in
developing countries) either because of unwarranted service
standards and monopolistic practices which may create
further artificial shortages,42 or because of the failure
and delays in the provision of urban services and
urbanized land in line with the growing demand. That could
occur as a consequence of shortage of financial capacity,
or to the permanence of unclear patterns of land
ownership, bringing as a result the total exclusion from
the process of the larger and growing segments of the
poorest population.
Availability of adequate infrastructure is critical
to the formation and survival of many complex urban
activities. In conditions of scarcity where the demand
for these activities is high, government must act to
42Market prices reflect in advance anticipated jumps in
the annual income from land such as tend to occur during the
transition from rural to initial urban use or when urban
land use controls are eventually relaxed as a result of
pressures for more intensive use.
CHANGES IN ANNUAL AND CAPITAL VALUES OF LAND
WITH CHANGES IN LAND USE*
RURAL/URBAN URBAN I/URBAN 11
Source: Dunkerley, Harold et. al., Urban Land Policy Issues and Opportunities,
Staff Working Paper 283, World Bank., Washington D.C., 1978, Vol 1, p.19.
provide expansions or new locations. Otherwise the
existing stock in key areas will be stretched beyond
capacity, and the character and quality of stable land
uses will be eroded by continued growth pressures.
1. The "Hacienda Las Tapias" Case
As has been shown in this thesis, the described system
of land ownership provided the setting for the emergence of
a system of intergenerational exchanges of land assets
which is a distortion of the market. In this way, the
following case study examines the differential rise in
land values and the patterns of changes in an area under-
going urbanization. Public investment was used as an
instrument to direct and guide development along different
"haciendas" through the construction of the "Andres Bello"
Avenue. The time period of the study extends from 1968
to 1980.
The "Hacienda Las Tapias" (Area: 273,880.77 square
meters)43 located in the Municipality of La Punta (Merida)
remained without substantial changes in its original
economic and physical structure during almost two hundred
fifty years. Land Values (with the exception of some data
43Source: Appendixes 4 and 5.
for the years 1932 and 1946)44 never were set thanks to
the fact that this piece of land was always inherited and
never subdivided.
However, since 1968 movements in land prices were
observed, since the announcement of the construction of
the "Andres Bello" Aveune which connects the City of Merida
with the small town of La Punta or La Parroquia. Located
just in the middle of the distance between both towns, the
"Hacienda Las Tapias" experienced a process of land
valorization and a big jump in land prices given by the
installation of the principal lines of public infrastructure
services (along the Avenue) by the government, that never
were taxed. In fact, it is important to note that given
the established economic and political power of the land
owners of the "Haciendas" affected by the construction of
the Avenue at that time (as it was displayed on Chart 7),
the original design of the project was changed to the
actual one, in order to avoid a major subdivision of the
"Haciendas" that should not allow the actual and more
profitable land subdivision of the plots (see Map 10 for an
approximation of the original design of the Avenue).
44Only for these years it is possible to find some
references about the value of the "Hacienda", even though
these values were approximations.
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Since this happens, it is possible to relate how
unitary price per square meter rose from 6-8 Bolivares in
1968 to 20 Bolivares by the time of the conclusion of the
Avenue in 1973. Then, in 1975, part of the "Hacienda"
began to be subdivided (see Maps 11 and 12) and supplied
with infrastructure services through a private investment
of approximately 3,060,000 Bolivares. 45
In 1975 only the value of the land was estimated equal
to 3,750,000 Bolivares by the landowners when they became
land developers. Thus, it can be established the total
value of the "Hacienda" equal to 6,810,000 Bolivares
before the sale of the plots of land began.
45Taking as references some works done by Perez, Ramon
(Estimacion de los costos unitarios para la instalacion y
mantenimiento de servicios urbanos publicos en la Region
Zuliana, LUZ, CIUR, Maracaibo, 1978), Urdaneta Alberto
(Costos de Urbanizacion on Revista de la Sociedad
Venezolana de Planicacion, No. 66-67, Caracas, 1969) and
CENDES (Fenomeno de Urbanizacion en Venezuela, Volume 5,
UCV, Caracas, 1968) because of the impossibility to get
accurate information about such matters either from the
public agencies (because of diversity of criteria about real
values) or from the private constructors and considering
that costs for the supply of infrastructure services are a
function of the Residential density, the following table was
prepared for the specific case of "Las Tapias."
HACIENDA LAS TAPIAS: INVESTMENT ON INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
Service Unitary price/hect. Total price
Electricity 30,000 Bs/hect. 450,000 Bs
Sewers 80,000 Bs/hect. 1,200,000 Bs
Roads 40,000 Bs/hect. 600,000 Bs
Water Supply 270 Bs/per capita (for
a density of 200 810,000 Bs
inhab/hect.)
Total 3,060,000
NOTE: Only the area considered as the residential part of
the "urbanizacion" (approximately 15 Hect.) was
considered for the supply of infrastructure services.
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Between 1975 and 1978, approximately 66,119 sq.
meters46 of the total area for residential use,47 was
selling for the price of 8,248,174 Bolivares. That means,
an increment in the average of unitary prices from 95.52
Bolivares/sq. meter to 208.00 Bolivares/sq. meter.
On the other hand, considering that approximately
35,672 sq. meters (13 lots of 2,744 sq. meters each) were
passed as multi-family residential use at the time the
construction permit was approved, it is possible to infer
that the remaining land (83,881 sq. meters) that was sold
for an average unitary price equal to 250 Bolivares/sq.
meter,48 represented an amount equal to 20,970,250.00
Bolivares.
Thus if:
Total area for residential use = 150,000 sq. meters
Land Value in 1975 = 3,750,000 Bolivares
Investment on Infrastructure = 3,060,000 Bolivares
Total Value in 1975 6,810,000 Bolivares
Quantity of land sold
between 1975-1978 
- 66,119 sq. meters
Selling price (1975-1978) = 8,248,174 Bolivares
46Data registered at the Cadastral files.
47Area estimated = 150,000 sq. meters.
48Data registered at the Register of Deeds.
Quantity of land sold
between 1975-1978 = 83,881 sq. meters
Selling price (1978-1980) = 20,970,250 Bolivares
Total selling price (1975-78) = 29,218,424 Bolivares
Ratio of total land value (1975) to selling price
= 4.29/1.
and even allowing for:
a) Underdeclaration of land values in 1975, either
in the cadastral record or in the Register of
Deeds, and,
b) An average annual rate of inflation (about 11.1%
between 1970-1978 in Venezuela),49 it is clear
that the process of valorization and the net
benefits for the landowners/land developers
represented approximately three to four times
its real value during a period of only five years.
49Source: Banco Central de Venezuela, Informe
Economico, 1978.
94
2. The "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de Los Curos" Case
This case is presented as an example of the intervention
of public agencies in the preparation and provision of public
services to peripheral land for urban use -- mainly
residential.
The "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de Los Curos" (Area:
804,000 sq. meters) was bought by the National Institute
of Housing in 1973.50 Selling price was established at
3,819,000 Bs (4.75 Bs/sq. meter) after a Presidential
Decree (1970) to encumber the "Hacienda" in favor of the
Institute in order to build 1,684 housing units for low
income groups. The amount invested by the Institute was
the following:
a) Land 3,819,000.00 Bs
b) Supply of infrastructure,
acess and preparation of
land for construction 20,898,242.47 Bs
c) Construction of 644
single-family units 6,120,520.86 Bs
d) Construction of 1,040
apartments 46,641,233.66 Bs
TOTAL 77,478,996.99 Bs
50Registro Subalterno de la Ciudad de Merida; Register
of deeds No. 90, March 7, 1973, Volume 4, Protocol 1, p. 211.
51Source of the data: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda,
Sucursal No-. 5: Los Andes, Division Tecnica. Obra No. 3504:
Urbanizacion Albarregas o Los Curos, Merida, 1973.
On the other hand, and considering that the average
selling price for the housing units was established at
approximately 37,500 Bolivares,52 and since this project
was partially subsidized by the Venezuelan government (more
than 50%), it seems to be very clear that in this case -
compared to the one presented before - at least an amount
equal to 14,328,996 Bolivares (Total amount invested -
# of units x average selling price) was lost by the
government.
However, even public financed projects directed to
moderate and low income groups - such as the one already
presented - benefitted land owners' families:
a) because it paid full market value for land;
b) it increased land prices of surrounding land
holdings (see Appendix 6) (especially "Hacienda La Mata,"
now the largest urbanizacion in Merida) through public
investments - mainly on access construction and supply of
infrastructure services that were not taxed, and,
c) because building and contractors of part of the
project of "Hacienda Santisima Trinidad de Los Curos" were
also the final land owners and building constructors of
the private development in "Urbanizacion La Mata."
52Selling prices were estimated as follows:
a) Single units: 5,500 Bolivares
b) 2 bedroom apartments: 40,500 Bolivares
c) 3 bedroom apartments: 51,500-64,000 Bolivares
d) 4 bedroom apartments: 69,500 Bolivares
Source: Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda, Sucursal 5, Los
Andes. Division Tecnica. Obra 3504: Urbanizacion Albarregas
o Los Curos, Merida, 1973.
D. Statistical Analysis
Examination of the historical-institutional structure
of land ownership in Merida reveals some features that
could have an impact on land prices formation, since the
land is rationed by non-price means through a political-
economic power. In that way arbitrary power or authority
can determine prices independent of any reference to market
considerations.
1. Hypothesis
The discussion of land prices formation for some
selected "Urbanizaciones" will be presented to relate them
with the degree of oligopolistic power (by virtue of the
concentration of land ownership). Oligopolitically
controlled land markets have the power to reduce the units
of land offered for sale (supply), and as a consequence, an
increase in land prices should be expected.
At this point two hypothetical models should be
presented in order to explain the formation of land values
in Merida.
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The first one relates a fixed supply of land along
which the demand curve is moving (see graphic below).
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That means that any increment in the demand side will be
reflected as an increase in the price per unit of land.
The second case, on the other hand, relates a demand
along which the supply curve is moving (see graphic below).
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That means that any increase in the amount of land in the
market is reflected in the decrease of its price per unit.
2. Data Source
Price trends by years, quantities of land sold, and
ownership are based upon the records of 952 land subdivisions
corresponding to:
a) The "Haciendas" -- Belen, San Jose, Santa Maria,
La Mata, Las Tapias and San Antonio and,
b) Land subdivisions from "Urbanizaciones": Pompeya,
Las Delias, La Linda, Mara and Santa Ana. 53
Transactions were taken from the survey of the
cadastral (taxation) records, even though all the
transactions are not included because of the lack of
compulsory cadastral registration in the city.
Sales prices in this survey are derived from the
Register of Deeds (records which are taken from the
purchase contract of the seller and identify among other
variables, the price).
For the purpose of the study five main variables
were chosen:
Variable X(l) Year
Variable X(2) Total area of the plot
Variable X(3) Total price of the plot
Variable X(4) Price per unit or square meter
X(4) = X(3)
X(2)
Variable X(5) Area * Year; X(l) * X(2)
53Those "Urbanizaciones" were chosen because of their
characteristics being similar to the ones derived from the
"Haciendas."
TABLE 8
OF TOTAL AREAS AND OF TOTAL PRICES BY YEARS AND BY "URBANIZACIONES"
"URBANIZACION"
La Hacienda
AREA
PRICE
Pompeya
AREA
PRICE
San Jose
AREA
PRICE
Santa Maria
AREA
PRICE
Las Delias
AREA
PRICE
La Mata
AREA
PRICE
La Linda
AREA
PRICE
Mara
AREA
PRICE
Santa Ana
AREA
PRICE
San Antonio
AREA
PRICE
Las Tapias
AREA
PRICE
TOTALS:AREA
PRICE
1968
1,33C
53,20C
3,822
214,971
1969
12,892
556,326
2,423
117,700
8,344
449,799
1970
9.429
463,851
12,694
666,171
1,989 7,059 63,320
128,930 465,023 920,145
5,230 13,901 8,490
312,211 870,189 568,692
12,371 44,619 93,933
709,312459,037618,859
1971 1972
7,271 7,156
346,804 440,200
2,523
180,420
1,516
90,960
504
40,000
2,894 4,088
158,580 226,602
5,006 3,199
316,085 201,566
2,980 5,427
196,614 384,186
398 3,870
32,000 306,600
1973
32,187
2,253,388
6,906
531,864
3,680
423,898
6,040
379,800
3,178
275,549
9,064
857,253
7,008
577,472
1974
17,713
.740,089
620
43,400
3,504
206,068
10,147
795,436
5,357
806,215
2,498
172,110
18,545
117,947
2,459
183,954
1975
6,908
816,204
1,905
285,855
614
82,500
375
66,000
800
240,000
6,186
759,222
1976
1,260
132,581
21,388
,824,219
1,777
171,321
11,408
,552,916
400
,386
37,549
3,586,791
1977
770
100,000
25,839
3,853,107
1,840
325,050
19,758
1,809,625
7,510
796,446
1978
4,381
638,522
443
88,620
7,767
1,273,023
14,874
3,105,715
21,073 25,7601 68,065 60,843 16,788 73,782 55,7171 36,125
L230,498 90,11415,299,224 13,065,219 12,249,78118,312,214 6,794,228 6,974,631
NOTE: Area is given in square meters and Total Price in Bolivares. Current exchange: $1 = 4.30 Bolivares.
SOURCE: Appendix 6
'
"URBANIZACION"
La Hacienda
Pompeya
San Jose
Santa Maria
Las Delias
La Mata
La Linda
Mara
Santa Ana
Las Tapias
San Antonio
L968
40
56. 24
TABLE 9
(X) PRICE PER UNIT OF LAND PER YEAR AND BY "URBANIZACIONES"
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
43.15 49.19 47.68 61.51 70.00 98.23 118.15
71.51 60.00 77.01 70.00
48.57 79.36 115.18 58.80
53.90 52.47 54.79 55.53 62.88 78.39 150.05 105.22
63.14 63.00 86.70 150.49 134.36
68.89
64.82 65.87 14.53 65.97 70.79 94.57 60.28 176.00
122.73
59.69 62.59 66.98 80.40 79.22 82.40 74.80 300.00
132.04
96.41
136.12
110.96
95.52
1977 1978
129.87
149.11
176.65
91.58
145.74
200.04
163.90
NOTE: Price per unit is given
SOURCE: Appendix 6, and Table
in Bolivares/sq.
8.
106.05 208.80
meter
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TABLE 10
MERIDA: UNITARY PRICES AND AVERAGE OF
UNITARY PRICES BY YEARS
UNITARY PRICE
(total prices/
total area)
57.33
55.11
27.88
58.39
65.61
77.85
83.25
134.01
112.65
121.94
193.06
AVERAGE (X) OF UNITARY PRICES
(unitary prices/# of
Urbanizaciones")
55.18
54.81
45.79
63.91
67.05
84.10
82.48
166.88
112.71
130.65
179.62
NOTE: Unitary price and the average of unitary price are
given in Bolivares/square meter.
SOURCE: Tables 8 and 9, and Appendix 6.
YEAR
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
"URBANIZACION" 1968
La Hacienda
Pompeya
San Jose 2
Santa Maria 5
Las Delias
La Mata
La Linda
Mara
Santa Ana 5
Las Tapias
San Antonio 10
SOURCE: Appendix 6
MERIDA:
1969
12
5
10
NUMBER
1970
9
15
18 23
TABLE 11
OF OBSERVATIONS BY YEARS
1971 1972 1973
6 6 52
3 2 4
1 7
4 5 8
8 8 6
AND BY
1974
26
1
5
14
14
"URBANIZACIONES"
1975 1976
13
1977 1978 TOTAL
124
9 13 21 17
13 11 12
24 17 8 10
108
8 44
76
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On the other hand, the average price per unit of land
(given in Bolivares/sq. meter) and the total area transacted
per year, has been computed in the aggregate54 even though
this method can distort results depending upon the
distribution in the variation of prices.
The interrelations of these variables are shown in
the following Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11.
3. Method
Comparative analysis of the tendencies observed and
the statistical discussion were based on the utilization
of Index numbers (basically the Laspeyres price index),
and the inflationary effect was removed by means of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Even though in Venezuela,
prices were reasonable stable throughout the 1960s, with
a slight upward trend which steepened in late 1969. By
mid 1972 stability had been virtually restored but
inflationary pressure has been renewed since 1975.
The Laspeyres price index was used given its inherent
properties that are expressed as the weighted average of
the price changes, with the weights being the quantities
consumed. In this way, it can be expressed as follows:
54The original data and the detailed statistical
analysis by "Urbanizaciones" is presented as Appendix 6.
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Laspeyres Price Index = ' P(l) x Q(Q)
P(0) x Q(0) x
P(0) = Price in the Base Period
Q(0) = Quantity sold during the Base Period
P(l) = Price in the Second Period
Q(l) = Quantity sold during the second period.
The established relation between P(0) and P(l), on
the other hand, should be understood either through the
concept of statistical correlation or through an economic
definition of a true index of price change. For purpose
of comparison, the price in each period is expressed as a
relative price of a given period or year.
For the specific case of Merida and because of the
importance of the selection of the base period, it has been
chosen the year 1968, one of the most stable in the national
economy, and the total quantities and average unitary prices
contained in Tables 8, 9, and 10. That means that there
will be obtained for each period a relative price on the
given base period as 100, in order to follow the variation
of price over time.
Following these theoretical concepts, Table 12 was
prepared.
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TABLE 12
MERIDA: APPLICATION OF THE LASPEYRES PRICE INDEX BETWEEN
1968 AND 1978 USING THE AGGREGATE DATA FOR ALL THE
"URBANIZACIONES" CONTAINED IN TABLES 8, 9, AND 10
BASE YEAR 1968 = 100
AVERAGE
UNITARY LASPEYRES
YEAR TOTAL AREA PRICE PRICE INDEX
1968 12,371 57.33 100
1969 44,619 55.11 96.12
1970 93,933 27.88 48.63
1971 21,073 58.39 101.84
1972 25,760 65.61 114.44
1973 68,065 77.85 135.79
1974 60,843 83.25 145.21
1975 16,788 134.01 233.75
1976 73,782 112.65 196.49
1977 55,717 121.94 212.69
1978 36,125 193.06 336.75
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TABLE 13
MERIDA: APPLICATION OF THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX TO RELATIVE
FOR SELECTED YEARS
TOTAL
YEAR AREA
1968
1970
1974
12,371
93,933
60,843
AVERAGE
UNITARY
PRICE
57.33
27.88
83.25
ADJUSTED
UNITARY
PRICE
57.33
23.04
43.00
INFLATION
RATE
11.1
15.0
193.06 52.48 18.0
CPI
100
121
193.6
367.841978 36,125
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4. Discussion
There has been a rapid increase in land prices in the
interval of 1968 and 1978 in Merida. It can be observed
that relative prices moved from 114.44 in 1972, to 145.21
in 1974, 233.75 in 1975 and up to 336.75 in 1978 (see
Table 12). That means an increment of:
14.44 above 1968 in 1972;
45.21 above 1968 in 1974;
133.75 above 1968 in 1975; and
236.75 above 1968 in 1978.
However, removing the inflationary effect using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), for the years that information
was available (as it is presented in Table 13), a different
set of conclusions can be traced.
5. Some Conclusions
1) Even though: a) the lack of city-wide coverage;
b) the lack of continuity and uniformity of the
cadastral records, and c) underestimations and
underdeclarations of land values either in the
cadastral records or in the register of deeds,
reduced the power of the data to yeild reliable
city-wide averages, the data given is crudely
representatives of the more recent patterns of urban
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growth and urban development in the city of
Merida.
2. It is unclear from the data whether possession of
oligopolistic power by landowners in the land market
is a necessary or sufficient condition for them to
have enough power to control land prices or, if they
had it, it was actually used by them.
3. This thesis has not shown that "the oligopoly"
deliberately controlled land prices. It has shown
that they did determine the supply in any given year
(second hypothesis). In other words, they determined
supply (see Table 8), but the data is not sufficient
to show that they used this power to control prices.
4. It appears that land values are not rising very fast.
In real terms, they have actually not kept up with the
Consumer Price Index (see Table 13).
5. The significant years of relative price variations were
1971, 1975, and 1978, when the amount of sold land
was the lowest. On the other hand, the small increases
in the rate of land values observed in 1969, 1970 and
1976 correlates with the total area transacted. Thus
it seems that land owners are increasing and decreasing
the amount of land transacted. Lower prices per unit
are shown when biggest quantities of land are in the
market.
109
6. It seems clear that it would have been better for the
large landowners - who hitherto owned all the
peripheral land necessary for the expansion of the
city - to hold off the market and wait for more
profitable sale. In fact they tended to sell land
all at the same time, which decreased sales prices
for everyone.
7. For specific analysis (not aggregate analysis) as the
one of "Hacienda Las Tapias" presented before, it
should be inferred that land values rise quickly at
the periphery when first brought into urban use,
especially when (and if) services are installed
- although the true rise in value depends in part on
the timing of development (true rise in land value
should net out the cost of service provision).
8. Although the data is very imperfect and does not
constitute a "proof" it appears to indicate that
although the "leading families" in Merida were in
a very strong position to control the supply of land;
to influence access to credit; to influence the
location and rate of construction of public services
(infrastructure); and even to influence zoning and
land use controls, they did not "exploit" this
situation to make exorbitant profits. Although there
were large profits in individual cases, in general
land prices did not even keep pace with general inflation.
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9. Again, it must be emphasized that the data presented
is not conclusive, what data is available is consistent
in indicating a failure of an oligopoly to exploit a
position of economic and political advantage it
inherited from 400 years of Venezuelan history.
10. This thesis stops at the year 1978. Large amounts of
land still remain in the hands of these families, and
the use of their power may change in the future (since
1978). However, for the large amounts sold between
1968 and 1978, title of forever "atomized," and will
never again be reassembled into the pattern in which
it had been maintained for over four centuries.
11. While the "leading families" of Merida are still rich
and powerful, and will continue to play an important
part in the life of the city and nation, it appears
(from this limited data) that their power may, in fact,
have diminished, rather than increased, from the rapid
growth of the city in the decade of 1968-1978.
12. It is hoped that this case-study, with all its
limitations, has contributed to our understanding of
urban land prices in Latin America. At least it
appears contradictory to much of the existing
theoretical writing on this subject.
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6. Further Statistics
Correlation Between Price Per Unit and Years (See Table 14).
The data presented here indicate that while a
relationship between time and price does exist, the
strength of the relationship varies from urbanizacion to
urbanizacion. It also shows that time by itself is not a
good predictor of price, that other factors (notably size
of the plots) also must be considered.
Relationship Between Size of Plot and Price (see Table 15).
The coefficient of variance figures show that within
each urbanizacion there is tremendous variation in the size
of plots sold (with the possible exception of La Linda
which coefficient of variance - 12.09).
Regression Analysis (see Table 16).
The regressions show that a positive relationship
between total price and land area exists in virtually
every "urbanizacion." All of them, except San Jose, show
a statistically significant relationship at least at the
5% level, and for most the level of significance is less
than 1%.
Finally, analyzing the graphs of area by price and
by years (see Appendix 6), two new things can be found:
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TABLE 14
CORRELATION BETWEEN PRICE PER UNIT AND YEARS
Statistical
Urbanizacion
La Hacienda
Pompeya
San Jose
Santa Maria
Las Delias
La Mata
La Linda
Mara
Santa Ana
Las Tapias
San Antonio
Correlation
0.76
- 0.01
0.25
0.25
0.42
0.23
0.38
0.29
0.50
0.25
0.55
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Significance
1 %
10
21
5 %
40
18
108
1 %
5 %
1 %
1 %
Not a statistically significant correlation.
TABLE 15
BASIC STATISTICS
TOTAL AREA
Urbanizacion
La Hacienda
Pompeya
San Jose
Santa Maria
Las Delias
La Mata
La Linda
Mara
Santa Ana
Las Tapias
San Antonio
STANDARD COEFFICIENT
MEAN X
757.05
1,156.50
581.47
816.88
456.68
1,290.20
364.33
648.88
1,001.11
1,502.70
554.68
DEVIATION
308.76
1,363.65
170.65
251.14
248.25
1,364.14
44.05
449.62
5,369.81
4,373.10
211.51
OF VARIANCE
40.78
117.91
29.34
30.74
54.36
105.73
12.09
69.29
536.38
291.01
38.13
MEAN X
54,334.86
84,664.40
47,670.28
52,536.42
44,260.39
182,896.20
42,061.16
77,259.40
40,740.49
186,292.50
40.672.60
TOTAL PRICE
STANDARD
DEVIATION
25,402.97
117.353.30
32,233.55
43.287.34
38,215.07
216,032.70
22,387.26
70,901.59
79,133.68
431,322.25
21,759.60
COEFFICEINT
OF VARIANCE
46.75
138.60
67.63
82.39
86.34
118.11
53.22
91.77
194.23
231.52
53.49
Unitary
Price
(Medium)
71.77
73.21
81.98
64.31
96.92
141.76
115.45
119.07
40.70
123.97
73.33
Correl. of
Price per
unit & year
0.755
-0.009
0.253
0.251
0.419
0.229
0.877
0.290
0.504
0.247
0.553
SOURCE: Appendix 6.
TABLE 16
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Degree of Freedom
V1 V2
La Hacienda 0.250 1 123 41.50
Pompeya 0.998 1 8 4,428.29
San Jose 0.025 1 19 0.48
Santa Maria 0.324 1 61 29.28
Las Delias 0.167 1 36 7.26
La Mata 0.888 1 38 301.62
La Linda 0.311 1 16 7.24
Mara 0.800 1 58 233.00
Santa Ana 0.583 1 106 148.58
Las Tapias 0.812 1 42 182.08
San Antonio 0.403 1 74 50.08
2
EXPLANATION: Equation: P = a + bA R = Correlation Coefficient
a = Mean price that does not depend upon the area of the
b = Unitary price (medium) per square meter
SOURCE: Appendix 6.
23,052.02
-14,771.97
30,397.47
-27,647.23
15,461.02
- 9,650.35
-60,281.51
-14,300.56
-29,348.81
52,689.66
4,417.93
41.32
85.98
29.72
98.16
63.06
149.23
283.64
141.10
11.26
88.90
65.36
Standard
Error
6.41
1.29
42.79
18.14
23.40
8.59
105.40
9.24
0.92
6.58
9.23
F = F Test P = Total Price
plot. A = Area in square meters. 0
Urbanizacion
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a) There seems to be a tendency for larger plots of
land to be sold in later years. In 1968 the largest plot
sold was 1,300 square meters. In 1969, four plots were
sold that were larger than 1,300 square meters. In 1972,
seven plots larger than 1,300 meters were sold, and in
1973, ten plots.
b) Occasionally very small plots are sold for a high
unit price (particularly in 1974). In fact almost all the
very expensive pieces of land seem to be not very small,
although it is not true, in general, that small plots are
expensive.
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VI. LAND POLICY ISSUES: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Chapter has three major sections:
A. Introduction
B. Land Policies:
1) Taxation
a) Property Taxation
b) Valorization Charges to Capture Betterment
c) Land Value Taxation
2) Direct Public Participation in the Land Market
(Public acquisition of land or development
rights)
a) Land Banking
b) The Land Readjustment System
3) Land Use Regulations: Codes and Ordinances
)a) Zoning Ordiancnes
b) Subdivision Control
c) Building Codes
7;d) Urban Planning
C. Discussion and Recommendations
1) Cadastral Surveys and Taxation Systems
2) Public Acquisition of Land for Urban Development
3) FONDUR as a Real Estate Trust Fund
4) FONDUR and its Research Program
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VI. LAND POLICY ISSUES: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Introduction
The main purpose of this thesis has been to trace the
history of the particular land market in Merida. However,
having done this research, it will be useful to make some
brief concluding remarks about different alternatives
and/or corrective instruments that may be implemented to
improve the efficiency and equity of the land markets in
Merida and Venezuela.
The first part of this presentation will comprise a
short description of a group of land policies, such as:
land taxation, land banking, land readjustments, etc.
Then, a second part will be presented related to the
discussion and proposal of simple recommendations and
instruments that will call for the establishment of basic
legislative supports for the implementation of land
policies in Venezuela.
Finally, using the legal characteristics and
structure of FONDUR (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano)
and using it as a revolving fund, some sort of
recommendations and ideas about how to deal with land
policies and how to manipulate some components of the price
of urban land in the country, will be presented.
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B. Land Policies
Since the location of housing and economic activities
has an effect on the general community, as well as those
living and working in the property concerned, governments
have for a long time pursued land policies which have as
their main objectives to capture part of its increase for
the public sector and to reduce the cost which high land
prices place on government as servicing authorities.55
For that reason, any attempt to maintain or reduce
land and housing costs has to be related with land control
in some way, such as:
55Dunkerley, et al., (1978) summarized the objectives
of urban land policies in the following statements:
- "The provision of an appropriate supply of urbanized
land for urban productive activities, including provision
of basic urban services, and for dwellings, community and
recreational activities;
- the promotion of urban spatial patterns that minimize
waste of resources relative to benefits, both economic and
social, in the dynamic setting of rapid urban expansion;
- the achievement of greater equity in wealth and
income including access by low income families to shelter;
and
- the promotion of a spatial balance of population and
their activities at regional and national levels consistent
with general national priorities."
Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land
Policy Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283,
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 60-61.
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a) Reducing standards by using less land,
b) Increasing efficiency of land use; and
c) Controlling land prices with the idea of avoiding
speculation, etc.
Many land policies have been developed and implemented,
especially those related to:
a) Taxation,
b) Direct public participation in the land market
(public acquisition of land or development rights),
and
c) Land use regulations, codes, and ordinances, some
of which will be explained as follows.
a) Taxation
It is one of the most strongly recommended policies to
control land prices. In general terms, taxation is defined
as a compulsory contribution to the public authority to
cover its expenses, in order to pursue the following
objectives:
- To provide general revenue;
- To provide revenue to finance expenditure on
specific public services;
- To provide incentives for efficient allocation of
resources in the urban land market;
- To reduce inequities in the distribution of land
ownership, land income, or benefits of land use;
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- To deal with administrative feasibility, political
acceptability, problems of transition, etc. 56
However, those objectives can be reached through
different types of taxes, some of which are applied to urban
land or property in general, and others that are oriented
to special assignments of land judged to be within the zone
of influence of benefits from individual projects.
Some of them will be described as follow.
1. Property Taxation
Real property tax refers to tax levied on all
immovable properties such as land and buildings. Also known
simply as property tax or real estate tax,57 it is distinct
from the more comprehensive general property tax which is
imposed on all property, real and personal, tangible or
intangible.
In theory, property tax has five main features:5 8
- Universality, applicable to all real properties;
- Uniformity, all property is assessed at the same
percentage of its true value;
56A good summary and discussion about the subject is
presented by Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land Policy
Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper No. 283,
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 2, pp. 28-32.
57Real estate refers only to the physical land and
things permanently attached to it while real property is a
broader concept that includes tangible and intangible
qualities of land and improvements.
58Fisher, G. W., The Property Tax System: A Manual,
University of Kansas, Kansas, 1975, p. l-c-l.
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- Ad valorem, the tax is levied according to the
market value of property;
- In rem, the tax is levied against property and not
against the person or the owner;
- Tax day, tax is levied each year on a particular day
and the status of the taxable property on that day
determines the tax.
In general, property should be taxed to its market
value. However, owing to the difficulty of operationalizing
the concept, surrogate measures have been utilized for tax
base estimation such as: Market data (or comparable data),
income (capitalization of income stream) and costs
(reproduction costs of real property less depreciation).
Property taxation and its role in the revenue generation.
One of the principal reasons for the continuing appeal
of property taxes, particularly to local government
administrators, is its revenue generating capacity.
Revenues from real property tax are said to be responsible
for rapid growth in local government expenditure. Following
that order of ideas proponents of property tax claim that
in the aggregate, it tends to increase the application of
resources in favor of high return human investment and may
deter lower return physical capital investment. It is also
neutral because it does not encourage premature land
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development.59 Furthermore, following the same logic for
betterment taxation,60 it is asserted that property is
afforded services which make it so attractive to owners,
tenants and speculators that they are willing to pay a
premium for its use or possession.
Finally, opponents of the real property tax contend
that it has negative impact (economic) on the free market
because:
- There is an objectionable inter-industry effect;
- It is claimed that the cost of public services
bears no necessary relationship to either value or
income of property;
- The system encourages land use planning in urban
areas designed primarily to maximize fiscal
advantage without necessarily achieving economic
efficiency.
- It is argued that the existence of tax abatement or
subsidy that applies to land and land improvements
makes implicit that these taxes are deterrent to
economic growth.
59This argument basically compares property tax with
site value tax.
60This tax is levied in order to capture unearned
increments in values of urban land that is attributed to
public expenditures. See: Doebele, William and Orville F.
Grimes, Valorization Charges as a Method for Financing
Urban Public Works: The Example of Bogota, Colombia, Staff
Working Paper N.254, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1977, and
Macon and Manon, Betterment Levies in Latin America, Inter
American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., 1975.
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- Tax serves as a disincentive to construction and
rehabilitation or land improvement.
- As a conclusion it is argued that in the long run,
the tax acts as penalty for maintaining present
level of improvements and as incentive to replace
them with investment of lesser value since the tax
burden would be reduced accordingly. Since the tax
discourages the application of capital goods to land,
it may be regarded as a penalty for putting land to
its best use. However, it must be realized that
real property has two components: land and land
improvements. While the depressing influence of the
tax on land improvement may be real, the tax also
induces landowners to put their land to a higher
level of use if possible to maximize revenue. Hence,
the tax should be viewed as producing conflicting
yet simultaneous impacts, the net effect of which is
not necessarily a disincentive. The composite
effects are unfortunately difficult to generalize
given uniqueness of real estate properties.61
2. Valorization Charges to Capture Betterment
"Valorization is a system of taxation by which the
cost of public works is allocated to neighboring properties
61See: Becker, A.P., Land and Building Taxes: Their
Affect on Economic Development, The University of Wisconsin
Press, Wisconsin, 1969, pp. 23-24.
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in proportion to the benefits conferred. Since valorization
depends on the availability of liquid assets to pay charges,
its application is less straightforward in lower income
residential areas, in which higher property values resulting
from public works may have to be realized through sale of
the house in order to pay the charge. On the other hand,
a variant of valorization, which encourages prepayment of
30% of costs, eliminates overhead charges, spreads
installment payments at low interest . . ., etc." 6 2
However, because Valorization is a process of recovering
either total project costs or land cost, by basing charges
on a proportion of the estimated surplus values produced
by the projects,63 even in the poorer areas of a given city,
the main difficulty for implementation is centered in the
determination of the before-project value and the final
after-project value, because both are hypothetical values
rather than measurable market prices.
62Quoted from: Doebele, W., and Grimes, 0. Valorization
Charges as a Method for Financing Urban Public Works: The
Example of Bogota, Colombia, Staff Working Paper No. 254,
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 2 and 3.
63Surplus value is defined as "that part of the increase
in urban land values over the time period under consideration
that, after allowing for general inflation, is in excess of
the increase attributable to capital investment in the land
by private holders (for example, privately financed infra-
structure or clearing of sites), including a normal allowance
for the holding costs, enterprise and risks involved."
Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land Policy
Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283, World
Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, p. 40.
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In such a way, the application of this sort of policy
in order to establish taxes for land capital gains, is
recommended for urban areas where:
- Benefits and charges can be readily associated;
- The size of the area to be developed is small;
- The land value gains are large;
- The capture of betterment does not exceed costs
of improvements, and
- where technical and administrative teams are
available.6 4
Setting these conditions, the Valorization system
should reach significant benefits for the municipality
creating means of self-financing projects which either
local governments were not able to carry out, or if they
were, it would have been done at a much slower pace.
On the other hand, the Valorization system because of
its flexibility, may be applied to a variety of projects
like: paving, drainage, historic districts, etc.
Another advantage of the Valorization system is given
by the fact that working on actual costs, it is easier to
charge owners, based on costs which are known rather than
on benefits which are not quite determinable (since the
64See Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land Policy
Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283, World
Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, p. 45.
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costs are almost always lower than benefits, there are
incentives for the owner to pay the cost). Finally,
extended interest-free payment schedule helps low income
groups meet their payments, and particularly, in the case
of inflation lowers the real cost of the charge. It
enlarges the choice and accessibility of jobs and
residential building sites to lower income groups.65
3. Land Value Taxation
Taxation of Site Value or Land Value or Unimproved
Value involves a tax whose base is the value of the land
alone irrespective of the value of the improvements (or
buildings) or lack thereof on the site. Hence assessment
for this tax is based solely on the value of land.
S.V.T. (Site Value Taxation) includes invisible
improvements like drainage, cost of clearing land, etc.
U.V.T. (unimproved Value Taxation) does not include
these improvements.
L.V.T. (Land Value Taxation) is generally applicable
to agricultural land.
The different interpretations of value for
assessment are:
65For a description of a successful experience, see
Doebele, W., and Grimes, Orville, Valorization Charges as a
Method for Financing Urban Public Works: The Example of
Bogota, Colombia. Staff Working Paper 254, World Bank,
Washington, D.C., 1975.
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a) purely market value;
b) "highest or best use value," that generally
coincides with market value;
c) planned value, as the one attributed by comprehensive
planning, zoning, etc. This is also reflected in
market value.
The main advantages related to the application of land
value taxation are focused on:
- the control of urban growth patterns;
- raise revenue for general expenditure, and
- the stabilization of land prices.
Land values reduce the market value of land and may
encourage savers to accumulate their wealth in the form of
produced physical capital rather than in land value (any
increase in land value causes an increase in the annual tax
payment). 66
On the other hand, they would help capture as tax
revenue some of the betterment that is associated with the
provision of public services.
66In countries where land value is an important means
of holding wealth, this reduction in land value may be a way
to stimulate capital investment and accelerate economic
devleopment. See: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land
Policy Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283,
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, p. 74.
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b) Direct Public Participation in the Land Market
(Public acquisition of land or development rights)
The direct public participation in the land market is
given by a process by which public agencies take over the
task of supplying land for specific purposes. In such a
way, the government becomes the major participant in the
process of converting raw land to urban use because public
infrastructure extensions play a large role in determining
land use possibilities and land values. 67
Four major objectives are pursued by the public
participation in urban land markets. They are well
expressed by Dunkerley, et al.,68 as follows:
- To improve the land use planning of newly urbanized
land;
- To provide government revenue to finance public
infrastructure;
- To allocate the serviced land to new residents,
firms and government uses, and
- To encourage efficient use of land after it is
converted.
67See: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land Policy
Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283, World
Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, p. 54, and Vol. 2,
p. 52.
68Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 52-
54.
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However, as it was pointed out by the same authors,
"the outlay and expertise required for large-scale public
acquisition of urban land or development rights and
subsequent management or disposal at price that recoup the
surplus are moreover generally beyond the capacity of
public authorities even in the more developed countries." 69
The following two policy instruments have been used
successfully as public interventions in urban land markets:
1. Land Banking
Land banking deals with the direct government purchase
of the land ahead of urbanization in order to form public
owned land reserves. The objectives in this kind of policy
are directed to the centralization of control of land
resources, the control over land uses to protect it as a
vital resource of which supply is fixed and to ensure an
adequate supply of land for future development. Implicitly,
land banking reduces housing costs through lowering land
prices and providing more opportunities for the government
to consider public housing. The implementation of land
banking allows the government to enter the market to buy
land, hold it, and sell or lease it with a vew toward
controlling land speculation, making land available at low
cost for public uses, and guiding the pace and direction of
69Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit.,
Vol. 1, p. 43.
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urban growth and development of new areas, providing more
sensitive regulations of land use. On the other hand, land
banking avoids premature development and provides oppor-
tunities for the government to consider low income housing
projects.
Financial Considerations of Land Banking
A public land bank must have the financial capability
to purchase land through a broad geographical area
(especially, a large supply of capital is needed to initiate
the land bank in order to purchase enough land to dominate
the market).
The selling price should be set to cover acquisition
cost and the investment in infrastructure.
Land banks have to have a parallel system of tax
exemptions or direct governmental aids (i.e., grants and
loans) that may be used to reduce the cost burden on the
bank (but it should be noted that it is merely a hidden
subsidy, and the real expenses are being paid by the
people).
Another key issue in the conformation of a land
banking system deals with the fact that land must be
purchased without development rights (compulsory if it is
necessary). That means, in terms of political considera-
tions the limitation of private property. If so, it will
be necessary to set the main alternatives with different
131
degrees of property limitations. Such as: to own all land
or all development rights; to own 10 years needs for
development; to control critical spots only; to acquire
land for only public works; to own enough land to dominate
the market; to acquire land as needed, etc.
Finally, the implementation and operation of land
banks imply:
- Considering the feasibility of acquiring property
by negotiated purchase versus the ability to acquire
land by the exercise of eminent domain;
- A high level of governmental authority supported by
the local agencies;
- Sufficient flexibility and authority in post-
acquisition stages must be authorized to:
- carry out detailed site-planning;
- install, or contract for infrastructure
improvements;
- sell, lease or dispose of improved sites or raw
lands or rights to private developers with
appropriate use;
- To consider the feasibility of pre-emption rights;
- To make sure whether government competition will
reduce the land prices or increase them by decreasing
supply.
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2. The Land Readjustment System
The land readjustment system recovers for the public a
part of the land developer's "profit" from such increments
by the simple expedient of making the public body the
principal developer in the area. This process is carried
out through the manipulation of the title of the land
itself, without substantial exchanges of cash, except for
the final sale to the party intending to use a given lot
for construction.70 This system is presently done in South
Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Japan, and can be character-
ized by the following advantages and disadvantages:
- From the city's point of view the whole operation
is self-financing;
- The area to be serviced is strictly defined, which
results in less speculation on the urban perimeter;
- Urban land is fully serviced by the city that owns
15% of the land spread all over the Master Plan
Area, and the owner gets back 55% of their land,
and the remaining 30% is taken for public use.
That means that the city is competing in the land
market (trying to control land price increases).
70Peattie and Doebele pointed out that: "while this
system involves what some would regard as an intolerable
government interference with the development process, it
still respects the basic land market, and in operation is
highly favorable to the owners of non urban land who fall
under a development plan." Quoted from: Peattie Lisa and
William Doebele, Some Second Thoughts on Site and Services
(unpublished paper), Cambridge, MA, 1976, pp. 6-7.
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On the other hand, the city may increase the supply of
land for housing the poor or can subsidize loans back to
the same people from whom the land was originally obtained
through the sales at low prices of its parcels of land.
In the specific case of incorporation of agricultural
land to urban land use some correctives have to be taken
into consideration in order to help displaced tenant farmers
because the whole process takes time and so there may be a
loss of one or two crops during the period of service
construction. Finally, a team of technical assistance is
required to complete the process of land valuation.7
c) Land Use Regulations, Codes, and Ordinances
One of the major causes of the rapid increase in land
prices near the development margin are the prevalent density
restrictions on residential use: differential building codes
and union restrictions on building procedures, land
aggregation problems, size of lots required, and zoning
constraints on land utilization. For that reason, a short
review about the most common instruments used to affect
land use will be presented:
1) Zoning Ordinances - "are an attempt to organize
and systematize the growth of urban areas, by setting up
71For an excellent discussion about the subject, see
Doebele, William, Land Readjustment in Korea, Urban and
Regional Report No. 77-9, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1976.
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categories, classes or districts of land in the community
which prescribe the uses to which buildings and land may
be put and apply uniform restrictions as to shape and
placement of buildings." 7 2
2) Subdivision Controls - govern the development
of raw land (the actual treatment of the development site)
for any purposes. They include prescriptions on lot size,
shape and width; on the character, capacity and location
of on-site utilities, etc. 7 3
3) Building Codes - Building Regulations "limit
the materials going into new structures and the way they
are to be built." 4 (Building codes deal especially with
the structural adequacy of a building: resistance,
plumbing, circulations, etc.)
4) Urban Planning - "is the allocation of scarce
resources to achieve certain goals and therefore includes
most functions of government. However, the common use of
the term planning refers to the process of making decisions
about the physical environment and the effect of changes in
this environment on people and the economy."75
72Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit.,
Vol. 2, pp. 116.
73For a more detailed discussion about the subject see:
Dunkerley, Harold, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 116-136.
74Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit.,
Vol. 2, p. 139.
75Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, op. cit., Vol. 2,
p. 142.
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C. Discussion and Recommendations
As has already been shown in this chapter, numerous
planning activities have been commissioned which attempt
to establish a physical form or design for an urban area,
without regard to quetsions of efficiency, equity and
adaptability.76 Numerous codes, ordinances, land policies,
and other instruments have been adopted as derivatives
from developed countries with totally different land and
construction circumstances. As a consequence, "Planning
and the codes become unenforceable, partly because of low
priority, partly because of irrelevance."77
In the specific case of Latin America, for example,
extremely detailed land use plans run the risk of
implementation failures, if public investment decisions
are not linked to the plan prescriptions, and because of
the poor performance of the monitoring, planning and permit
levels. "In Latin America, land use planning has been
influenced by architectural design concepts often bearing
little relation to social and economic circumstances or
76For a detailed discussion about the subject see:
Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land Policy Issues and
Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283, World Bank, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1978, Vol. 2, p. 92.
77Quoted from Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit.,
Vol. 2, p. 92.
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implementation possibilities." 7 8 As a consequence, the gap
between plans and performances is even greater and rigid.
In such a way, it must be borne in mind that a fair
assessment of urban land control, cannot be undertaken in
the absence of information about how it is implemented:
the rate, its yield, its method of administration,
effectiveness, if it is or whether or not it is, its place
in the country's tax system and the socio-economic
environment. Each instrument not only has to answer a
given problem but also fit into the over-all policy
structure, economic organization and the constitutional-
legal framework.
As an example, it is possible to point out that:
- Charges on surplus value will reduce pressure for
devious manipulation of land use controls. However, they
may retard private investment in land development (if they
are too heavy). In the same way, programs to increase
security of tenure may conflict with programs to promote
adaptation of urban patterns to rapid urban expansion.
- Rent controls to protect the poor may end as
subsidies to the middle class.
78Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., op. cit.,
Vol. 2, p. 114.
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- Urban development plans in the long run may cause
delays. They can incorrectly estimate growth patterns or
there could be a failure in the provision of public
services within an indicated time.
- Urban land taxation, on the other hand, even if
related to the setting of greater equity in income and
wealth distribution should be inadequate. As is observed
by Shoup:
Because of the difficulty of measuring the
overall efficiency of land market operations,
the resource allocation objectives such as to
lower land prices, to promote early
development of vacant land, or to curb land
speculation. A problem with all these . . .
is that achieving them may not in all circumstances
produce an efficient allocation of land. For
instance, it is not axiomatic that a reduction
in land prices, if any policy can achieve this,
will mean that resources will be more efficiently
allocated; the most obvious impact on resource
allocation is that everyone will want to use more
land. Similarly, it is not clear that early
development is always a more efficient use of
land than later development; not all land can be
developed at once; and some must be reserved for
future use. In practice, some of these intermediate
objectives may be related more to distributional
concerns than to their contribution to an efficient
use of land. While the question of efficiency in
allocation and equity in distribution are never
independent, it is useful, at least for purposes
of analysis, to keep them separate. 79
- Heavy taxes on land value which reduce the market
value of land may encourage savers to accumulate their
79Quoted from: Shoup, Donald. Land Taxation and
Government Participation in Urban Land Markets: Policy
Alternatives in Developing Countries, Urban Issues Back-
ground Paper, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 29.
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wealth in the form of produced physical capital rather than
in land value.80
- Finally, urban land controls can be used to serve
the interest of politically influential groups producing
inefficiencies and inequities as it has been shown in our
case.
Keeping all those facts in mind and considering the
precarious situation that the Venezuelan urban legislation
has in such matters, this proposal will be oriented toward
the formulation of simple recommendations and instruments
that will call for the establishment of the basic
legislative supports which in the long run will allow the
implementation of more comprehensive land policies.
a) Cadastral Surveys and Taxation Systems
There is no reasonably accurate cadastral system in
the country. Cadastral surveys have to be up-to-date as
support of any effective system of land taxation and land
use controls. They will increase municipal revenues through
the collection of cadaster taxes and, should allow in the
80 In countries where land value is an important means
of holding wealth, this reduction in land value may be a
way to stimulate capital investment and accelerate
economic development.
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long run the creation of a system of valorization to
capture betterment.81 At the same time, property taxes
should be oriented taking into account that in spite of
the many limitations of the property tax system, it
remains one of the most potent instruments which may be
combined with other instruments at government disposal,
to achieve long-run ends for housing in particular, and
economic development in general.
In such manner, it will be recommended that property
taxes should allow government to improve fiscal cadaster
and to establish progressive rates for land that is kept
vacant.
b) Public Acquisition of Land for Urban Development
This program will be developed through the intervention
of FONDUR (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano), which is
characterized by the following elements:
FONDUR was created by an act of the Congress of the
Republic of Venezuela passed on August 21, 1975 and signed
into law on September 1, 1975, as an independent and
81To begin modestly, it will be recommended to tax
betterment associated with provision of public services
instead of betterment levy.
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autonomous entity responsible for the promotion of urban
residential development, with its own legal personality
and independently administered social capital. In order
to perform its assigned functions, FONDUR was endowed with
an authorized capital of 2,000 million Bolivares (U.S.
$465 million), to be paid-in as needed.
Functions
a. FONDUR acts as a central discount window for the
mortgage banking system, purchasing bank securities backed
by valid unencumbered first preferential residential
mortgages for the purpose of injecting needed liquidity
into the national mortgage finance system for the
continuance of urban residential development.8 2
b. FONDUR is an owner of urban lands designated and
set aside for residential development within the terms
established by the government's housing programs. On the
other hand, FONDUR will promote residential development
by arranging the sale of these lands to constructors and
developers whose plans fall within the terms of the
government's programs.
82Those interested in this aspect may refer to the
Joint Ministry of Finance - Ministry of Urban Development
Decree; July 30, 1979; The Presidential Decree No. 214 and
the National Congress Decree; September 9, 1975 (Gaceta
Official No. 30,790).
141
Financing
FONDUR's regular source of funding is coming from the
national government, supplemented from time to time with
the proceeds of authorized domestic bond issues. FONDUR
is also authorized to undertake debt obligations for up to
ten times its paid-in capital and reserves where loan
proceeds are utilized in the refinancing of first
preferential mortgages or in the purchase of mortgage-
backed securities. In addition, FONDUR is authorized to
borrow funds from local and foreign banks on a short-term
unsecured basis, for purposes other than the purchase of
mortgage-backed securities, in amounts that not exceed
25% of total paid-in capital. 8 3
For all the characteristics presented before, FONDUR
will be the executing agency for the program of land
acquisition and land development. By investing in the
purchase of peripheral land, FONDUR will be benefiting in
the future from the plus value generated by its own
investment (or the investment made by public agencies) in
land development and redevelopment.
However, it will be recommended, at this point to
keep in mind the basic features to be sought in government
83All the references were taken from brochures
published by the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano;
Caracas, Venezuela, 1979.
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land development as they are expressed by Neutze as
follows:84
a) land should be purchased without development
rights, compulsorily if necessary, and disposed of with
those rights specified, and development required within a
specified time;
b) enough resources should be available so that the
government can set the price in the market, and supply
enough developed land to maintain the price established,
and
c) price should be set to (at least) cover
acquisition costs and the cost of development.
It is important to recognize that private landowners
and developers are simply trying to maximize their wealth
within the law. Public land acquisitions are (like any
other measures) always politically difficult to implement
and in many cases have had undesirable political and
economic consequences affecting more the low income groups
that these measures intended to serve. For that reason,
implementation of these policies should always follow a
strategic approach taking into account undesirable impacts.
84Quoted from: Dunkerley, Harold, et al., Urban Land
Policy Issues and Opportunities, Staff Working Paper 283,
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1978, Vol. 1, p. 56.
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In order to achieve these purposes FONDUR will, first
try to persuade the private landowners to create a mixed-
private-public corporation. This corporation will combine
the development expertise of the private sector with the
borrowing and legal powers of FUNDUR. By acting in this
way, landowners have the first choice to associate with
FONDUR (pre-emption right partnership). If landowners
refuse to associate, FONDUR will exercise compulsory
purchase of the land (expropiation) paying compensation
according to cadastral data and bid the pre-emption right
for partnership.
FONDUR should always have the control of the decision
in the Board of Directors in the association. The
financing of the projects will be done by private financing
agencies according to existing regulations. If the
association is not able to get the total amount of funds
required for a project, FONDUR will supply the needed
extra money. The corporation will also be able to bid out
to private developers the execution of development projects.
Compulsory purchase procedures usually take a long
time and have high administrative costs; in order to avoid
this situation, FONDUR should have the legal mechanisms to
accelerate the process.
One of the difficulties with public land acquisition
is choosing what sites should be purchased at what time.
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If no immediate development is necessary or desirable,
FONDUR will expropiate land and lease it through bidding
for agricultural use until development seems desirable
according to city growth.
In order to achieve these goals, FONDUR should be
reinforced with proficient personnel in four fields:
a) Planning;
b) Management;
c) Operations; and
d) Negotiation.
These imputs of personnel will capacitate FONDUR with
the necessary knowledge of how to:
a) define and redefine land policies and development
policies at the local level in each particular city
depending on specific circumstances;
b) change and/or enforce legal control mechanisms;
c) translate policies into actions and lessen the
degree of risk involved in implementation;
d) have a more direct imput in budgeting and
programming;
e) monitor phases in the execution of the projects;
f) participate extensively in the development process
and
g) implement stronger land use controls.
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c) FONDUR as a Real Estate Trust Fund
FONDUR as a Real Estate Trust Fund will be used as a
revolving fund. Its loans will be for short and long term,
and the conditions will be different in order to recover
public investment. Because of its greater access to the
financing resources, FONDUR will permit the establishing
of better financing mechanisms, permitting also the self-
financing of some projects. Finally, FONDUR as the trust
will allow an easier and less expensive form to finish the
programs of urban development for people with low income
and an adequate control over the use of land.
This form will permit:
- Greater access to the source of financing
independently of budgetary allowances;
- Programming in advance the projects, the purchase
of land for urban purposes and delivering public services
by contractual agreements;
- Establishment of credit programs;
- Coordination with other agencies at different levels
and
- FONDUR will act as an antiinflationary agency that
should stabilize land prices intervening in the free market
as any private person or institution in order to maintain
the best quality and very fair profits.
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d) FONDUR and its Research Program
FONDUR will promote a research program of basic
legislative supports which in the long run will allow
the implementation of more comprehensive land policies.
In such a way, the following laws are recommended to
start it for possible modifications:
1936 August 19 Ley de tierras Baldias y Ejidos.
1942 September 1 Codigo Civil: Modificaciones al
libro II; sobre la Propiedad.
1947 November 6 Ley de Expropiacion por causa de
utilidad publica o social.
1958 December 30 Creacion de la Officina Central
de Coordinacion y Planificacion.
1960 September 12 Ley de Venta de Parcelas.
1961 January 23 Modificacion de la Constitucion
Nacional. Titulo IV: De los
Municipios.
1965 December 30 Ley Forestal de Aguas y Tierras.
1975 April 22 Ley del Sistema Nacional de
Ahorro y Prestamo
1975 May 13 Ley del Instituto Nacional de la
Vivienda.
1975 September 1 Creacion del Fondo Nacional de
Desarrollo Urbano.
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1975 December 12
June 8
April 12
Normas de Incorporacion de
areas suburbanas y rurales a
las actividades urbanas.
Ley Organica del Ambiente
Reglamento de la Ley Forestal
de Suelos y Aguas.
1976
1977
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APPENDIX l
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS
ABOUT THE DETERMINANTS OF URBAN LAND VALUES
The purpose of this appendix will be to focus on the
presentation of some of the doctrines, theories, and
models which try to explain the mechanisms governing land
markets; basically, those which have tried to explain the
formation of urban land values and economic rents.
The main reason for this presentation is as a basis
for discussing the case study. This discussion will be
organized historically around different schools of the
economic thought. The first school is represented by the
Eighteenth century Physiocrats even though their work was
mainly oriented to agricultural land. However, their work
became the foundation upon which was constructed the whole
subsequent tradition of English classical economics which
can be traced from the Nineteenth and Twentieth century
writers such as Thomas Malthus (1815) and David Ricardo
(1817). These latter, on the other hand, united with
John Stuart Mill (1848) and Karl Marx (1867) to create the
most important classical schools of thought, theory and
doctrines about land (mainly agricultural), in the
political economy field.
Special attention will be given to H Von Thunen (1826)
because of the importance of his work in the spatial
economy field. After that a short review of the works
done by Alfred Marshall (1916) and R. M. Hurd (1903) of
5the Neo-Classical school will be also presented, especially
because of their influence on R. M. Haigh (1926).
Finally, a brief description of the most important
models developed around the subject will be presented;
both those related to the spatial distribution of land
uses and those related to the explanation of land price
formation. As examples of the former summaries will be
presented of the descriptive theories developed by
E. W. Burgess (1925), H. Hoyt (1933) and C. D. Harris and
E. L. Ullman (1945).
In the latter category on the other hand, it will
focus on the works written by London Wingo (1961) and
William Alonso (1965).
Besides the authors that have been presented,
hitherto, it does not mean that the works done by the
well known economists of the urban land such as Murray
Haig (1927), Richard T. Ely (1928) or the models
developed by I. S. Lawry (1960), G. T. Lathrop,
J. R. Hamburg, Rend Mayer and some others were not
considered.
The Physiocrats
Basically, their position was based on the belief in
the existence of a natural order and regarded the State's
role as simply that of preserving property and upholding
the natural order. They held that agriculture, and as a
consequence, land, were the only source of wealth.
Turgot (1766-1770) and Sir Jamen Stewart (1767) were
the most important writers in the formulation of the basic
principles of the theory of the rent of land,2 before the
publication of the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations in 1776 by Adam Smith. 3
1Reference from: Bannock G., R. Baxter and R. Rees,
The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, Penguin Ed., Great
Britain, 1978, p. 346.
2Being the rent of land the most important sort of
income of the land owners or "terratenientes" it can be
defined etymologically as "any income or yield from, an
economic agent, but in economics it has come to be used
almost entirely in connection with income from land.
Surplus income for any factor of production results
whenever any unit is receiving a greater income than the
minimum amount necessary to induce that factor to remain
in its present use. Thus, the surplus of receipts over
the minimum supply price of a factor may be called economic
rent." Quoted from: Renne, Roland, Land Economics,
Harper and Brothers, New York, N.Y., 1958, pp. 212-21.
On the other hand, from the classical economy writers,
the rent of land is the surplus that is received by land
owners as land was a factor of production in what its
returns were not related to work done.
3The process of elaboration of the Physiocrat's view
about the rent of agricultural land can be also found in
the works done by William Petty (1662); Nicholas Barbon
(1690) and Richard Cantillon (1755). A very good
Without doubt the piece of work done by Adam Smith -
the founder of the English Classical Economics -
constituted one of the most important sources for the study
of the rent of land. He supports the idea that the rent of
land should be considered as the price which is paid for a
specific land use, and hence, it is naturally a
monopolistic one.
He also introduced concepts of natural prices, market
prices, current prices, etc., and rejected the Physiocrats'
view of the pre-eminent position of agriculture,
recognizing the parallel role played by the manufacturing
industry. Many controversies have been generated by
his work in the field but it is not the objective of this
presentation to deal deeply in such matters.
Following this brief description, at this point, it
should be important to confront the conceptual differences
established on the conceptualization of the rent of land
by three of the most important writers of the classical
school: Thomas Robert Malthus (1815) for example,
proposed that "the rent of land may be defined to be that
portion of the value of the whole produce which remains to
3 (cont.) discussion about the subject is also
presented by Baptista, Asdrubal, Controversias en la
Historia de la Economia Politica: David Ricardo, Thomas
Maltus y la rewcci6n anti Ricardiana, Universidad de Los
Andes., Merida, Venezuela., 1979, pp. 22-50.
the owner of the land, after all the outgoings belonging
to its cultivation, of whatever kind, have been paid,
including the profits of the capital employed, estimated
according to the usual and ordinary rate of the profits
of agricultural capital at the time being," or as " . .
the excess of value of the whole produce, above what is
necessary to pay the wages of labor and the profits of
capital employed in cultivation.,"4
David Ricardo (1817) on the other hand, defined
rent as " . . that portion of the produce of the earth
which is paid to the landowners (landlord) for the use
of the original and indestructible powers of the soil." 5
Finally, John Stuart Mill (1848), following his
father's idea and according to the Ricardian theory
suggested that Rent, being a surplus, was ideally suited
to taxation. In other words, Mill proposed fundamentally,
that all future increases in any kind of unearned rents
should be taxed.
A different view about the formation of the rent of
land, was supported by Karl Marx (1867) who in his theory
of value defined the rent of land ". . . as a revenue
4Reference quoted from Ely, Richard T., Land
Economics, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1940, p. 117.
5Reference quoted from: Renne, Roland R., Land
Economics, Harper and Brothers, New York, N.Y., p. 219.
received by land owners, who are able to wrest this
revenue from those who would use their land."6 In such a
way, rent is viewed as both "the result of a landed class
monopoly over a natural resource and a subtraction from
surplus value which would otherwise be taken as profit by
the capitalist class."7  Marx defines three kinds of rent:
Differential rent that is "the revenue paid because
capitalists compete for use of better land or for the
right to make more intensive use of land. In this case,
the revenues paid to landowners come directly out of
surplus value without affecting prices." 8
Monopoly Rent that is "the revenue received by
landowners who let out land for the production of goods
sold under monopoly conditions. If production of a
product is not subject to competition among capitalists,
price can be driven above its price of production or its
value, allowing excess profits."9
Absolute Rent that is "the revenue received when land
owners, either by insisting on a minimal rent for marginal
6Quoted from: Matthew Edel, Marx's Theory of Rent:
in Kapitalistate, Number 4-5, Summer 1976, p. 100.
7Matthew Edel, op. cit., p. 100.
8Matthew Edel, op. cit., p. 101.
9Matthew Edel, op. cit., p. 102.
land on which no surplus profit could be produced, or
through other barriers to use of land by capitalists,
restrict the flow of capital into a sector of
production. ,,10
From the summaries presented before some important
factors should be concluded:
The peculiar physical characteristics of land have
led many to conclude that property in land gives greater
possibilities of monopolistic gain than ownership of the
other productive agents and that, therefore, land rent
is a monopolistic return.
Rents constitute a surplus over the normal supply
price of a unit of a productive agent made possible
because the supply of the factor is less than perfectly
elastic and because the demand for the factor is
sufficient to necessitate use of more units than would
be offered at the lowest supply price of any unit.
The minimum supply price of each piece of land will
be the amount that the land could earn in its most
profitable alternative use, and may be referred to as the
opportunity price of the land or transfer cost.
The Ricardian theory contends that (a) unequal costs
in the production of agricultural commodities, in the face
of equal market prices, as set by the highest cost
10
Matthew Edel, .op-. cit., p. 102.
11
producer, yield differential rents, which in capitalized
form constitute a source of unearned increment for the
owner of more fertile or more advantageously located
lands; (b) Rent is a surplus that is earned on non
marginal land and, (c) Different rents are obtained for
land of different qualities which means that with demand
rising as a result of increasing population, and a level
of subsistence which tended, to rise over time, more and
more less fertile land had to be brought into cultivation,
having as a result that as population expanded and less
fertile land is incorporated into cultivation, profits
became squeezed between the increasing proportion of
total output which went in rent and the basic level
(minimum) of subsistence allocated to the wages of
labor.
Finally, it is possible to point out that:
(a) the foundation of much present-day land value theory
remains Ricardian rent theory which was developed to
explain differential prices paid for agricultural land,
and that this line of reasoning can be easily extended
to urban areas where the ability of a parcel of land to
earn economic rent is due, not so much to its physical
characteristics, but to accessibility advantages.
Quoted from: Renne Roland, op. cit., p. 219.
12
That means, in practice that "economic rent may be
defined as a surplus over and above opportunity cost 12
which is given, in the case of an urban site, by the
sum that would be earned in its next best alternative
use. "13
(b) Land values depend on land use (not vice versa).
(c) The value of the land is treated separately from
the value of the improvements to that land. 14
Based on the previous analysis J. H. Von Thunen
(1826) introduced his theory about the location of
agricultural production and placed the notion of
accessibility more directly into the analysis of the
determination of land rents. 15
Essentially, the theory explains the location of
different agricultural production around a central
place, "agricultural land is arranged around a market
through a process of competition in which one piece of
land will be more profitable than the others, "16 and
12 Opportunity cost: In economics, it is considered
appropriate to define cost in terms of the value of the
alternatives or other opportunities which have to be
foregone in order to achieve a particular thing. This
definition was taken from: Bannock G., Baxter and Ress;
The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, p. 99.
13From: Renne Roland, op. cit., p. 221.
14 Improvements represent capital, and as such have a
cost of production.
15This concept should be the key stone in the
formulation of the later theories and the starting point of
all the urban models.
13
also explains the nature of land rents. Initially, it
explains the location of agricultural products to satisfy
the demand at the central place, with transport costs as
its essential variable: " . . . As the price of a product
is given at the center, the profit made by a farmer will
decline as the cost of transporting the product to the
market increases, "7 and the profit will decline until it
is equal to zero (there is an assumption of equal
fertility of the land.)" Through this explanation it is
possible to define an area of a circular nature around the
central place where the product will be produced, with
the resultant pattern that those products which are highly
sensitive to transport costs will locate near the
consuming market, paying the maximum land rent.
R. M. Hurd (1903), Alfred Marshall (1916), and
R. M. Haigh (1926), on the other hand, introduced their
concepts applying Von Thunen's reasoning to the urban
land market.
R. M. Hurd, for instance, established a kind of
hierarchy of ground rents within the city limits and
argued that the land outside the city is devoid of value.
In such manner he pointed out that " . . . as the value
is dependent on the economic rent, the rent is dependent
16Quoted from: Echenique, Marcial, Class Notes for
Transportation Policy and Planning in Developing Countries,
MIT, Cambridge, MA, Spring 1980, Lecture 3 (unpublished).
17Quoted from: Echenique, Marcial, op. cit.
on location, the location on convenience, and the
convenience on proximity, it is possible to disregard
the intermediate stages and determine that the value is
dependent on proximity to the centers of economic
activities. ,18
Alfred Marshall's approach, which also dealt with the
problem of urban land value introduced the concepts of
location value. 9 He argued that "the basis for the
worth of land is its value as agricultural land, and the
urban land value is determined by adding the location
factor to the agricultural land value."20 Marshall's
approach contains in principle, the whole context for the
formation of the present theories about urban land prices,
although it has been argued that Marshall's theory did
not explain the formation of land values devoted to
residential use, and that set on a parallelism in the
prices of urban and agricultural land, while on the
other hand, there is competition between potential users
of the land which will go to the highest bidder. 21
1 8Darin-Drabkin, H., Land Policy and Urban Growth,
Pergamon Press, London, Great Britain, 1977, p. 142.
1 9The location value is expressed in the financial
advantage deriving from the site location.
20Quoted from: Darin-Drabkin, H., op. cit., p. 142.
A very good presentation about this matter can be
found in Darin-Drabkin, H., op. cit., pp. 142-43.
R. M. Haig (1926) on the other hand, introduced
the concept of spatial friction which can be overcome
through the transportation system. Haig argued that
the theoretically perfect site for any activity was that
yielding the required access characteristics at the
lowest cost of space friction. Then, transport cost and
site rentals are complementary because site rental is
envisaged as the charge a landowner could levy for the
annual savings in transport cost arising from the use
of his site, compared to the highest cost location in
22
use.
Finally, he introduced the concept of rent of land
as "The payment collected by the owner of urban land for
the savings in transportation costs made possible by the
use of that land." 2 3
His most important contribution to the field was
based on the definition of the role of prospective income
from services erected on the land in the formation of
land prices.24
22From Darin-Drabkin, H.,*op.-cit., pp. 142-43.
23Quoted from Darin-Drabkin, H., op. cit., p. 143.
2 4See for a very good presentation about the
subject: Darin-Drabkin, op. cit., pp. 143-44.
From the material presented before, it is possible
to conclude that even the variety of factors influencing
the formation of urban land rents, prices and values,
there is more attention paid to a very specific variable
such as accessibility or transportation costs (mainly
oriented to the location of residential use), that in
some way should not explain very dynamic process of urban
growth where the role of planning and political decisions,
or the permanency of well defined patterns of land tenure
and land ownership are the key elements in the
allocation of urban activities.
Finally, there will be briefly presented a group of
models that try either to explain the spatial allocation
of urban land uses and economic activities or the formation
of land prices.
First, will be presented the works done by E. W.
Burgess (1925), H. Hoyt (1933) and C. D. Harris and
E. L. Ullman (1945) which in essence are essentially
descriptive and static when trying to explain the
allocation of urban land uses.
E. W. Burgess' theory, for example, developed the
hypothesis that the urban land-use pattern could be
represented by a series of concentric zones, each
specialized in a particular use, centered on the CBD
(Central Business District). Through competitive bidding
17
in the urban real property market land uses are sorted
out according to their ability to benefit from and
therefore pay for proximity to the position of greatest
accessibility. He argued that theories of urban
structure usually " . . . reflect the economic principle
of specialization as applied to urban land use although
they lend themselves equally to interpretation in use
intensity and land value terms. "25
However, it will be necessary to point out some
implicit assumptions that are taken in this model such
as: (a) the heterogeneity of the urban population;
(b) a commercial-industrial economic base; (c) mechanism
of perfect competition for sites, (d) a system of
private land ownership, (e) an unicenter urban area and,
(f) no topographical singularities, etc., that like
some other models do not totally explain the real
conduct of the urban phenomenon, even though his
contribution -- derived from the ecological approach -
constituted the key stone in the formulation of further
models.
The Sector Model, developed by Homer Hoyt, was
mainly similar to the concentric model. However the
sector model, recognizes the importance of limited
25Goodall, B., The Economics of Urban Areas,
Pergamon Press, London, Great Britain, 1972, p. 111.
transportation system in urban areas, suggesting that
"specialization of land use takes place according to
direction rather than distance from the position of
greatest accessibility. The differential access
advantages associated with certain routes attracts
particular uses that radial sector as well as causing
market sectorial variations in land values." 2 6
Hoyt shows the dramatic difference in the magnitude
of oscillation between the general business cycle and the
land market. He makes the point that commodity, land and
stock speculation do not occur at the same time but tend
to alternate. He suggests that the movement of each
(speculation) may be enhanced by the concentration of
funds upon each in turn instead of the diffusion of
capital over all of them at the same time, and as a
consequence speculators who reaped large profits from
the rise or fall of commodity prices may invest in
land.2 7
In summary, the Sector theory represents a transport-
land use model that tries to establish and to perpetuate
contrasts in land use that arise from the differential
advantages of radial routes.
2 6Goodall, B., op. cit., p. 112.
27From: Goodall, B., op. cit., p. 112.
19
The Multiple Nuclei Theory, on the other hand,
developed by Harris and Ullman observed that urban areas
may have more than one focal point, each of which
influences the location of different land uses, as a
result of four facts that are commonly given:
1. Some uses need special facilities which must
be allocated out of the CBD.
2. Activities of one kind often cluster in one
district due to external economies.
3. Certain activities are detrimental to each
other (e.g., residential versus industrial activities).
4. Certain activities cannot afford to pay high
rents for the most accessible locations, thus forming
their own clusters.2 8
As a summary, it is possible to point out that the
most irregular pattern of urban land use is produced
by this theory since development can proceed from more
than one center (the number of centers depends on the
size of the urban area) and peculiarities of areas,
sites, and historical factors can be allowed for.
Finally, there will be presented two models which
tend to explain urban land uses by means of economic
relationship. These models should be qualified as part
of the location theory which intends to give an
28These four factors were quoted from Darin-Drabkin,
op. cit., p. 146.
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explanation of the process of location of activities in
space. As a basis it uses the classical economy theory
for explaining this process: the world is understood
through the mechanism of an economic market composed of
producers and consumers working within a system of
perfect competition. The behavior of these "actors"
(i.e., consumers and producers) is explained as the
product of their seeking to maximize their utility.2 9
The connection between space and the classical economic
theory is made through a single element: the cost of
transport. Transport cost then, can be introduced
within the other conventional factors of production
(e.g., labor, capital and land) to determine the optimum
location of activities.30
The L. Wingo Model (1961) evolved a theoretical
analysis which established a complementary relationship
between land costs and transport costs. Together they
equal a constant sum determined by the transport costs
involved in the use of the most distant residential
location. In such a model all or part of the locational
advantage of a given site is absorbed as rent, and a
unique set of locational rents can be generated for
every worker at every point in space depending on
preferences. These conditions play a role in equalizing
29Utility is defined in different ways; as maximum
profit or minimum cost.
3 0See: Echenique, Marcial, op. cit.
the net incomes among all workers and, at the same time
provide a basis for urban site value since the location
rent at any site equals the annual savings in transport
costs compared to the highest transport cost location in
use. Transport cost, therefore, determines the spatial
structure of location rents. 31
Finally, the William Alonso Model describes in great
detail an iterative procedure by which the final
allocation of land will be determined. Competition for
land in his model is more realistic because account is
taken on the fact that individuals determine their bids
for land on the basis of the alternative opportunities
available. They do not first determine their bid prices
and then take the resulting quality of land as given by
rents in the market. This is done by assuming that:
- All employment and services are concentrated in
the center;
- Perfect competition between householders;
- The land available satisfies the demand;
- The value of dwelling plots is solely dependent on
distance from the center;
- There are no topographical singularities, e.g.,
the site is plain.
31For a detailed discussion, see, Goodall, B.,
op. , pp. 167-68.
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APPENDIX 2
COMPILATION OF SOME OF THE LEGAL ACTS
ENACTED BY THE SPANISH CROWN WHICH HAD A
MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE PATTERNS OF LAND PROPERTY
IN THE HISPANIC COLONIES ESTABLISHED
IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Appendix is to present a brief
compilation of all the legal acts enacted by the Spanish
Crown which had a major influence on the patterns of
land property in the Hispanic colonies established in
the American continent. This presentation will follow
chronological order and it will include the description
of the following legal acts:
Pre-Colonial Period
The "Siete Partidas"
The Three Bulls of Pope Alexander VI:
Inter Caetera 1 and 2
Hodie Siquidem
The "Tordesillas" Treaty
The "Usucapion"
Colonial Period
The "Regalia"
The "Capitulaciones" (originary titles for
lands under private domain)
"Reales Cedulas" and "Provisiones" about the
discovery and new population
The 1573 "Ordenanzas"
1Only those Articles dealing with the usage,
allocation, tenure and property of the lands will be
presented.
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The 1680 Compilation of the Laws of Indias
The Reform of 1754
The description of the "Mercedes Reales," the
"Encomiendas," the "Confirmacion," and the "Composicion"
will not be included here, because they will be
discussed in detail in the Venezuelan case, in
Appendix 3. Finally, we will define two basic units
used in the measurement of land properties, the "PEONIA"
and the "CABALLERIA. "
2
The term "large properties" is used here despite
its ambiguity. Later, we will present the differences
between the concepts of "Latifundio," "Hacienda," and
"Plantacion" (which at no moment can be accepted as
synonyms).
The Seven "Partidas"
This juridical act originated in the Middle Ages
and was widely used in Spanish legislation. It
permitted the appropriation and usage of all lands
belonging to a territory conquered by an army on behalf
of an authority, generally regal.
In this respect, the "Seven Partidas" say the
following:
all the things snatched away from the enemies
of the faith with whom the King does not have
either armistice nor peace will be of the
King, whosover wins, however being his, the
king must assign the honor of property to
those who win the land. 3
This legislation permitted the transfer of all conquered
lands to the desired hands, and in the desired ways,
through the "Mercedes" or acts of grace of the king of
Spain.
Papal Bulls
Inter Caetera 1 and 2 (May 3rd and 4th, 1493
respectively) and Hodie Siquidem (May 4th, 1493). These
Papal Bulls could be considered as early international
treaties ("laudos") which limited the conquest ambitions
of the Crowns of Spain and Portugal. The Inter Caetera I
3Suarez de Castro, Fernando, Estructuras Agrarias
en America Latina, Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias
Agricolas de la O.E.A., San Jose de Costa Rica, Costa
Rica, 1965, p. 67.
only established the King's complete rights over the
lands which had been already discovered and conquered
on his behalf. The second one established limits between
Spanish and Portuguese possessions. Finally, through
the Hodie Siquidem there was established a definitive
treaty, arbitrated by the Pope ("laudo arbitral") between
Spain and Portugal (This treaty was particularly
favorable to Spain, the Pope's mother land).
The "Tordesillas" Treaty
This legal act regulated Spanish and Portuguese
property in America. It was based on the Papal Bull
but included some modifications.5
The "Usucapion"
It was a mode of acquiring domain over a goods or
territory on the basis of extending occupancy during
4This Bull established the limits of the conquered
territories to each country, taking as a guide a line
from the North Pole to the South Pole, and taking as a
reference the green cape and the Azores islands. Spain
had rights within 100 mille range to the West, and
Portugal within 100 mille to the East of such a line.
5This modification increased the 100 mille
established in the Papal Bull up to a distance of 370
mille. This permitted Portugal to take possession of
the Brasilian territory.
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certain time. This form was widely accepted among the
Romans as a form of acquiring property in Civil Law.
Later it was incorporated into International Public
Law under the name of "Utis Posidetis Juris."
Fernando Suarez de Castro notes that for the
"Usucapion" to be considered valid it could only be
applied
over that land where the exercise of property
by the supreme authority ceased de facto and
has not been renovated, and where belligerent
sovereign hands have taken and maintained the
land as position.6
The letter of this legal act, thus, made it clear that
the "usucapion" was legally effective only when it was
the result of war of conquest or other military action.
Thus, the conquest and colonization of the American
territories was legalized as "usucapion."
All the aforementioned acts constituted the legal
base for today's land tenure order in Latin America.
The basic rules regulating this land system will be
defined in the following paragraphs.
The "Regalia"
The residue of lands, fields, pastures, mountains
and waters that for particular grace and will of
the Monarch had been conceded to the cities, towns,
or places of the Indies, or to other communities
6Suarez de Castro, Fernando, op. cit., p. 69.
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or particular persons, especially those lands
suitable for agricultur5, is and must be of
his Royal Crown domain.
As the previous paragraph shows, all the lands of West
Indies were given the legal character of "Regalia." The
private control of land, thus, was considered a "gracia
or merced real" (grace or royal mercy). Goods of
different nature such as treasures coming from shipwrecks,
jewels, etc., were also considered "regalias."8
The "regalia" served as a basis for several legal
instruments which allowed the use and enjoyment of
state-like property rights by private individuals.
The "Capitulaciones" derived from the "regalias" and,
later, they were complemented by the "Reales Cedulas"
and the "Instrucciones."
The "Capitulaciones" (Originary title of private domain
over the land)
Judiciarily they could be considered as contracts
between a private individual, or a group of private
individuals, and the Crown. In spite of their
resemblance to purely private enterprises, they were
always the result of government intervention. This was
7Ots Capdequi, J. M., Espanta en America: El Regimen
de Tierras en la Epoca Colonial, Fondo de Cultura
Economica, Mexico, p. 7.
8Ots Capdequi, J. M., op. cit., pp. 7-8.
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particularly true after the first of these enterprises
were striking successes.
We can find "Capitulaciones" that only affected
the discovery of a determined territory, other affected
navigation routes, lake drainage, creation of settlements
and villages, etc. It would be very difficult to
formulate a definite concept of this legal instrument
because it was never systematized.
We could however, try to delineate a common
pattern of rights and privileges granted in the
"Capitulaciones."
The typical pattern consisted in awarding to the
discoverers large tracts of land that they were allowed
to distribute among those who accompanied them.
However, it is important to notice that ownership of
the distributed lands was acquired only after residence
for at least four years (however, there is evidence of
land concessions given without the necessary residence).9
Real "Cedulas" and "Provisiones*" about Discovery and New
Population (previous to the "Ordenanzas" of 1573)
In addition to the "Capitulaciones," and before
1573, a series of legal instruments were enacted. These
9
The faculty of distributing lands was granted in
general terms in a simple and pure manner, and in some
occasions with the royal officials and other officers.
measures ruled and modified in one way or another the
settlement of new populations. Among the most important
of these legal acts, that we consider of great influence
on the conformation of today's spatial patterns, we
could mention those concerning the rights from generation
to generation and according to the "quality of the
persons." 10
The "Ordenanzas" (Ordinance) of 1573
The enactment of this body of ordinances tries,
for the first time, to unify and structure the
legislation concerning the colonization and process of
settlement in the Indies (Americas).
10As examples, we can mention the "Real Provision"
of April 10, 1495 for Santo Domingo, where it was
ordered:
Have for you and for your heirs, or for whom
it is appropriate, the houses that you build,
and the lands that you cultivate. These lands
will be assigned in those islands or territories
where there is space for that.
Another "provision" of great importance for its
content was that enacted on August 2nd, 1513 to the
settler Pedrarias Davila, where it was ordered that:
The plotares were to be distributed according
to the "quality" of the persons, the same
will hold for other lands, taking care that
all get parts of the good, the medium and the
worst.
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Among the most important aspects of this
legislation:
1. Property over the land was conferred in
perpetuity after five years of residence.
2. Indian "Repartimientos" (plural) were subject
to inheritance.
3. The right to found populated settlements with
a minimum of 30 neighbors was established.
4. In newly created settlements the land was
distributed according to:
First take what is necessary for the "solares
y ejidos" (communal land) where cattle, which
are to be owned by the "vecino", largest
land owner, and other members of the community,
can graze plentifully. The rest of the new
territory is to be divided in four parts. One
corresponds to the founder while the other
three fourths are to be disgributed equally
among the thirty settlers.1
5. The right of "mayorazgo" was conceded to the
first founders.
6. The "Peonia" and the "Caballeria" were used
as measurement units for the "repartimientos."1 2
7. The "Ejidos" were to be large enough "in such
adequate quantity that, even with the population
growing fast, there will always remain enough space
Ots Capdequi, J. M., op. cit., p. 20.
12Ots Capdequi, J. M. , op. cit., pp. 20-21.
where people can recreate, and cattle go, without
causing any damage.,1 3
8. Finally, it was established that in any type
of settlement of the so-called West Indies, the town
was to be incorporated within the limits of a
"Municipalidad" (somewhat equivalent to county), the
commundl lands devoted to the "ejidos;" other designed
to the council, and the lands qualified as property.
Several controversies, however, surrounded the
"Ejidos," in particular when the densities of the first
settlements, kept growing. In some cases, "Baldia"
lands were incorporated to the new towns, in others,
part of the "ejidos" were rented or sold to private
individuals.
Finally, it is necessary to make reference to
other juridic institutions that, in one way or another,
were included in the structuring of land property
patterns in the New World. Particularly relevant were
the regulations related to the use of the subsoil or
mining layer, the agricultural and cattle regime; the
defense of the indians, and the fiscal regime.1 4
Ots Capdequi, J. M., op. cit., p. 21.
14The protection to the "Resguardos Indigenas"
(indian reservations) was created as a device to
recognize the legal rights of the indian population to
enjoy private property rights over the land, even
The Compilation of the Laws of Indies of 1680
Basically it reproduces the previous legal acts
with some minor modifications regarding the number of
neighbors allowed in new settlements and the prohibition
against giving land to the same person in different
provinces. Capdequi, for instance, said:
Those who own lands and 'solares' (land plots)
in one settlement shall not be given or
allotted more elsewhere unless they move
their residence to a new town. If, after
having inhabited their "repartimiento" for
the four years required to acquire ownership,
they abandon it or leave it without proper
use then such "repartimientos" shall be 15declared nule and the settlers be condemned.
Finally, we shall just mention a series of titles
describing the same process of acquisition of land
property that constituted variations of the
aforementioned legal acts: The "Reales Cedulas,"
Ordinaries and Extraordinaries, of Grace or Mercy;
the "Peonias" and the "Caballerias. "
14, cont.though such capacity was conditioned
(the indians were considered as rustic or miserable
people needing protection). They could not dispose of
the lands of their property without the approval of
superior authorities. This legal instrument, however,
was not applied frequently. Some authors, on the other
hand, argue that the "latifundista" structures
(especially in Colombia), did not originate from the
"encomiendas" regime, but instead, that its historic
origin can be found in the "resguardos indigenas." For
a full discussion on the subject, see: Capdequi, op.
cit., p. 139, and Bengoa, Jose, La Hacienda Latino-
Americana, Ediciones Ciese, Quito, Ecuador, 1978, p. 23.
15Quoted from Ots Capdequi, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
These legal instruments were created, in principle,
to reward services rendered but, at the same time, they
permitted the consolidation of the "population policy"
of the Spanish Crown. It was only later when they
acquired an economic-patrimonial character and the
exchange-value in contrast with the use-value, became
important.16
The Reform of 1754
The damages infringed to the common ("comun")
citizen of the kingdom were so evident: the
wealthy neighbors took the richest, abundant,
and well located lands, harming the poorest
and renting them arbitrarily according to
their needs. From this principle, we can
say that most of the inhabitants of this
kingdom live at the mercy of the landowners
in danger of being expelled, or just suffering
whatever burden the landowners impose upon them,
for the sole reason of not having their own
land to settle on. For this reason, laziness
becomes hereditary, and they acquire the
weakness of spirit and lack of strength that
characterize misery.1 7
There- are some poor ones who need land and that
cannot get it because of the embarrassment
assuiated with submitting petitions to obtain
it.
1 6In reference to this issue, it is recommended
the "Real Cedula" of 1591 which constituted, in fact,
a true agrarian reform. This act introduced new
regulations about acquisition of "Baldia" lands, the
assignment in public action (among the most used forms
were the "censo al Quitar" enacted in 1680, which
constituted a true jurisprudence about the limits of
property. This concept of property (dominio in spanish)
was given in three modes: enfiteutico, reservative and
consignative. State ownership finance were definitively
consolidated during this period.
17Moreno y Escandon, quoted by Capdequi, op. cit.
pp. 113-14.
The paragraphs quoted above are examples of the
situation created in the hispanic colonies before
1754, when the property in land was concentrated in
very few hands. We can contend, however, that the
legal regime established in relation to land property
was not successful. In economic terms, it did not lead
to an equitable distribution of the land. In fiscal
terms, it neither promoted distribution of income nor
provided a source of funds to the Crown. State
intervention faced strong resistance which may be
understood if we remember that the discovery
expeditions had an entrepreneurial character where
the crown was frequently a minor partner.
The permanence of the irregular situation described
above led to the promulgation of the "Real Instruccion"
of 1754 (regal intruction) which at least theoretically,
took over all the aspects related to the land problem
in the Spanish colonies. In this regard, the
"instruction" included chapters dealing with the
"Resguardos indigenas" (equivalent to indian
reservations), the "Repartimientos" given to the less
favored social classes, the defense of the fiscal
interest, etc. As we pointed out before, however, the
irregular situation continued.
18From a letter of the Viceroy of Nueva Granada to
the Crown dated January 8th, 1776.
Several measures were discussed within the Crown.
Some, even labeled as revolutionaries (see Moreno y
Escandon)19 included the confiscation of unutilized
lands and a distribution within parameters of equity.
It is paradoxical then to find that the Real Cedula of
August 2nd, 1780, which should have included the
correctives, included, instead, a regime of more
protection and respect to the rights of the large
proprietors:
. . . In agreement with the judge of "Realengos"
(lands not yet assigned) and with my regal
court, I have resolved that those citizens
of this viceroyalty (here the reference is
to the viceroyalty of "Nueva Granada" or
Colombia) who are in possession of unassigned
lands, either by occupancy, sale, contract
with the crown, contract with an individual,
or any other means which is not suspected of
spoliation, will not be disturbed and cannot
be asked to sell or rent their land against
their will.2 0
Measurement Units Used in the "Repartimientos"
Two measures described here were used in the
"Repartimientos." Since they included units of land
as well as property above the ground, they played a
1 9Moreno y Escandon, cited by Capdequi, op. cit.
pp. 115-16.
It is interesting to notice that this "Real
Cedula" constituted a starting point for the elaboration
of the land property Law of Colombia.
very important role in the determination of area and
wealth required during the implementation of land
property instruments.
Peonia
It could be defined as "a solar (land plot) of
fifty feet wide and hundred long; one hundred "fanegas"
of labor land suitable for wheat or barley, ten for
corn; two "Huebras" of land for producing and eight
other trees; grassland sufficient for one hundred
parks, twenty cows and five horses, a hundred sheeps
and twenty goats." 21
Caballeria
House land plot of hundred feet wide and two
hundred long and equal to five "peonias" in all other
respects. 22
210ts Capdequi, op. cit., p. 27.
Ots Capdequi, op. cit., p. 27.
APPENDIX 3
BASIC HISTORIC ELEMENTS THAT SHAPED THE
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF VENEZUELA AND DETERMINED ITS TERRITORIAL
STRUCTURE AND LAND TENURE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental objective of this Appendix is to
describe and discuss the basic historic elements that, on
one hand, shaped the economic, political and social
development and, on the other hand, determined the
territorial structure and land tenure system of Venezuela.
PERIOD
PERIOD
PERIOD
PERIOD
PERIOD
The discussion will include five basic periods:
1: Venezuela during the last decade of the XV
century.
2: Venezuela as a Colony, XVI, XVII and XVIII
centuries.
3: Venezuela during the first half of the XIX
century (Independence War).
4: Venezuela during the second half of the XIX
century (Federal War).
5: Venezuela "Petrolera."
Parallel to the analysis, we will keep track of the
different judiciary and legal forms which, in one way or
another, supported the creation of the aforementioned
territorial structure. Several such structures are
effective today.
The main idea beyond this historical presentation,
which is not intended to be comprehensive, is to provide
a conceptual, theoretical and referencial framework for
the analysis of the Venezuelan case. This analysis, in
turn, will serve as a preliminary step to the understanding
of our case study: the City of Merida.
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA
Size: 352,143 square miles (sixth largest Latin
American country).
Location: Northern coast of South America between
latitudes 0*38' and 12*131 north and longitudes 59*47' and
730251 west.
See Table No. 1 for references and chronologies.
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TABLE 1
E-'O0
U) H
0
H
94
0
E-4
1498
1499
1522
1526
1548
1550
1558
1567
1650-1700
1721
1728
1767-1773
1777
1784
1799
1810
1811
1812
Discovered date of Venezuela (Christopher
Columbus sights Venezuela)
Alonso de Ojeda sails into Lago de
Maracaibo, names country: Venezuela
First permanent settlement in South
America, Neuva Toledo founded
Spanish colony under the jurisdiction of
Santa Domingo
Cattle introduced; becomes major
enterprise
First "Hacienda" or "Hato" settled
Colony placed under authority of the Real
Audiencia of Santa Fd de Bogotd.
Merida founded
Caracas founded
Confirmation and consolidation of the
"Haciendas"
First University established
Real Compania Guipuzcoana created to
control colony's trade
Expulsion of the Jesuitas
Colony becomes a Captaincy General
Guipuzcoana Company liquidated
Establishment of relations of freedom of
commerce in the Captaincy
On April 19, Caracas and six other
provinces revolt
On July 5, Venezuela first declares its
independence from Spain
First Republic falls.
1813 Decree of "Guerra a Muerta"
Second Republic proclaimed
1814 Second Republic falls
1815 Establishment in Caracas of the "Tribunal
de Secuestros de bienes"
1819 Congress of Angostura proclaims third
Republic
Promulgation of the "Ley de Repartos"
1821 On June 24, the Independence of Venezuela
is consolidated through the Carabobo Battle;
Congress of Angostura ratifies the "Ley de
Repartos de Bienes";
Congress of Colombia ratifies the "Ley de
Repartos de Bienes";
All the Spanish properties are confiscated;
On June 28, there is a petition to revoke
o the "Ley de Repartos de Bienes"
H
1822 On March 21, the "Reparto de Bienes a los
Ejercitos" law is ratified
1829 Venezuela declares its Independence from
Gran Colombia
1830 Gran Colombia dissolved and Fourth Republic
created
1834 The "Diezmo" to the church is abolished
1841 On May 15 the "Espera y Quita" law is
promulgated
1854 Slavery abolished
1858-1863 Federal War
P 0 1863 The system of "Medianerias" is established
rZP 1878 Petrolia del Tdchira is founded
1908-1935 Judn Vicente G6mez seizes the presidency
and begins 27 years of dictatorship
rZ4 1914 "ZUMAQUE" oil well begins regular
production
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0 1926 Petroleum becomes nation-as leading export,
displacing traditional products
o 1928-1933 Gran depression
1949 The "Instituto Agrario Nacional" is
o created
H
1958 First democratic government in Venezuela
1960 Land Reform is promulgated
rP4
H
44 1976 The oil industry is nationalized
PERIOD 1: VENEZUELA DURING THE LAST DECADES OF THE XV
CENTURY.
The historical data about this period do not permit
us to describe in absolute terms the conditions that
surrounded the aboriging population at the time of
Venezuela's discovery in 1498.
In regard to population we have only speculations.
Julian Stewart, for example, mentions the number 350,000,
2
while Federico Brito Figueroa inflates the number up to
500,000 (see Table 2).
Still we can attempt to outline the basic native
economies as follows:
- Indian settlements with economies based on fishing,
hunting and collection.
- Indian settlements with economies based on
extensive agriculture with irrigation systems.
- Indian settlements with economies based on hoe-type
agriculture.
- Indian settlements supported by incipient forms of
plant cultivation.
1Steward, Julian H., Handbook of South American
Studies, Washington, 1949, Vol. V, pp. 665-68.
2Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Historia Economica y
Social de Venezuela, Universidad Central de Venezuela,
Caracas, Venezuela, 1966, Vol. I, pp. 21-35.
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These simple subsistence economies were characterized
by little socio-economic differentiation. There was no
individual ownership of land. 3
The following quote is typical among historians:
Within the primitive Venezuelan indians all property
was collective and, aside from the land used in the
small community farms (conucos), the land belonged
to the whole nation, that is, up to the point where
they find enemy's resistance. . . . They did not
recognize boundaries . . . property, as we today
interpret it, was unknown.4
The aforementioned forms of economic and social
organization gave origin to three modes of land tenure
which characterized this first period:
- Agricultural land used but not owned;
- Agricultural land collectively used for the
community's benefit, and
- Land devoted to the fishing and hunting of the
whole community.5
3In the aborigin communities, on the other hand, it
is established the property of labor instruments.
4 See, Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit., p. 38. The term
Nation in this case is referred to the Waikas indians
communities.
5See, Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit., p. 38.
VENEZUELA:
Fifteenth Century (final
350, QOC
500,0 OC
TABLE 2
POPULATION GROWTH
decades)
indians
indians
Sixteenth Century
307,000 Rosenblat
Seventeenth Century
307,000 Rosenblat
Eighteenth Century
(1771-1784) 332,971
(1784-1800) 898,043
Nineteenth Century
1806-1807 800,000 (
975,972 (
728,000 (
1810 802,000
825,000
800,000
1811 1,000,000
1822
1823
1825
Marti
Marti
1806)
1807)
1806-07)
767,100
766,000
659,000
701,633
830,0001830
Walley
Lavayass
Depons
Humboldt
Hall
Restrepo
Census of the first
Republic
Census of Colombia
Official Census
Codazzi
Official Census
Nineteenth Century, continued
1838 1,047,000
887,000
1839 1,147,760
945,348
887,168
1840 903,957
1844 1,218,716
1847-50 1,273,000
1,267,692
1,375,000
1854 1,564,000
1857 1,788,000
1873 1,784,194
1881 2,075,245
1891 2,323,000
1920 2,411,952
1926 3,026,878
1936 3,491,159
1941 3,850,771
1950 5,034,838
1960 7,523,999
1971 10,714,560
Cagigal
Official Census
Cagigal
Codazzi
Official Census
Official Census
Official Census
Official Census
Official Census
Official Survey
Official Census
Official Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
National Census
(1850)
SOURCES:
Brito Figueroa, Federico. Historia Economica y
Social de Venezuela. Caracas, 1966, Vol. 1 and 2.
Codazzi Agustin, Resumen de la Geografia de
Venezuela, Paris, 1841.
Gil Fortoul, Jose, Historia Constitucional de
Venezuela, Caracas, 1943.
Humboldt, Alejandro. Viaje a las Regiones
Equinocciales del Nuevo Continente, Caracas, 1941, Vol. I.
Ministerio de Hacienda, Division de Estadisticas y
Censos Nacionales.
Steward, Julian H. Handbook of South American
Studies. Washington, 1949, Vol. V.
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PERIOD 2: VENEZUELA AS A COLONY - XVI, XVII and XVIII
CENTURIES
The key elements of the economic and social structure
were developed during the second period. These elements
played the role of integrating the Venezuelan territory,
and were especially shaped throughout the XVII and XVIII
centuries. Later developments during period three, in
particular, the independence war, consolidated this socio-
economic structure.
In terms of population growth (see Table 2 for
details), the number of inhabitants in Colonial Venezuela
grew from 307,000 in the XVII century as reported by
Rosenblat,6 to 975,972, reported by Lavayass in 1807.7
The indian population, however, declined drastically during
this period.8
The economy of the Venezuelan colonial period
consisted mostly of cattle raising activities until the
XVII century (cattle were introduced in 1548 for the first
6Rosenblat, quoted by Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit.,
pp. 156-57.
7Lavayass, quoted by Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit.,
p. 157.
8According to some authors, the indian population in
Venezuela was decimated during this -period. More than
180,000 indians "Disappeared." For a more extensive
discussion, see Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit., Vol. 1,
pp. 123-52.
time). Plantation agriculture, such as cocoa, largely
replaced cattle raising as main economic activity toward
the last century of this period, XVIII.
Contrary to the rest of the Spanish Colonies, mining
exploitation was very scarce.9 This has been offered as
an explanation for the fact that the Venezuelan territory
never achieved the preponderance and economic properity
of other Spanish colonies.
Nevertheless, some elements of great influence in
later economic evolution were introduced during this
period:
- Relations of commercial exchange with Spain, and,
since 1799, with other colonies.
- The creation of agricultural land property,
especially during the period between 1548 and 1700.
- The slave trade established the year 1525.
- The introduction of financial capital.
The structures for the private control of the land
consolidated upon the plantation based economy. These
structures were characterized by their monopolistic
9With the exception of some scarce gold, silver,
copper and pearls exploitation. The pearls constituted
the fundamental wealth of the Margarita Island during the
first years of the Spanish domination on the colony of
Venezuela.
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character and the creation of large "Latifundios."1 0
Agricultural production and exports are shown in tables
3 and 4.
The basis for the organization of the property in
agricultural land was established by "Las Mercedes" and
the "Reparto de Tierras" throughout all Latin America ever
since the enactment of the laws of June 18 and August 9,
1513.11
1 0
"Latifundio" - its definition corresponds to a
large land estate or property often held by only one natural
or juridical person. However, the classification of land
extension by size, is considered misleading and it is
criticized by several authors who point out the little
importance that size can have under certain circumstances
(for example in relation to location, fertility, etc.).
For a complete discussion on the subject see: Suarez de
Castro, Fernando, Estructuras Agrarias en America Latina,
pp. 47-48, 1966, San Jose de Costa Rica, et. sequel.
11Among the best known legal figures within the
structures of "Repartimientos" or "Mercedes Reales," we can
mention the "Encomienda" (1521-1721). In its judiciary
form it consists of the "assignment of a determined number
of indians to a white who is obligated to protect them, to
provide religious services and to give military help to the
king, in exchange of a tribute which he would receive in
money or in kind. It did not include property title over
the land nor rights over the indian labores (reference
taken from El Poder Politico en el Ecuador durante la
Colonia, Centro de Publicaciones de la Universidad Catolica
del Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador, 1977, pp. 18-'19). However,
the fact that "economiendas" became hereditary led to the
enforcement of complete property rights despite the lack of
formal titles. In the specific case of Venezuela, the
"encomiendas" system started in 1545 and was characterized
for: 1) late introduction; 2) slow evolution; 3) personal
service until the end of the "encomiendas;" 4) woman work;
5) very small number of indians in the majority of the
"encomiendas;" 6) poor performance; 7) regime of natural
economies. But the main characteristic was that of the
(continued on page 53)
52
TABLE 3
ANNUAL PRODUCTION EXPORTED FROM VENEZUELAN PORTS BEFORE 1810
Product
Cocoa
Coffeee
Indigo
Quantity
110-120,000 "fanegas"
70-80,000 "quintales"
900,000-1,00,000 "quintales"
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., Vol. 4,
pp. 221-222.
TABLE 4
ANNUAL COCOA EXPORTS FROM THE CARACAS PROVINCE DURING THE
COLONIAL PERIOD
Decades
1691-1700
1701-1710
1711-1720
1721-1730
1731-1740
1741-1750
1751-1760
1761-1780
1771-1789
NUEVA ESPANA
(en "fanegas")
109.801
136.892
143.744
181.464
188.945
173.862
177.956
159.881
91.228
ESPANA
(en "fanegas"
15.470
9.436
4.736
40.243
225.795
158.558
317.931
343.242
335.437
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 103.
The use of two judiciary forms, known as the
"COMPOSICIONES" and the "CONFIRMACIONES" transformed the
"ENCOMIENDA" into an institution capable of originating
property rights over the land.
They (the "COMPOSICIONES" and the "CONFIRMACIONES")
allowed the institutionalization of:
a) the property of occupying land for long periods
without valid title, and
b) the definitive plundering of indian population
from their lands.
It permitted the formation of two kinds of manpower
associated with exploitation of the land: the slaves, and
the Indian and "mestizo" population subjected to socio-
economic relations of servitude. The following relations
pattern was formed:
COMPOSICIONES EXPLOITATION AND
PRIVATE LAND FORMATION OF THE
DOMINION AGRARIAN PROPERT'
CONFIRMACIONES
SERVITUDE
SLAVE MANPOWER
--ENCOMIENDAS
11, continuedfusion of two modes: the "Repartimiento"
and the "Encomienda", this fusion constituted the so-called
"Encomienda de Repartimiento" form which lasted until the
end of the century. Reference from: Brito-Figueroa
Federico, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 76.
The "Composicion," in its basic definition, usually
started from a "merced de tierra" generally of unprecise
limits, or from the simple occupation without legal
documents. The owners would, then, proceed to extend such
"concessions" at the expense of the land reserved to the
Indian communities, of the "realengos plots," "ejidos," or
"baldios." Based upon their economic power, land owners
used bribery and intimidation in order to have the titles
transferred to them or, in other instances, to enlarge the
original boundaries through the payment of the composition
.12
rights.
This process consolidates the "latifundista"
character of the land tenure system. So it is possible to
see that in a period of less than 50 years (approximately
during the fourth decade of the XVIII century), more than
600,000 hectares, including forest and water, became
private patrimony through a process where the legal value
of the "composiciones" and the "confirmaciones" did not
mean much in front of the usurpations and de-facto
seizures. 13
In this way, and especially during the period between
1800 and 1810, the cattle-agriculture exploitation area
12See Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., p. 87.
13See Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., p. 72.
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under private dominion, covered approximately a surface of
150 "leguas" from West to East by 40 "leguas" from North
to South.
The most important "Haciendas" of that time were
located from the Cumana Province in the East to Merida,
in the Andean region.
A list of the most important "Haciendas" and owners
for that time is shown in Table 5.14
Finally, it is necessary to mention the relation
between the structure of property in land and the political
power. Since the land was the main productive resource
and the base for social prestige it led the oligarchy to
look at forms to extend its domain.
In this way, the "criollos" (creoles) landowners
controlled town and city political institutions, the
"cabildos" (municipal council) in particular. They based
1 4The "Hacienda" constituted the agricultural
production unit, during the colonial period. They were
established at the beginning of the period and acquired
their characteristics through a gradual process that
started to consolidate during the XVIII century. They
constituted the axis of political power and the
"hacendados" the factors of authority. They were
consolidated through inheritance, usurpation, marriage,
donation, etc. Basically, the "Hacienda" could be defined
as any agricultural production unit that used dependent
manpower and exploited the land and labor in a traditional
manner. The "hacienda" is neither necessarily equal to the
"latifundio" nor the "plantations." On the other hand, we
can equate it with the medium size properties if they
fulfill the necessary conditions. Even today, properties
which do not exceed 20 hectares are called "hectares" and
this custom reflects a social reality. Quoted from Hurtado,
Oswaldo, op. cit., pp. 20-26.
TABLE 5
PERIOD 1800-1810: MOST IMPORTANT VENEZUELAN "HACIENDAS"
FOR THAT TIME
Casas Habit. Propietarios Esclavos
Socorro
La Ceibita
El Macho
Morrocoyes
Caragano
Guatacaral
La Mata
Cabecera de
Morrocoyes
Lagunaalta
La Puerta
Barbasco
La Pastora
Tembladal
Rincon de Juan
Hilario
Santa Barbara
La Sierra
140
151
95
79
77
68
48
43
40
40
39
34
18
19
11
11
Jose Fco. Hernandez
Ml. Martinez de la Guardia
Maria Ramos
Dionisia Machado
Jose A. Gonzales
J. de la C. Gutierrez
Herederos de J. Diaz
George Guzman
Magdalena Reyes
Manuel Andres Soler
Ramon Perez
Vincente Guzman
Carlos Vargas Machuca
Miguel Faustino Cordero
Augusto Montes de Oca
Vincente Guzman
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. I., p. 75.
Hatos
17
13
21
8
10
2
8
4
18
2
6
1
10
their dominance on their economic strength and an official
certification called "cedula." The first "cedula"
enacted in 1565, gave preference to the conquerors,
settlers and their descendants in the constitution of
the "cabildo" (whose members were called the "regidores").15
Later, "cedulas" consolidated the hegemony of the "criollos"
when the post of "regidor" was given an inheritable and
sellable character. This social class was described as:
being generally constituted by one family and
used to despotism; willing to defend it against
any intruders from the lower classes even if
they were "peninsulares" (spanish); all this
due not only to political exclusivism, but to
the hierarchization, reinforced by means of
endogamy and repulsion to anyon unable to
prove the purity of his blood.1
Study of the family structure in that period reveals
a significant fact. Kinship relationships contributed to
create a small group which, based upon family ties,
monopolized the political institutions in urban centers.
Humboldt, for example, highlighted that it was:
15As an example we bring a quote from Constantino
Bayle (taken from Hurtado, 0., op. cit., p. 26) who said:
In order to be "Alcalde" (mayor) or "Regidor"
it is necessary to enjoy the status of "vecino"
(more than a simple neighbor), acquired by
those who own state in the city, "hacienda"
in the country and "encomienda" with indians.
It can be seen, thus, that the open cabildos did not
constitute a democratic institution because they were
integrated only by the main "vecinos", that is those who
had the economic power in their hands.
16Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 170-71.
A small group of families which due to their opulent
heritage on early settlement, constituted a true
municipal aristocracy. They would rather deprive
themselves of some rights than share them with others.
They would prefer foreign domination than accept
authority from an inferior class. They abhor any
political constitution based upon equality of rights,
to attain decorations and titles which constitute a
part of their domestic happiness. 17
PERIOD 3: VENEZUELA DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE XIX CENTURY
(INDEPENDENCE WAR)
In this section we will present the most important
events which occurred between the year 1810, when the first
republic and the war were declared, and the year 1854, when
abolition of slavery deepened the economic and social
differences which led to the federal war. Special attention
will be given to the series of legal-judiciary instruments,
enacted during the period, which led to the establishment of
new patterns of land ownership.
The population, as shown in Table 2, grew from 802,000,
reported by Humboldt in 1810, to 1,564,000 inhabitants
reported in the official census of 1854. It is important
to note, however, the drastic loss of population suffered
between 1812 and 1825, decimated by the war and the 1812
earthquake. 1 9
17Humboldt, Alexander (quoted from Brito-Figueroa, F.,
Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 171.
18Humboldt, Alexander, Viaje a las Regiones Equinoc-
ciales del Nuevo Continente, Vol. II.
19See Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 258-59.
In economic terms, all the activity of the period was
centered around the production and exports of cocoa, coffee
and indigo. Table 6 shows yearly figures for this period.
During the fourth decade of the XIX century, especially
in the period between 1840-1848 a great economic crisis
shook the country. It originated in world overproduction,
the devaluation of agricultural products, the dependence on
the utilitarian mercantile capitalism and the crisis of
the slavery based on agriculture. The fact that total
Venezuelan exports went down from 9,510,495 pesos in the
1841-1842 period, to 8,465,193 pesos between 1842-1843, and
for the period 1843-1844, only represented a value of
7,458,400 pesos.20
In terms of land property, the Independence period
represented only a transfer of power between two groups of
the same oligarchy (there was no complete substitution of
the dominant social groups), which intensified the process
of concentration of land property. The change which
occurred with respect to agrarian property was of personal
nature; a good proportion of the old "terratenientes" were
replaced by the independence heroes and oligarchs of a
new kind.
20See Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit.,
pp. 221-54.
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TABLE 6
PRODUCTION EXPORTED FROM VENEZUELAN PORTS AFTER 1810
COCOA
COFFEE
INDIGO
25 - 30,000 "fanegas"
30,000 "quintales"
15 - 20,000 "quintales"
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., p. 221-254.
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As pointed out by Brito-Figueroa21 during the War of
National Independence,
many of the old proprietors, representatives or
descendants of the families which had monopolized
the territorial property during the colony,
disappeared physically. A considerable part of
the social wealth, represented by land, slaves
and real estate in general, passed to the most
significant leaders of popular ancestry.
The material interest of the social classes in
conflict did not transfer the "latifundista"
tenure system into a democratic one."
The 'latifundio," thus, remained in tact as an institution,
and what happened was a transfer of "latifundista"
property from a sector of the colonial nobility to the
military chiefs of popular ancestry.
This transfer of property rights from one dominant
group to another was reinforced, in general terms, through
a series of judiciary acts, some of which we briefly
describe here.
The Policy of Confiscation of Estate and Goods Within the
Liberated Territories (October 10, 1817)
Through this act it was decreed that all real estate
to be confiscated in the future, and not designated for
official use would have to be allotted among military
officers and soldiers.
21 Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
Later, a modification of the previous act, known as
the "Ley de Repartos" (distribution law),22 was
implemented to satisfy the so-called "Haberes Militares."2 3
Specifically, this law designated the following properties
eligible for allotment: a) All estate to be confiscated
in the future and not developed by the time of the
publication of the law; b) public underdeveloped land
("baldios") if confiscated land was not sufficient;
c) public estate and goods in case of necessity.
Constitution of the Republic, 1830-1854
To a certain extent, this constitution continues
consolidating the already existing land tenure system
because it limited the political participation of the
22The "Ley de Repartos" was ratified by the Angostura
Congress in 1821, and by the General Congress of Colombia
on September 28, 1821.
23Through this law, the Republic recognized "Haberes
Militares" to those Venezuelan officials, classes and
soldiers who were in campaign from 1816 to February 15,
1819, and to those foreigners who came to fight for
Independence before May 6, 1820. The land allotments were
assigned according to the military rank earned on the
battleground whenever they had remained at least two years
in continuous service. For example, a General in Chief had
the right of properties with an approximate value of
25,000 pesos; a Captain to properties not in excess of
6,000 pesos and a Soldier to 500 pesos. See, Brito-
Figueroa, F., op. cit., pp. 207-211.
popular classes. Political rights were exclusive property
of the "terratenientes" rentist, descendants of the
municipal oligarchy and military chiefs enriched from the
land reserved to the soldiers who fought for independence.24
Citizenship rights, for example, were reserved to
those being Venezuelan, married, older than 21 years, able
to read and write whose annual rent was in excess of 50
pesos, or a professional or holder of a job which produced
100 pesos per year without having dependents or defaulted
.25
claimers.
In order to enjoy second degree electoral rights it
was required to be the owner of "real estate whose annual
rent was 200 pesos, or to have a profession which produced
annually in excess of 300 pesos or an annual salary of
at least 400 pesos." 26
Finally, in order to be a congress representative
("diputado") it was required to be "the owner of a real
estate property whose annual rent was 400 pesos, or to
have a profession which produced annually 500 pesos or an
annual salary of 600 pesos." On the other hand, in order
24Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 273.
25Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 273.
26Brito-Figueroa, F., p. 274, quoted from the
Constitution of 1830, Tit. VII, art. 27.
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to be Senator it was required to be "the owner of a real
estate property with an annual rent of 800 pesos, or to
have a profession which annually produced 1,000 pesos or
an annual salary of at least 1,200 pesos." 2 7
Freedom of Contracting Law (April 10, 1834) and the Wait
("espera") and Take ("quita") Law
The Freedom of Contracting Law was nothing but a
reaction against the colonial legislation which taxed
interest and prosecuted the usury as a crime. Later and
in support to this law, the "Espera and Quita" Law (Wait
and Take), enacted May 15, 1841, required the consent of
all the creditors to extend loan deadlines or to defer the
auction of the debtors' goods. As it was expected, this
law institutionalized a very irregular factual situation.
In practice it resulted in nothing but a mechanism, for
the appropriation of labor and another's property through
credit.
The implementation of this judiciary act permitted
the auctioning of huge amounts of land in favor of
established "terratenientes" (land holders). 28
27Brito-Figueroa, F., p. 274, quoted from the
Constitution of 1830, Tit. XI, art. 52.
28For a detailed discussion, see Brito-Figueroa,
Federico, op. cit., p. 276-284.
PERIOD 4: VENEZUELA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE XIX
CENTURY
During this period big social and ideological
controversies divided the Venezuelan population. The
Federal or Social War (1858-1863) was the cultivation of
these differences. It was characterized, in part, by the
rebellion of the rural population "enfeudada" against land
29
owners.
As some authors have pointed out, the Federal War
was, in essence, nothing but a desperate search for a
new stable social order that could replace that
which existed during the colonial years. The
colonial war an order of castes which allowed
social contradictions, inequalities and
expectations to coexist for 300 years without
big disruptions. The Federal War, on the
contrary, was a kind of frenzy to destroy the
bases of the society and end anything that
meant hierarchy whether just or unjust, from the
wealth of the wealthy and the property of the
land owners to the hate that the most savage of
the "gerrilleros" proclaimed against the whites
and even against those able to write.3 0
In order to fully understand this process, it is important
to compare the patterns of agrarian property existing
before and after the Federal War (Tables 7 and 8).
29Several theories regarding the political and
ideological bases of the Federal War have been developed.
However, it is not the objective of this work to discuss
these positions.
30Quoted from: Brito-Figueroa, F., op. cit., p. 324.
TABLE 7
THE AGRARIAN TERRITORIAL PROPERTY BEFORE THE SOCIAL WAR
1858 -1863
Lands in private
property *
Agricultural
Cattle
Forest
3,850
7,600
11,450
"Baldia" Lands
10,050
1,400
13,191,
24,641
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 294.
*
The measurement units are given in square "leguas"
TABLE 8
THE AGRARIAN TERRITORIAL PROPERTY
IN 1873-1891
Medium and Total
Small Pro- Controlled Big Pro- Controlled Pro-
Land prietors Land PrietYears prietors
Land In-
corporated
to private
ors dominion
1873 28,222
1881 19,154
1891 19,901
7,490
7,245
5,000
980
1,022
1,184
8,400
9,725
14,184
29,202 15,890
20,126 16,970
26,085 19,184
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1., op. cit., p. 295.
Total
13,900
9,000
13,191
36,091
As these tables show, for the period preceeding the
Federal War, and considering the "Baldia" lands as a
property of the state, 54% of the total lands used to
raise cattle and the 28% of the total devoted to
agriculture were under private control. However, during
the period immediately after the Federal War we can see
that the situation became more serious because, by the
year 1873, only 3.35% of the owners controlled 52.86% of
the land under private domain. In the year 1881, these
figures increase to 5.07% and 57.30%, and in 1891, to
5.89% and 73.93% respectively.
From these results it is possible to demonstrate
that in spite of its "social" objective, the Federal War
did not change the structure of big proprietors, no matter
how profound were the political changes that occurred to
the institutions of the Venezuelan state. Instead, what
happened as a result of this war was simply a transfer of
property (similar to that which occurred after the
Independence War) from the hands of military
"terratenientes-caudillos" of the oligarchic or
conservative party, to the military "terratenientes-
caudillos" of the liberal or federal party.
Furthermore, the "latifundista" structure
(characterized by the possession of huge extensions of
land by a small number of persons, cultivated to limited
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extent, and dominated by feudal relations such as peonage,
and rent in kind and human work, enlarged its sphere of
influence by means of seizures and expropriations, some
times at the expense of public and "baldia" lands.
Strong backwardness, manifested in all the national
economic sectors, was a consequence of the permanence of
the "latifundista" structure. "Medianeria" was left as
the only subsistence alternative for most of the
Venezuelan rural population.31
The permanence of this land ownership structure impeded
the formation of a national market by condemning most of
the population to an almost massive form of under
consumption. It also stopped the production of merchandise
across its boundaries. The "latifundio" was technically
unable to provide the incipient urban economy with the
necessary raw materials required for its development,
emphasizing even more the dependence on imports. In short,
31The "Medianeria" is a contract by which the landowner
gives in rent to a peasant a plot of land, generally in the
mountainous part or in the boundaries of its property, with
the condition that he will give him back half of the plants
at the moment of the production and that the other half will
be sold to him at request. In order to cultivate this
virgin land the "medianero" usually received advance
payments from the landowner leaving the plants of its
protected "medianeria" as collaterals. These small
plantations generally stayed incorporated to the huge
plantations owned by the landowner as payment for debts
acquired from advanced payments. See Brito-Figueroa, F.,
p. 298, op. cit.
this period can be typified in social and economic terms,
by the existence of a semifeudal social and economic order
in the rural zones and, in the urban centers by the
predominance of the financial and commercial capital whose
development had been initiated during the colonial period. 32
Finally, in terms of population growth we can see in
Table 2 a reduction of 1,788,000 inhabitants registered
in 1857 to 1,784,194 inhabitants registered in 1873;
this decrease could be attributed to the four year War
(1858-1863).
PERIOD 5: VENEZUELA PETROLERA
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Venezuela quite
clearly belonged to that second group of Latin American
countries which had no export sector, and consequently a
negligible share in world trade. In the specific case of
Venezuela, this was due to an almost complete lack of
natural resources and a considerable shortage of
manpower.33 The big break for its economy was the
32See Brito-Figueroa, F., Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 303.
33The domestic market was also limited. The entire
population did not reach 2 million before 1900 - See
Table 2.
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discovery of oil, in the early 1900s. Soon enough, produc-
tion soared from 70,000 tons in 1920 to 15.8 million tons
in 1928. By 1928 Venezuela had become the second largest
producing country and the leading petroleum exporting nation.
During the thirties, about 1/10 of the world output was
produced in Venezuela, and the value of exports (95% origi-
nated from oil production) went up to 150 million dollars in
1929. Imports bought from the foreign exchange to 85 million
dollars. Venezuela's share in world trade was ten times the
amount realized in the traditional small scale era before
1923 and reached 1% by the end of the thirties. See Tables
9 and 10.
On the other hand, this distorted development, almost
entirely founded on the expansion of one sector, was not only
causing a growing dependence of Venezuela-especially on the
U.S. since 1937-but also led to the stagnation and
eventually regression of the traditional sector (agriculture).
See Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14. These production-marketing
problems were intensified by the enormous population growth,
especially that set in after World War II. See Tables 15 & 16.
The oil also constituted a factor of territorial
property mobility during the first decades of the XX
century because it influenced the transfer of extensive
estates under public ownership to the oil companies and
to the patrimony of the military officers of Gomez's
dictatorship. This transfer, again, did not destroy the
TABLE 9
VENEZUELA: DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS
(% OF TOTAL VALUES)
Coffee-Cocoa
78%
92%
15%
4%
3%
2%
Oil Iron
2%
83%
94%
96%
90%
Others
6%
2%
6%
SOURCE: Direccion General de Estadisticas: Anuario y
Boletines.
Year
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
22%
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TABLE 10
VENEZUELA: PRODUCTION OF EXPORTED COFFEE AND OIL BETWEEN
1917 AND 1921
Years
1917-1918
Product
Coffee
Quantity Value
588,719 sacks 29,191,622 Bs.
21,194 metric
tons
899,673 Bs.
1918-1919 Coffee 1,375,034 sacks 115,093,198 Bs.
18,833 metric
tons
817,229 Bs.
1919-1920 Coffee
Oil
1920-1921 Coffee
Oil
739,221 sacks 101,723,718 Bs.
18,566 metric 1,067,435 Bs.
tons
622,461 sacks 45,357,205 Bs.
100,970 metric 5,261,443 Bs.
tons
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 373.
Oil
Oil
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TABLE 11
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF THE VENEZUELAN FOREIGN TRADE IN
THE THIRD DECADE OF THE XX CENTURY (IN MILLIONS OF BOLIVARS)
Exportation of
coffee, cocoa,
cattle,
leathers, etc.
122
122
128
148
193
149
163
143
185
128
Exportation
of asphalt,
oil and
derivatives Imports
12 96
16 101
29 153
66 216
137 304
247 412
281 363
267 417
594 453
634 364
Balance with
Relation to
the Farming
Exports
26
21
25
68
111
263
200
274
268
236
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, .
Years
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
0Op. Cit. , p. 463.
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TABLE 12
VENEZUELA: DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS (% OF TOTAL VALUE)
1926 1936 1941 1950 1951 1961
Consumption goods
Non Durables
Durables
Raw Materials
Lubricants and Fuels
Fixed Capital Goods
57.6 43,3 48.3 55.2 49.2 40.8
51.4 26.7 40.0 41.7 36.1 28.0
6.2 16.6 8.3 13.5 13.1 12.8
15.9 11.1 12.6 15.6 19.4 27.0
- 0.6 0.3 1.6 0.2 0.3
26.5 45.0 38.8 27.6 31.2 31.9
SOURCE: Direccion General de Estadisticas.
Cifras Absolutas de Importacion.
TABLE 13
VENEZUELA: IMPORTS PER INHABITANT (CONSTANT BOLIVARES)
1913
1926
1936
1944
1950
1955
1958
35.18 Bs.
52.04 Bs.
51.37 Bs.
56.08 Bs.
310.02 Bs.
397.22 Bs.
584.47 Bs.
SOURCE: Maza Zavala, Venezuela una Economia Dependiente.
Universidad Central de Venezuela. Instituto de
Investigaciones Economicas, Caracas, 1964.
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TABLE 14
VENEZUELA: EXPORTATION OF OIL BETWEEN 1943 AND 1962
1943 1957 1958 1962
Quantity 29,000,000 161,000,000 151,000,000 186,000,000
cubic meters cubic meters cubic meters cubic meters
Value 533,000,000
Bs.
7,865,000,000
Bs.
7,099,000,000 7,240,000,000
Bs. Bs.
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 373.
TABLE 15
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE IN
CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA
YEAR URBAN
POPULATION (%)
1926
1936
1941
1950
1957
1961
15
RURAL
POPULATION (%)
TOTAL
POPULATION
100
100
100
60 40
62.5 37.5 100
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit., p.
(%)
553.
"latifundista" structure.34 See Tables 17, 18, 19, 20,
and 21.
As it has been shown, during the first two decades of
this period a) the primitive communal economic system;
b) the mercantilist one, and, c) the pre-capitalist with
semi-feudal elements were all simultaneously key elements
in the configuration of the actual Venezuelan capitalist
system dominated by foreign monopolies that reinforced a
highly dependent economy through investments in the
services and manufacturing industry out of the mining
exploitation. High index of imports - even of the daily
products produced in other periods - are supported by
the financial oligarchic that joined the commercial
bourgeoisie constituting the new Venezuelan social
establishment. However, a new social class appears for
the first time in the history of the country - the wage-
earner labor force - that having been migrated from the
rural areas to the oil exploitation centers produced the
decline of the old "Latifundista" system; and the
usurpation of the remaining "Baldios" and "Ejidos"
through royalties primarily given to the foreign oil
34The oil companies eventually attained direct control
over 6,000,000 Ha and indirectly control over 30,000,000
Ha. These lands, although being feasible for agricultural
development were declared as appropriate but not used, for
oil exploitation. The "baldia" and municipal lands were
particularly affected.
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TABLE 16
VENEZUELA: URBAN POPULATION GROWTH
Urban Population
1,206,746
2,411,811
4,705,288
8,400,216
Increment
1,215,065
2,293,477
3,694,928
SOURCE: X Censo Nacional de Poblacion; Venezuela:
Resultados Comparativos. Ministerio de Fomento,
Caracas, 1971.
TABLE 17
VENEZUELA: "BALDIAS" LAND TRANSFERRED BY THE NATION IN 1917
Agricultural
Land
HaState
Anzoategui
Bolivar
Lara
Merida
Sucre
Zulia
50
Cattle Land Gratui-
Raising Land tously Trans-
Ha ferred - Ha
1,052
10,939
1,863
404
454
575
14,429
378
1,215
2,192
3,831
Totals
Ha
1,097
10,939
2,291
1,215
2,596
575
18,714
Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit.,
Year
1941
1950
1961
1971
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, p. 382.
78
TABLE 18
VENEZUELA: "BALDIA" LAND GRATUITOUSLY TRANSFERRED IN 1920
State Ha Square Meters
Anzoategui 149 3,265
Bolivar 400 -
Lara 6,209 1,025
Monagas 43 2,473
Portuguesa 3,768 5,642
Sucre 1,056 6,000
Trujillo 2,639 -
Yaracuy 1,998 -
Zulia 21,768 4,476
38,692 7,795
SOURCE: Brito Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 383.
TABLE 19
VENEZUELA: ALIENATION AND AWARDING OF "BALDIA" LAND BETWEEN
1922 AND 1929
1922 24,496 ha and 0.378 meters
1923 50,875 ha and 2,191 meters
1924 4,516 ha and 2,653 meters
1926 51,718 ha and 4,465 meters
1929 55,414 ha and 5,445 meters
Total 187,019 ha and15,102 meters
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 474.
TABLE 20
VENEZUELA: LAND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION PATTERNS IN 1945
STATE NUMBER OF MAJOR LAND OWNERS ON RO LED
Anzoategui 121 90 %
Aragua 151 80 %
Bolivar 34 90 %
Barinas 17 90 %
Carabobo 145 90 %
Cojedes 94 90 %
Guarico 110 90 %
Tachira 69 50 %
Trujillo 21 21 %
Miranda 21 57 %
Distrito Federal 56 90 %
Yaracuy 57 78 %
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 493.
TABLE 21
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF THE LAND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
Year Number of Major Land Owners Total of Land Controlled
1937 3,338 20,804,673 Haa
1950 3,422 17,403,120 Hab
a) This quantity corresponds to 80% of the land
incorporated under private domain and represents 89% of the
total of agricultural property in Venezuela.
b) This quantity corresponds to 79% of the land
incorporated under private domain (19% of the national area)
and it represents 80% of the total of agricultural land in
Venezuela.
SOURCE: Brito-Figueroa, Federico, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 572.
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exploitation companies and further transferred to different
forms of private property, atomized - because of the
complexity of the new establish economic system - the
relations between landowners, wealth, political power,
etc., even though it will not be reckless to talk about a
process of "mimesis" where the basic relations survive.
Land owners joined the Financial, Commercial, and Political
institutions modifying the economic value of the land that
(when not valuable for mineral exploitation) should be to
support holding structures waiting for valorization through
the incorporation of new economic activities, mainly urban
ones.
Parallel to these factors was consolidated a
Central-Periphery model of national development where
spatial and regional inequalities are the common place.
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APPENDIX 4
MERIDA: LIBERTADOR DISTRICT URBAN PERMITS
FROM 1963 TO 1975
APPENDIX 4
MERIDA: LIBERTADOR DISTRICT URBAN PERMITS FROM 1963 TO 1975
Name of the
Year "Urbanizacion"
1963 Santa Maria
1963 Juan R de Lora
1964
1965
1970
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
San Antonio
Pompeya
Las Delias
Alto Chama.
Alto Chama.
Alto Chama
Jardines
La Linda
Norte
Sur-E
Sur-O
1972 La Hacienda I
1972 La Hacienda II
1973 La Pedregosa
1973 El Carrizal N.
1973 El Carrizal S.
1973 Las Tapias
1974 La Sabana
1974 La Mata
1974 Mara
1975 San Antonio Sur
Total Area
(sq.meters)
266,082
40,000
219,176
71,752
108,750
135,000
86,305
59,090
21,960
50,000
175,775
85,750
69,094
106,250
174,000
325,480
82,000
651,600
146,571
88,000
Number of
Lots or Land
Subdivisions
200
112
193
42
144
159
48
56
73
138
61
72
76
126
242
746
138
563
178
75
Total Area
of the Lots
(sq.meters)
160,000
22,400
112,474
36,144
66,047
67,450
56,880
42,084
13,140
41,760
76,250
43, 300
41,387
56,950
100,597
343,154
56,633
333,107
91,536
45,000
Average Area
of the Lots
(sq. meters)
800
200
582
779
458
550
600
549
180
450
1,250
601
544
451
415
492
400
543
514
600
Area Remain-
ing for
Other Land Use
106,082
17,600
106,702
45,588
42,703
47,550
29,425
17,006
8,550
25,640
99,525
44,450
27,707
49,300
73,403
153,903
25,367
318,493
55,035
43,000
Major Land Use
Single Housing
Housing for
Low Income
Single Housing
Single & Multi-
family Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single & Multi-
family Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
Single & Multi-
family Housing
Single Housing
Single & Multi-
family Housing
Single Housing
Single Housing
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APPENDIX 5
LA PUNTA: PATTERNS OF INERITANCE OF THE MAJOR
"HACIENDAS"
and
LEGAL GLOSSARY
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HACIENDA LAS TAPIAS
AREA: 273,880.77 square meters
NAME OF THE ORIGINAL LOTS: La Laguna, Dona Teolinda,
El Ciruelo, Los Naranjos, La Becerrera, El Cilindro
and La Sabana.
15 -1627
1628-177
1773
1786-1811
1830
1901
1920
Ventura de La Pena, Councillor of the city of
Merida receives as a concession the plot named
"Las Tapias."
The Jesuits receive as a grant the "hacienda"
to establish a college.
Las Tapias is adjudged by the king Charles III
through a Royal Degree to the Dominics.
The construction of a Conciliar Seminar is
approved. The Hacienda Las Tapias is adjudged
to the Seminar College -- University of Los
Andes.
Las Tapias is rented to Mr. Francisco Briceno
Balbuena and Mr. Pedro Briceno Balbuena.
Ana Paredes de Davila inherits the "hacienda"
from her husband, Antonio Davila.
Maria Luisa Celis acquires by inheritance some
rights to the "hacienda." She is the wife of
Mr. Eloy Davila Paredes (he is the son of
Antonio Davila and Ana Paredes de Davila).
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1932 Ana Paredes de Davila sells Las Tapias to
Emelina Davila Paredes, Ana M. Davila Paredes,
Isolina Davila Paredes and Eloy Davila Paredes.
1946 Eloy Davila Paredes buys rights to the land
from his sisters.
1962 Maria Luisa Celis de Davila acquires by
partition the lot named "La Sabana."
1962 Maria Luisa Celis de Davila transfers by
inheritance to her seven sons and daughters
(Eloy Davila Celis, Ana Davila Celis, Maria
Juana Davila Celis, Emelina Davila Celis,
Alcira Davila Celis, Cira Maria Davila Celis
and Igor Davila Celis) the "Hacienda Las
Tapias." They become the Succession Davila
Celis.
1972 The Municipal Council of the city of Merida
grants with servitudes all the lots (including
Las Tapias) along the Andres Bello Avenue.
1973 The Succession Davila Celis transfers the
total property of the "Hacienda Las Tapias" to
"Urbanizadora Las Tapias."
1974 The "Urbanizacion Las Tapias" is registered.
SOURCE: Hidalgo Beatriz, Merida: Relaciones Espaciales a
Nivel Urbano y a Nivel de la Vivienda del Migrante
Rural (unpublished) Merida, Venezuela, 1977.
REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA:
77, February 3, 1920,
25, January 25, 1932,
60, January 26, 1946,
21, October 15, 1962,
88, May 14, 1964,
89, May 14, 1964,
379, April 25, 1972,
71, May 23, 1973,
8, March 30, 1974,
3, April 3, 1974,
pp. 67-73,
pp. 26-27,
pp. 99-106,
p. 32,'
pp. 149-152,
pp. 149,152,
p. 42,
p. 226,
p. 30,
p. 6-17,
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
Protocol
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
HACIENDA LAS TAPIAS. LOT: LA SABANA
1909 Gregoriana Uzcategui de Briceno inherits from
her husband Avelino Briceno "La Sabana."
1920 Gregoriana Uzcategui de Briceno sells to her
granddaughter Maria Luisa Celis Briceno the lot
"La Sabana"
1931 Francisco Antonio Celis Davila and Ana Briceno
Uzcategui de Celis inherit the lot "La Sabana)
1940 Josefina Celis Briceno, Enrique Celis Briceno
and Pablo Celis Briceno inherit "La Sabana"
1943 Pablo Celis Briceno buys part of the lot
"La Sabana" to Josefina Celis Briceno
1953 Pablo Celis Briceno buys part of the lot
"La Sabana" to Enrique Celis Briceno
1973 "La Sabana" is urbanized.
SOURCE: Hidalgo Beatriz, Merida: Relaciones Espaciales a
Nivel Urbano y a Nivel de la Vivienda del Migrante
Rural (unpublished) Merida, Venezuela, 1977.
HACIENDA LA TRINIDAD CANADA DE LOS CUROS
AREA: 804,000 square meters
1884 Mariano Arteaga Rovenga sells part of the "hacienda"
to Clodomiro Ruiz
1887 Avelino Briceno Davila sells part of the "hacienda" to
Clodomiro Ruiz
1890 Ana Paoli de Ruiz inherits the total plot of the
"hacienda" from her husband Clodomiro Ruiz
1894 Ana Paoli de Ruiz sells the "Hacienda La Trinidad
Canada de Los Curos" to Avelino Briceno Davila
1909 Gregoriana Uzcategui de Briceno inherits the
"Hacienda" from her husband Avelino Briceno Davila
1912 Carlos Enrique Davila Briceno buys to Jose de Jesus
Davila Garcia part of the "Hacienda La Trinidad
Cahada de Los Curos."
1913 Gregoriana Uzcategui de Briceno sells part of the
"hacienda" to her son Avelino Briceno Uzcategui
1920 Clorinda Paredes de Briceno Uzcategui receives part
of the property rights of the "Hacienda" from Avalino
Briceno Uzcategui
1934 Carlos Enrique Davila Briceno buys a lot of the
"Hacienda" from Manuel Valecillos
1946 Mariana Briceno de Davila sells her part of the
"Hacienda" to her son Carlos Enrique Davila Briceno.
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1953 Carlos Enrique Davila Briceno sells to his sons:
Carlos Enrique Davila Picon and Jose Davila Picon
the "Hacienda La Trinidad Cafiada de Los Curos."
1970 Presidential decree to encumber the "Hacienda" in
favour of the National Institute of Housing (INAVI
or Instituto Nacional de la Vivenda)
1973 Carlos Enrique Davila Picon and Jose Davila Picon
sell the "Hacienda La Trinidad Canada de Los Curos"
to The National Institute of Housing.
Presidential Decree No. 790 Gaceta #29,664, Caracas,
Venezuela, 1970.
SOURCE: REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA:
No. 157, September 23, 1912, pages 136-137, Protocol
No. 3, April 20, 1934, page 4, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 17, September 6, 1946, pages 236-264, Protocol 1
No. 143, May 16, 1953, page 175, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 125, August 29, 1972, page 216, Protocol 1, Vol.
No. 90, March 7, 1973, page 211, Protocol 1, Vol. 4
No. 122, December 4, 1974, page 312, Protocol 1, Vol
No. 13, October 23, 1975, page 44, Protocol 1, Vol.
No. 18, October 23, 1975, page 70, Protocol 1, Vol.
No. 14, October 23, 1975, page 46, Protocol 1, Vol.
No. 17, October 26, 1975, page 68, Protocol 1, Vol.
No. 16, April 30, 1979, page 35, Protocol 1, Vol. 1.
1, Vol. 1
Vol. 1
3
4
EL CARRIZAL
AREA: 38,800 square meters
1937 Mery Rivas de Paredes, Consuelo Vivas Briceno,
Antonio Rojas, Josefa Rojas and Rosa Vivas de Rojas
sell to Tulio Febres Cordero "El Carrizal."
1944 Pablo Briceno, Maria Luisa Celis Briceno and Josefina
Celis Briceno sell to Tulio Febres Cordero part of
"El Carrizal."
1969 Tulio Febres Cordero sells to Leticia Febres de
Sanchez, Sara Febres de Quintero, Mary Febres Salas,
Mariana Febres Salas and Homero Sanchez Febres the
"Hacienda El Carrizal."
1970 INVOCA ("Inversiones de Occidente Compania Anonima")
buys "El Carrizal."
1972 INVOCA sells to Muchacho Hermanos Industrial Compania
Anonima part of the "Hacienda El Carrizal."
SOURCE: Hidalgo, Beatriz, op. cit., Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA:
No. 51, February 18, 1970, pages 121-124, Protocol 1, Vol. 4
No. 11, July 12, 1972, pages 42-46, Protocol 1, Vol. 1.
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HACIENDA SAN ANTONIO
AREA: 181,257.05 square meters
1923 References to the Succession Picon Lares
1940 Eduardo Picon Lares inherits property rights of the
"Hacienda San Antonio."
1950 The Succession of Eduardo Picon Lares inherits
property rights of the "Hacienda San Antonio."
1950 Roberto Picon Parra, Magdalena Picon Parra and Gabriel
Picon Parra inherit property rights of the
"Hacienda San Antonio."
1963 The descendents of Delia Lares de Hener receive by
inheritance property rights of the "Hacienda San
Antonio."
1965 Gonzalo Picon Parra transfers the property of part of
the "Hacienda San Anotnio" to "Urbanizadora San
Antonio Compania Anonima."
SOURCE: REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA
No. 104, May 11, 1923, page 99-101, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 1, October 7, 1933, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 30, April 17, 1940, page 36-38, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 174, March 27, 1950, pp. 243-247, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 132, May 18, 1965, p. 241, Protocol 1, Vol. 3
No. 102, August 17, 1965, pp. 199-200, Protocol 1, Vol. 3;
No. 103, August 17, 1965, pp. 201-204, Protocol 1, Vol. 3;
No. 29, January 24, 1966, pp. 47-55, Protocol 1, Vol. 1.
HACIENDA LAS PENAS (ALTO CHAMA)
NAME OF THE ORIGINAL LOTS: El Corozo, Casa para arriba,
Los Establos, Del Medio, Wenceslada, Francisca and
Cafe Viejo.
1845 Juan Nicolas Briceno transfers the rights along the
irrigation canal named Las Penas to Pablo Maria Celis
Bricehio.
1921 Enrique Celis Briceho and Pablo Celis Bricehio inherit
the property rights of the "Hacienda Las Penas."
1931 Pablo Celis Briceho receives by partition the lots:
"El Corozo" and "Casa para arriba."
1953 Pablo Celis Briceno receives part of the "Hacienda"
that is transferred to him by his brother Enrique
Celis Briceio.
1968 Pablo Celis Bricehio receives the lots "Wenceslada"
and "Francisca."
1970 Enrique Celis Briceo receives by permutation from
Pablo Celis Briceno the lot named "Los Establos."
1970 Pablos Celis Bricefio receives by permutation the lots
named: "Cafe Viejo," "Casa para arriba," and "Del
Medio."
1971 Pablo Celis Bricefio buys to Bernardo Celis Parra part
of the lot "Los Establos."
1971 Pablo Celis Bricefio sells to "Urbanizadora Alto
Chama" the lots: "El Corozo," "Casa para arriba,"
"Del Medio," "Wenceslada," "Francisca," and part of
"Cafe Viejo."
1971 Bernardo Celis Parra trades with the "Urbanizadora
Alto Chama" the lot "Los Establos."
SOURCE: REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA
No. 66, August 8, 1931, pp. 76-81, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 32, April 30, 1968, p. 83, Protocol 1, Vol. 2
No. 66, May 12, 1970, p. 172, Protocol 1, Vol. 3
No. 117, December 7, 1971, pp. 337-342, Protocol 1, Vol. 1.
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HACIENDA LA MATA
AREA: 651,600 square meters
Josefa Maria Uzcategui de Hernandez Bello and
Griselda Hernandez de Ramirez inherit the property
rights of the "Hacienda La Mata" from Rafael Maria
Hernandez Bello.
1911 Rafael Ramirez buys the property rights of the
"Hacienda" from Josefa de Hernandez Bello.
1911 Teodoro Ramirez e Isabel Ponce de Ramirez buy the
property rights to Rafael Ramirez and Griselda
Hernandez de Ramirez
1931 Rafael Ramirez and Teodoro Ramirez sell the property
rights of the "Hacienda" to Avelino Briceno Uzcategui.
1949 Avelino Briceno Uzcategui sells to his son Carlos
Enrique Briceno Paredes the "Hacienda La Mata."
1970 Presidential decree to encumber the "Hacienda" in
favour of the National Institute of Housing
1974 Alicia Davila de Briceno, German Briceno Davila,
Clorinda Briceno Davila, Nora Briceno Davila, Alicia
Briceno Davila, Maria L. Briceno Davila and Maria
Briceno Davila inherit the "Hacienda" from Carlos
Enrique Briceno Paredes.
1974 Alicia Davila de Briceno and her son and daughters
sell the "Hacienda La Mata to Pedro Grespan B.
1974 Pedgro Grespan B. sells to "Urbanizadora La Mata" the
"Hacienda."
SOURCE: REGISTRO SUBALTERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE MERIDA
No. 38, April 29, 1974, p. 105, Protocol 1, Vol. 1
No. 113, June 20, 1974, p. 105, Protocol 1.
Hidalgo, Beatriz, op. cit., Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
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HACIENDA LA CONCEPCION
NAME OF THE ORIGINAL LOTS: El Picacho, Los Guamos,
Del Medio, El Canafistol, Los Morales, La Casa,
El trapiche de Afuera, El Trapiche de Adentro,
Las Cuadras, and El Solar.
1865 Jose de Jesus Davila buys to Antonio Davila the lots
named: "El Picacho," "Los Guamos," and "Del Medio."
1898 Jose de Jesus Davila buys to Adela Monreal de
Davila the lots: "El Canafistol," "Los Morales,"
"La Casa" and "The Trapiche de Adentro."
1898 Jose de Jesus Davila inherits part of "La Casa" and
"El Trapiche de Afuera" from his mother Maria Garcia
Ramirez.
1917 Mariana Briceno de Davila sells to Carlos Davila
Briceno, Concepcion Davila Briceno, Guillermina
Davila Briceno, Cristina Davila Briceno and Elena
Davila Briceno all the lots that were property of
Jose de Jesus Davila.
1946 Elena Davila de Pardi buys "Los Guamos," "Del Medio"
and one part of the lot "Hacienda De Afuera."
1946 Guillermina Davila de Rojas buys "Los Morales,"
"El Canafistol," and other properties.
1946 Cristina Davila de Salas buys "El Picacho," "Las
Cuadras" and one part of "El Guamo."
(*o+3zjptcs9oeL )6oe,,L. 688*z 0
ILUO 696*0 9E0,991 0 *1
Ztet *61,E. CC*+?lrmooE96S*S-)Or9*fi9s- 19c*z 0 z
9soo L10*0 200*0 0 T
'isa S3853V 83AGW3V 3bud ViN03 WnN
UOUN3. 31130-3 A IOL vvoa 51403 #VA
(*O+3z96fiGEGTTE t9fi6fit2TTE abUORVIS3 VONS3
s0+3zzcoz*6 or.+3ioLvz*T el lunals3a
cocol'i 60+38stWT 0+39160tr z NOIS38538
01+300ozoz oz iviol
W3 3s is 31RVIJ
u7RuiiiUA ui 34 3C I S, v All
GzfiGT * 0
123
URBANIZACION SANTA MARIA
1S38E- as15ss113433335581ats sisaIis&&&. -
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - VENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONOM1A
INSTITUTO DE ESTADISTICA RPLICADA Y COMPUTACION
PROGR'HP'IMPLEM.PROF.:Renato del Conto J.(1979)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.: VARGAS
CONSULTANTE............... FLORES RANGEL
Us66Is538ssasgsssgRssassassasgsassgassesas
ANALISIS DE REGRESION
3*3*5e~eIsIsesgsesete
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE EHTRADA DE LOS DATOS
1=TECLADO , 2=CASSETTE , 3=LECTORA DE TARJETAS 4=DISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIGO= 1
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EH CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE= I
NUN. DE VARIASLES DE ENTRADA= 3
2 VARIABLES SERAN.AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
I X( 1) XC 2) XC 3) X( 4) XC 5)
1 68.00000 796.00000 47790.00000 .60.03769 54128.00000
2 68.00000 750.00000 45600.00000 60.80000 51000.0000-
3 68.00000 727.00000 43620.00000 60.00000 49436.09000
4 68.00000 800.00000 4g000.00000 ' 60.00000 54400.00000
5 68.00000 749.00444 29961:00000 .40.00134 50932.00000
6 69.00000 885.00000 44296.00000 .50.05198 61065.00000
7 69.00000 827.00000 33090.00000 40.01209 57063.00000
8 69.00000 839.00000 50370.00000 60.03576 57891.00000
9 69.00000 794.00000 31792.00000 40.04030 54786.00000
10 69.00000 726.00000 56401.00000 77.68733 50094.00000
124
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29,
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
40.02400 51750.0000069.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
71.00000
71.00000
71.00000
71 .00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
73 00000
750.00000 30018.00000
794.00000 4768$.00000
760.00000 38000.00000
807.00000 48424.00000
1162.00000 69720.00000
720.00000 45407.00000
760.00000 68400.00000
1196.00000 60000.90000
1914.00000 112802.00000
840.00000 33600.00000
652.00000 39120.00000
600.00000 32000.00000
760.00000 38000.00000
997.00000 39916.00000
800.00000 32000.00000
679.00000 27130.00000
639.00000 38376.00000
845.00000 33920.00000
333.00000 20000.00000
760.00000.- 45600.00000
640.00000 38400.00000
784.00040 31360:00000
720.00000 29820.00000
750.00000 60000.00000
874.00000 34988.00000
702.00000 2084.00000
760.00000 664Q0.000,0
750.00000 45000.00000
1002.00000 50130.00000
740 00000 29600.00000
60.06045
50.00000
60.00496
60.00000
63.06528
90.00000
50.16722
58.93521
40.00000
60.00000
40.00000
50.00000
40.03611
40.00000
40.01475
60.05634
40.02367
60.06006
60.00000
60.00000
40. 00000
40.02779
80.00000
40.03204
40.00570
90 .00000
6C.00000
50.02994
40.00000
54786 00009
52440.00600
55483.00000
80178.00000
50400.00000
53200.00000
83720.00000
133980.00000
58800.00000
45640.00000
56000.00000
-53200.00000
69790.00000
56000.00000
47460.00000
44730.00600
59150. 00000
23310.00000
53200.00000
45440.00000
55664.00000
51120.00000
53250.00000
6-928.00000
50544.00000
54720. 00000
54000.00000
72144.00000
54620.00000
125
73.00000
73. 00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73. 01000
73.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00A00
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.40000
74. 0o00o
74. 00100
74 00000
74. 00000
74.00000
74.00q00
75.00000
76. 00000
760.00000
803.0000f)
849.00000
349.OQQO00
116 .0000 )
.T 0. 0
740.00000
760.00000
740.00000
800.00000
800.00000
797.04000
749 . 0 0
669 .00000
820 00000
664.0~0000
681.00000
Cf t.fl-tV013
19l05.00000
1260.00000
45600 00000
42220.00000
33980 00000
70000.00000
90000.00000
;240V9 ' f0., V00 0
44400.00OO
38000.00000
29600.00000
64000.00000
64000.00000
47871 00000
44955.00000
26692. 000900
240000 0000
32800 00000
39840.00000
40872.00000
Z212t4.77 7
28585' 0000)
132581.00000
PRIMR FILE= I ULTIMO FILE= 63
63 OBSERVACIGNES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
ESTADISTICAS BASICAS
.MEDIA
71 .34921
816.88889 25
52536.42857 432?
44,31662 5
53320.0737 1837
DES EST
2.18616
1. 14217
7.34693
4 31218
9.50063
VAR
4 77931389E+00
6.30723907E.04
I .8?39440Ei09
3.00437552E*03
3.378o)43E+08
60.00000
52.57783
40.02356
e2.44994
76.988838
60 .90o00
60.00000
50.00000
40.00000
80.0214
80.00000
60.06399
60.02003
39.89836
.31 4b6
464.21663
40.00000
.60.00000
-60.0t762
.31 . 8b22
150.05512
105.22302
55480.00000
58619.00000
61977.00000
61977.00000
85337.00000
2920o.oooo
54020.00000
56240.00000
54760.00000
64750.00000
59200.00000
59200.00000
58978.00000
55426.00000
*9506.00000
44918.00000
38259.C0000
60680.00000
47136.00000
50394.00000
49432.0C000
142875.00000
95760.00000
VAR. NUM
2
3
4
5
CV
3.06403
30.74374
82.39492
65 22243
31.51488
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MATRIZ DE CORRELACION
I x I ? A( ) x( 3) X( 4*
2 0.0
3 n 3o) 0 5 9
4 a 251 - ; 0 ) 0 764
5 0.16? Q.34 0.603 0 026
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE= 3
TOLERaNCIO= ('.0010)
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCIO
03STE'AjIE, i=?O'RJD, 2-ZACKWARD, 3=MANUAL
METODO SELECCIONADO,CODIGO= 3
*..**.. ** **.S ** **************** ************* **************
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
NUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER RElRES EST.
1 0 6.434 0. 309 1 00)
2 0 29.279 0.569 1.000
4 0 85.504 0.764 1 000
5 0 34.847 0.603 1.000
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PASO Num. 1
VARIABLE 2 AWREGADA
TABLA DE ANAL!'IS DE LA VARINZA
FUENTE GL CM F
TOTAL 62 1 16175EZ 11
REGRESION 1 3 7677'E+10 3.7677)E+10 29.27837
RESIDUAL 61 7 .4382E+10 1.268;6EO9
ERROR ESTANDAR= 35972.77447 ( 3 5972?744?E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER RECRES EST.
1 0 7.369 0.331 0 996
2 0 29.278 98.157C 9 815-3666E+01) 18.14051
4 0 381.334 0.930 1.000
5 0 12.785 0 419 i * ±
CONSTANTE--27647.23I56
******,* ** * ** * *** ** ** * **** * * * ******* * ** ***** * ******* *** * ** ********** **** **** ***
PASO HUM. 2
VARIABLE 5 AGREGADA
R -CUA= 0.44300
TABLA DE ANALIS IS DE LA VARIANZA
FUENTE GL SC CM F
TOTAL 62 1.16175E+11
REGRESION 2 5.14652E+10 2.57326E+10 23.85958
RESIDUAL 60 6.47101E+10 1.07850E+09
ERROR ESTANDAR= 32840.54431 ( 3.284054431E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 3.681 0.242 0.095
2 0 8.556 -455.648C-4.55648018E+02) 155.77472
4 0 432.612 0.938 0.937
5 0 12.785 7.611( 7.61071175E+00) 2.12855
CONSTANTE=-1910?.08154
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UR3ANIZACION LAS DELIAS
112tIs2e1ets 11tIfa11 st5111t111t11t119a21gs
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - VENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONOMIA
INSTITUTO DE ESTADISTICA APLICADA Y COMPUTACION
PROGR'NP'IMPLEM.PROF.:Renato del Canto J.(1979)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.! VARGAS
CONSULTANTE............i FLORES RANGEL
StaEttatuESIUettstetstaatutuetestaggtettatte
ANALISIS DE REGRESION
Seletetetsget*5*tetet
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
I=TECLADO , 2=CASSETTE , 3-LECTORA DE TARJETAS 4uDISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIGOm I
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE* I
RUN. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADAn 3
2 VARIABLES SERAN AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
X( 1)
71.00000
71 . 00*00
71.00000
71.00000
71.00000
71 .00000
71.00000
71.00000
72.00000
72.00000
X( 2)
634.00000
356.00000
351.00000
291.00000
346.0000e
475.00000
1274.00000
1279.00000'
317.00000
664.00000
X( 3)
41236 00000
23144.00000
21060.00000
18922.00000
20796.00000
30927.00000
79942. 00000
80158.000001
19032.00000
39849.00000
X( 4)
65.04101
65.01124
60.00000
65.02405
.60.10405
65.10947
62.67033
62.67240
.60.03785
60.01355
X( 5)
43014.00400
25276.0000,
24921.00000
20661.00000
24566.00000
33725.00000
90454.00000
90809.00000
22824.00000
47808.00000o
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
PRIMER FILE* I
72.00000
72.0000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74 . 00000
74.00000
74.00000
75.00000
75.00000
317.00000
351.00000
296.00000
451.00000
480.00000
323.00000
119.00000
475.00000
352.00000
368.00000
364.00000
500.00000
290.00000
338.00000
475.00000
386.00000
326.00000
475.00000
320.00000
371.00000
384.00000
404.00000
346.00000
250.00000
317.00000
475.00000
320.00000
294.0000
19032.00000
22815.00000
19279.00000
29337 00000
31224.00000
20998.00400
144000.00000
30927.00000
22942.00000
23953.00000
23707.00000
30000. 00000
25000.00000
40000.00000
45000. 00000
160000.00000
118000.00000
30927.00000
27000.00000
34000.00*00
160000.00000
36289 00000
35000.00000
20000.00000
30000.00000
45000.00000
37500.00000
45000.00000
ULTIMO FILE= 38
36 OSSERVACIDOES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
131
60 .03783
65.00000
65.13176
65.04879
65.05000
65.00929
128.68633
65.10947
65.17614
65.08967
65.12912
.60 .00000
86.20690
118.34320
94.73684
414.50?77
361.96319
65.10947
94.37500
91 .64420
416.66667
60.07947
10!.15607
80.00000
-94.63722
94.7364
117.18750
153.06122
22824.00000
25272.00000
21312.00000
32472 00000
34560.00000
23256.00000
81687.00000
34675.00000
25696.00000
26864.00000
26572.00000
36500.00000
21460.00000
25012.00000
35150.00000
29564.00000
24124.00000
35150.00000
23680.00000
27454.00000
28416.00000
44696 00000
25604.00000
18500.00000
2-459.00000
35150.00000
24000.00000
22050.00000
132
ESTADISTICAS BASICAS
MEDIA
72.84211
456.68421
44260.39474
102.48852
33163.57395
DES EST
1. 28345
248.25391
38215.07771
90.62615
17641.17484
VAR
1.65007114E+00
6.16300057E+04
1. 4o.039216E+09
8 21309996E+03
3.11211050E+08
CV
1.76347
54. 36008
86. 34148
88.42566
53. 19442
"ATRIZ DE CORRELACION
XC 1) X( 2) X( 3) X( 4)
-0.329
0.222 0.410
0.419 -0.116 0.837
-0.303 0.999 0.422 -0.106
SELECCION DE PROCEDINIENTO PARA RECRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE= 3
TOLERANCIA= 0.00100
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
0uSTEPUISE, I=FORUARD, 2=BACKUARD, 3=MANUAL
METOO SELECCIOHADO,CODIGOm 3
F
ENTR.
1.864
7.260
84.068
7.783
CORR TOL
PARC
0.222 1.000
0.410 1.000
0.837 1.000
0.422 1.000
REMOVER
CCEFIC
REGRES
ERROR
EST.
VAR. NUm
1
2
3
4
5
I
2
3
4
5
VAR
mUM
1
2
4
5
CODIC
CONTR
0
0
0
0
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URBANIZACION LA MATA
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - YENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONOMIA
INSTITUTO DE ESTADISTICA APLICADA Y CONPUTACION
PROGR'HP'IMPLEM.PROF.:Renato del Canto J.(1979)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.: VARGAS
CONSULTANTE............ FLORES RANGEL
ANALISIS DE REGRESION
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DAT3S
I=TECLADO , 2=CASSETTE , 3mLECTORA DE TARJETAS 4-DISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIGCA= I
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE= I
HUM. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADAw 3
2. VARIABLES SERAN ACREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
X( 2)
57471.00000
57471 .00000
57471.00000
57471.00000
5?4?1.00000
57471.00000
57471.00000
306773.00000
651600.00000
51471.00000
X( 3)
850000:00000
850000 00000
950000.00000
850000.00000
850000.00 000
950000.00000
950000:00000
850000.00000
3420900.00000
3420900.00000
X( 4)
14. ?9007
14.79007
14.79007
14.79007
14.79007
14.79007
14.79007
2.77079
5.25000
.66.46267
' X( 5)
4252954.000
4252854.00000
4252e54.0000
4252854.00000
4252854.00000
4252954.00000
4252e54.00000
22701202.00000
48218400.00000
3908854.00000
X( 1)
74.00000
74.00000
74.0000
74. 00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.90000
74.00000
74.0000
138
I 74.00000 57471.00000 3420900.00000 59.52393
12 74.00000 57471.00000 3420900.00000 59.52393
13 74.00000 57471.00000 3420900.00000 59.52393
14' 74.00000 57471.00000 3420900.00000 59.52393
15 74.00000 57471.00000 3420900.00000 .59.52393
16 74.00000 306773.00000 3420900.00000 11.15124
1? 74.00000 651600.00000 3420900.00000 5.25100
PRIMER FILE* I ULTIMO FILE= 17
17 OGSERVACTONES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
PRIMER FILE* 1 ULTI-O FILE= 17
17 OBSERVACIONES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
1lTECLADO , 22CASSETTE , 3=LECTORA DE TARJETAS 42DISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CCD'10=
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE* 18
RUM. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADA= 3
2 VARIABLES SERAN AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
X( 1)
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
X( 2)
5448.00000
400.00000
543.00000
2835.00000
611.00000
400.OqOOO
1397.00000
1601.00000
3871.00000
484.00000
3328.00000
X( 3)
658682.0000
48000.00000
78790.00000
396400.00000
89659.00000
24000.00000
181680.00000
224252.00000
541940:00000
67880.00000
465920.00000
X( 4)
120.90345
120.00000
145.10129
139.82363
146.74141
.60.00000
130.05011
140.06996
140.00000
140.24793
140.00000
42528!4.00000
4252E54.00000
4252354.00000
4252854.0900Q0
4252954.00000
22701202. 00000
48218400. 00000
X( 5)
414048.00000
30400.00000
41268.0000v
215460.00000
46436.00000
30400.00000
106172.0C000
121676.00000
294196.00000
36784.00000
252e28.00000
139
12
13
14
15
16
1 ?
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
76.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.0000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77. 00000
77.00000
77.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78. 00400
470.00000
400.00000
3781.00000
4106.00000
922.00000
2486.00000
3879.00000
1223.00000
411.00000
611.00000
425.00000
400.0000
425.0000
507 00000
468.00000
405.00000
1395.00000
510.00000
450.00000
411.00000
454.00000
.485.00000
624.00000
617.00000
451.00000
429.00000
408.00000
502.00000
PRIMER FILE& 18 ULTIMO FILE= 57
47016.00000
28000.00000
945400.00000
595471.00000
69218.00000
310845:00000
562677.00000
159081.00000
97896.00000
97896.00000
65875.00000
624000:04000
65875.00000
58336.00000
5336:00000
60750.00000
69756.00000
84150.00000
72000.00000
67848.00000
7493t.00000
80074.00000
74970:00000
74040.00000
74563.00000
64397.00000
67340.00000
60356.00000
100.03404
70.00000
250.03967
145.02460
75.07375
125.03821
145.05723
130.07441
160.222539
160.22259
155.00000
155.00000
155.00000
115.06114
i24.64957
150.00000
.50.00430
165.00000
160.00000
165.08029
165.05286
165.10103
120.14423
120.00000
165.32.816
150.10956
165.04902
120.23108
35720 00000
30900.00000
291137.00000
316162.00000
70994.00000
191422.00000
298683.00000
94171.00000
47047.00000
47047.00000
32725.00000
30600 0000
32725.00000
39039.00000
36036.00000
31185.00000
107415.00000
39270.00000
34650.00000
32059.00000
35412.00000
37830.00000
48672.00000
48126.00000
35178 00000
33462.00000
31824.00000
39156.0*000
140
40 OBSERVACIONES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
ESTADISTICAS BASICAS
VAR.NUM. MEDIA
1 76.92500
2 1290.20000
3 182896.20000
4 137.17354
5 98920.22500
DES EST
0.72986
1364.19012
216032.70360
34.43117
104189.84185
VAR
5.32692308E-01
1.86101468E+06
4.66701290E+10
1.19550560E+03
1.08a55231E+10
MATRIZ DE CORRELACION
I X( 1) X( 2) X( 3) X( 4)
2 -0.338
3 -0.266 0.942
4 0.229 0.129 0.368
5 -0.333 1.000 0.944 -0.131
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA RECRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE L.PENDIENTEm 3
TOLERANCIA- 0.00100
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
0-STEPUISE, 1-FORUARD, 2=8ACKWARD, 3mMANUAL
NETODO SELECCIONRDOCODIGO= 3
VAR
HUM
1
2
4
5
COD! G
CONTR
0
0
0
0
F
ENTR.
2.898
301.628
5.948
308.543
CoRR TCL
PARC
0.266 1.000
0.942 1.000
0.368 1.000
0.944 1.000
REMOVER
COEFIC
REGRES
CV
0.94879
105. 73478
11e. 11766
23.10045
105.32714
ERROR
EST.
141
PASO HUM. I
VARIABLE 2 AGREGADA
R.CUA= 0.88911
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIANZA
FUENTE GL SC ,CM F
TOTAL 39 1.82014E+12
RECRESIGH 1 1.61649E+12 1. 61649E+12 :301.62847
RESIDUAL 38 2.03649E+11 5.35919E+09
ERROR ESTANDAR= 73206.51958 C 7.320651958E+04)
VAR CODIG F COR TOL F ;CEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 1.063 0.167 0.886
2 0 301.628 149.238( 1.49237760E+02) 0.59296
4 0 45.360 0.742 0.983
-AR H. 5 SU TOLERANCIA ES HUY PEQUENA (TOL= 8.51100E-05 )
CONSTANTE-9650.358435
142
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTEa 3
TOLERANCIAn 0.000,0
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
OnSTEPUISE, 1=FORWARD, 2=BACKWARD, 3=MANUAL
NETODO SELECCIONADO,CODIGO= 3
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 2.898 0.266 1.000
2 0 301.629 0.942 1.000
4 0 5.948 0.368 1.000
5 0 308.543 0.944 1.000
PASO NUM. 1
VARIABLE 2 AGREGADA
R CUAw 0.86811
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIAMZA
FUENTE GL SC CM F
TOTAL 39 1.82014E+12
REGRESION I 1.61649E+12 1.61649E+12 :301.62847
RESIDUAL .38 2.03649E+11 5.35919E+09
ERROR ESTANDAR= 73206.51958 ( 7.320651958E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F .OEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 1.063 0 167 0.886
2 0 301.628 149.238( 1.49237760E+02) 8.59296
4 0 45.360 0.742 0:983
VAR M. 5 SU TOLERANCIA ES MUY PEQUENA (TOL= 8.5110E-05 )
CONSTANTE=-9650.358435
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PASO HUM. I
VARIABLE 2 AGRECADA
it CUIA- o.891!!
FUENTE
TOTAL
REGRESIO
RESIDUAL
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIANZA
GL Sc
39 1.82014E+12
N I 1.61649E+12 1.616
38 2.03649E+11 5.359
49E+ 12
19E+09
301.62847
ERROR ESTANDAR=
VAR C
HUN C
4
VAR N.
ODIG
ONTR
0
73206.51958 ( 7.3206519.58E+04)
F CORR TOL
ENTR. PARC
1.063 0.167 0.896
F
REMOYER
COEFIC
REGRES
ERROR
EST.
0 301.628 149.238( 1.492377.60E+02)
0 45.360 0.742 0 983
5 SU TOLERAHCIA ES HUY PEQUEHA (TOz 8.5110oE-05 )
CONSTANTEa-9650.358435
8.59296
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LRBANIZACION. LA LINDA
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
1=TECLADO , ZCASSETTE , 3wLECTORA DE TARJETAS 4=DISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIGO I
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAH EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE- I
NUN. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADAm 3
2 YARIABLES SERAN AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL FOR TRANSFORMACION
XC 1) XC
74.00000 391.
74.00000 317.
74.00000 330.
74.0000* 324.
74.00000 .330.
74.00000 39?.
74.00000 409.
76.00000 391.
76.00000 317.
76.00000 317.
76.00000 391.
76.00000 361.
77.00000 330.
77.00000 :330.
77.00000 330.
77.00000 425.
77.00000 425.
78.00000 443.
FILEu.1 ULT2WO FILE= 18
2)
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
0000*
0000
00000
0000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
00000
XC 3)
27370.00006
20605.00000
23100.00000
21060:00000
21450.00000
25805:00000
32720.00000
27370.00000
38040.00~000
20605.00000
42000.00000
43306.00400
- 42900.00005
52100:00000
52800.00000
72250.00000
95000.00000
88620.00000
XC ~ 4)
74.?0000
.65.00000
70.00009
65.00000
65.00000
65.00000
.80.00000
79 .00000
120 . 00000
.65 .00000
07.41688
l'19.96122
190.60606
157.87079
160.00000
170.00000
200.04000
* 20~'004! 15
:XC 5',
28934.00000
23450. 00'00
24420.000^0
23976. 00000
24420.00CvW
29379.000^0
30266.00000
29716. 00%f0
24092.0000
29716. 000N
2746. 0900o
254'10. 0000
25 4106.006.
254t'0. 00040
32725.00000
32725.00040
34554. 00)0
18 OBSERVACIONES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
PRIMER
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ESTAOISTICAS BASICAS
VAR.NHUN. MEDIA
1 75.61111
2 364.33333
3 42061.1666?
4 113.38378
5 27563.22222
DES EST
1.41998
22387.26682
52.53718
3526.45457
VAR
2.0!633988E+00
5.01189716E+08
2.76015544E+03
I .24358818E+0?
CV
1.87800
2. 09262
53.22550
46.33571
12.79406
- NATRIZ DE CORRELAC10N
X( 1) X( 2) X( 3) X( 4)
0.264
0.83? 0.558
0.877 0.344 0.965
0.400 0.989 0.658 0.458
SELECCION DE PROCEDINIENTO PARA REGRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTEw 3
TOLER#MCIAu 0.00100
COIO METODO DE SELECCION
OnSTEPUISE. I=FORUARDi 2mBACKUARD 3MANUAL
NETODO SELECCIOHADOCODIGO= 3
VAR
HUN
1
2
4
5
CODIG
CONTR
0
0
0
0
F
ENTR.
37 .527
7.242
214.072
12.201
CORR
PARC
0.83?
0.558
0.965
0.658
TOL
1 .000
1.000
1 .000
S. 000
REMOVER
COEFIC
REGRES
ERROR
EST.
149
PASO RUN. 1
VARIABLE 2 AGREGADA
R CUA- 9.31160
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIANZA
FUENTE GL Sc CH .F
TOTAL 17 8.52023E+09
REGRESION- 1 2.65491E+09 ;.65491E+09 7.24232
RESIDUAL 16 5.86532E+09 3.66582E+Oe
ERROR ESTAHDAR= 19146.34212 C 1.914634212E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 43.505-0.662 0.931
2 0 7.242 283.649( 2.83648706E+02) 105.40034
4 0 895.218 0.992 0.882
5 a 49.307 0.876 0.021
CONSTANTE--61281.51188
150
PASO "UN. 2
VARIABLE 5 ACRECADA
R CUA= 0.83943
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE L4 VARiANZA
FUENTE GL SC Cm F
TOTAL 17 8.52023E+09
REGRESION 2 7.15210E+09 3.57605E+09 39.20746
RESIDUAL 15 1.36813E+09 91208397.14400
ERROR ESTANDAR= 9550.30875 C 9.550308746E+03)
VAR CODIG F CORR -TOL F COEIC ERROR
NUN CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 0.161 -0.107 0.015
2 0 38.000 -2232.794C-2.23279423E+03) 362.20762
4 0 196.914 0.966 0.219
5 0 49.307 31.775( 3.17754692E+01) 4.52521
CONSTAHTEu-20291.78943
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URBANIZACION MARA
a Itsa I ssI *ssa ItIIas i ofsst i %192*9 Ite11
UHIVEPSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - YENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONOMIA
INSTITUTO DE ESTADISTICA APLICADA Y COMPUTACIOH
PROGR'HP'IMPLEM.PROF.:Renato del Canto J.(1979)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.: V0GAS
CONSULTANTE ...... . FLORES RANGEL
ANALISIS DE REGRESION
. **5.i-u *as*#*ca*a.5
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
IxTECLADO , 2=CASSETTE , 3=LECTaRA DE TARJETAS 4uDISCO
PORKA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS CODIGO= 1
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE= I
NUM. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADAm 3
2 VARIABLES SERAN AGREG.AL CJTO ORIQINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
X( 3)
77636.00000
93720 00000
432688.00000
215000.00000
80355.00000
286910.00000
214240 00000
77160.00000
85199.00000
138330.00000
X( 4)
130.04355
130.00000
130.01442
130.30303
130.02427
171.49432
129 .94242
±30.13153
130.07481
145.00000
X( 5)
45372.00000
-40944.00000 .
252929.00000
125400.00000
46968.00000
127149.00000
125400.00000
45068.00000
49780.00000
73458.00000
I
2
3
4
6
8
9
10
XC 1)
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76 -40000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
77.00000
X( 2)
5397.00001
_ 644..00000
3328.00000
1650.00000
614.00000
16?3.00000
1650.00000
593.00000
655.00000
954.00000
152
77.00000
7?. 00000
77 . 00000
77.00000
77.00000
77. 00000
77 .00000
77.00000
77.00000
7?00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77 . 00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77. 00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
7?. 00000
77.00000
7?. 00000
7? . 00000
142.99724 55748.00000724 00900 103530.00000
653.00000 95410.00000
526.00000 76373.00000
412.00000 59812.00000
790.00000 114639.00000
725.01i0l0i 47125.00000
840.00000 121800.00000
493.00000 71519.00000
858.00000 124497.00000
450.00000 52065 00000
400 00000 52065.00000
400.00000 58072.00000
541.00000 78517.00000
426.00000 24903.00000
405.00000 24903.00000
430.00000 24903.00000
465.00000 24903.00000
475.00000 24903.00000
450.00000 24903.00000
457.00000 24903.00000
474.00000 24903.00000
490.00000 24903:00000
481.00000 24903.00000
549.00000 24903.00000
549.00000 24903.00000
306.00000 24903.00000
509.00000 24903 00060
572.00000 24903.00000
676.00000 24903.00000
609.00000 24903.00000
145.00000
145.20532
145.17476
145 .1 1266
65.00000
145.00000
145.06897
145.10140
1 15.70000
130.16250
145.18000
145.13309
58.45775
.61 .48889
.57.91395
.53.55484
:52.42737
.55.34000
54.49234
.52 .53797
50.82245
51.77339
45.36066
45.36066
81.38235
-.48 .92534
43.53671
'36.83876
40.89163
50666 00000
40502.00000
31724.00000
60830.00000
55825.00000
64680.00000
37961.00000
66066.00000
34650.00000
30800.00000
30800.00000
41657.00000
32802.00000
31185.00000
33110.00000
35805.00000
36575.00000
34650.00000
35189.00000
36498.00000
37730.00004
37037.00000
42273.00000
4r.273.00000
23562.00000
39193.00000
44044.00000
52052.00000
46893.00000
77.00000 4
77.00000 4
77.00000 4
77.00000 4
77.00000 4
77.00000 4
78.00000 5
78.00000 5
78.00000 4
78.00000 5
78.00000 7
78.00000 5
78.00000 5
78.00000 4
78.00000 4
78.00000 4
78.00000 4
78.00000 5
78.00000 5
78.00000 -9
ULTINO FILE-
62 .00000
92.00000
20.00000
20.(10000
20.00000
50.00000
57.00000.
26.00000
52.00000
54.00000
82 .00000
08.00000
41 .00000
88.00000
50.00000
31 .00000
12.00000
49.00000
49.00000
68.00000
24903.00000
24903.00000
24903.00000
24903.00000
24903.00000
63000.00000
89000.00000
84299.00000
75000.00000
94344.00000
132940.00000
91530.00000
107140.00000
89308.0000C
90000.00000
21550.00000
100000.00000
127456.00000
127456.00000
43000:00000
60 OSSERVACIONES :NCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
ESTADISTICAS BASICAS
VAR.HUNM. MEDIA DES EST
1 77.08333 0.61868
2 648.88333 449.62452
3 77259.40000 70901.59831
4 113.83897 57.17016
5 49903 33333 34084.36014
VAR
3.82768373E-01
2.02162206E+0S
5.02703664E+09
3.26842713E+03
! 16174361E+09
153
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
,a0
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
5
59
60
PR INER
53.90260
50 .61585
59.29286
59.29286
59.29296
151 .11111
159.78456
160.26426
165.92920
170.29603
170.00000
180.17717
191.04067
183.00820
200.00000
50.00000
242.71845
232.16029
232.16029
44.42149
35574.00000
37884.00000
32340.00000
32340.00000
32340.00000
34650.00000
43446.00000
41028.00000
35256.00000
43212.00000
60996.00000
39624.00000
42191.400000
38064.00000
35100.00000
33618.00000
32136.00000
42822.00000
42822.00000
75504.00000
FILE- I
CV
0.80262
69.29204
91.77084
50.22020
68 30077
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MATRIZ DE CORRELACION
1 X( 1) X( 2) X( 3) XC 4)
2 -0.420
3 -0.257 0.895
4 0.291 0.134 0.543
5 -0.410 1.000 0.996 0.137
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION MOLTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE= 3
TOLERANCIA= 0.00100
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
0=STEPUISE, 1=FORUARD, 2=BACKUARD, 3=MANUAL
METODO SELECCIONADOCODIGOu 3
**********************************e*******************..****************
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
NUN CONTR ENTR. PARC REMVVER REGRES EST.
1 0 4.116 0.257 1.000
2 0 233.003 0.890 1.000
4 0 24.256 0.543 1.000
5 0 235.137 0.896 1.000
******************************** *************
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PASO HUM. I
VARIABLE 2 AGRECADA
R C!JA= 0.90069
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIANZA
FUENTE GL SC CM F
TOTAL 59 2.96595E+11
REGRESION I 2.37482E+11 2.37482E+11 233.00808
RESIDUAL 58 5.91135E+10 1.01920E+09
ERROR ESTANDAR. 31924.89705 ( 3.192489705E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 5.280 0.291 0.824
2 0 233.008 141.104( 1.41103897E+02) 9.24386
4 0 606.744 0.956 0.982
VAR H. 5 SU TOLERANCIA ES MUY PEUEHA (TOL* 1.23982E-04
CONSTANTE-14300.56704
VARIABLE 5 SU TOLERANCIA ES NUY PEQUENA
156
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION AULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTEu 3
TOLERANCIA= 0.00010
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
9uSTEPUISE, 1=FORWARD, 2mBACKWARD, 3"NANUAL
RETODO SELECCIONADO,CODIGD- 3
**********.**** **.******************.,****.44.**...*...sessessesse 
.. **
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
NUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 4.116 0.257 1.000
2 0 233.008 0.895 1.000
4 0 24.256 0.543 1.000
5 0 235.137 0.89 1.000
PASO NUM. 1
VARIABLE 2 AGREGADA
R CUA= 0.80069
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA VARIANZA
FUENTE GL SC Cm F
TOTAL 59 2.96595E+11-
REGRESION I 2:374B2E+11 2.37482E+11 233.00803
RESIDUAL 58 5.-91135E+10 1.01920E+09
ERROR ESTANDARm 31924.99705 < 3.192489705E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F COEFIC ERROR
HUN CONTR ENTR. PARC RENOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 5.280 0.291 0.824
2 0 233.009 141.104( 1.4110389?E+02) 9.24386
4 0 606.744 0.956 0.992
5 0 1.776 0.t?4 0.000
CONSTANTEa-14300.56704
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URBANIZACION SANTA ANA
i. -8I3s8&5833;a3 aE&53;It;3 4ta3 it3s$ 3 ,i32 t--.
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - YENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONOMIA
INSTITUTO DE ESTC.31 TPL >> Y C0,PUT:C C4
PROCR' HP' 1PLE .PROF. :R nat7 d#l C antto (137?)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.;
CONSULTANTE..... ...
5363333t3553;I@33313;1v83;;ssssateui
ANALISIS DE REGRESION
E**I**4*L*OS 3AT
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORNA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
I=TECLA0O , 2=CHSSETTE , 3=LECTORA DE TARJETAS 4zDISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIO= I
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PR1MER FILE= 1
RUM. DE VARIABLES DE ENTRADA= 3
2. VARIABLES SERAN AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
I XC 1) XC 2) cXC 3) XC 4) X( 5)
.1 68.00000 375.000 21000.00000 56.00000 2550o.00300
2 68.00000 375.00000 26250.00000 -70.00000 25500.00090
3 68.00000 600.00000 42000.00000 -70.00000 40800.00000
4 68.00000 379.00000 22000.00000 .58.04749 25772.00000
5 68.00000 260.0000e- 17680.00000- 68.00000 17680.00000
6 69.00000 375.00000 26000.00000 69.33333 25875.00000
7 69.00000 400.00000 27000.00000 67.50000 27600 00000
a 69.00000 375.00000 19000.00000 .50.66667 25875.00000
9 69.00000 400.09000 26000.000000000 0000 '27600.00000
10 69.00000 375.00000 24000.00000 64.00000 25875.00000
00*00oz~
000000sz
000000cz
00000'.1OC
00000QZS
C 000,0scez
00000 09Ei I
00000 0000cer
00000,0910Z
00000*0sz9z
00000*0*sz9Z
00000 0CL6?z
00000*&9
00000,0;,4,01
00000 £808Z
00000'6sz9z
000000za
00000. 99*,Zo
00000 -fb812?
00000 slesa
00000 I9?
00.0tIIs
' 1
00000 fr6?ZZ
00000 Lvio
00000*SLOSZ
19999,99
00000, 0Z.
03Z9 69?
T 1111 law,
00000* 0 1
00000' C8z
19999' 99.
ECs M9
9EZ0* 01.-
Gfl6z*2s
00000' OL.
00000* 0Z.
298911' 0z
LQUt0o
0*000*
1986* a
c9LG0 CL
QS?60" Oz
00000 9
S 8~ 09Z
Oviv, 0 z
00000"t95
00000 000 z
0000 .a u
00000 Og?9?
00000*000??
00090000??
00000*000??
00000,OOOLZ
00000 0CZTZ
00000*66&?I
00000, 000092
00000 928fi
00000 09s
00000.' 0Z0?S
00000,0002a
00000,0oe
00000*06*O?
00000' 0199?
00000*9816Z
00000,00091
00000 1~t'EZ
00000*Os
000V 4 1 19 61
00000 It.Oi
00000 000*Z
T9T
00000* 1t
00000MZ16
00000. 6ZE
00000 uZ
00000*69t
04.000, 09E
00000,69E
00000*2ZE
00000 ,so
00000. 00022
00000 Ose
00000';ZE
00000*? 19
00000. SLE
00000rz
00000* Olf
00000' z0*
00000' ISE
00000*91*1
00000' * t19
00000'si
00000' £16
000061E
00000 *Z
00000' z
00000, 0L
00000' *01
00000*01
0000 0 01
00000' 01
00000' 01
00000' 01
00000' 01
00000' 01
00000'* 01
00000' 01
00000 0z
00000 01
00000 01
00000'0
00000 , 01
00000,69
00000 * 69
00000,'69
0 0000 * 69
00000' 69
000006'9
00000 *69
00000,69
00000,69
00000 '69
0001 69
000006,9
00000 69
00000*69
9t
CE
*6
0!
9z
C?
11?
cc
0?
61
S1
91
ST
162
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
4?
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
68
69
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
71 .00000
71.00000
71 .00000
71 .00000
71.00000
71.00000
71 .10000
71.00000
71.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
.72.00000
72.00000
72 . 00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72 .00000
72 . 0000
72.00000
73.00000
375.00000
375 . 00000
375.00000
375.00000
730.00000
375.00000
410.00000
375 00000
375.00000
250.00000
151.00000
375.00000
250.00000
660.03000
169.00000
3?5.00000
375.00000
458.00000
375.00000
994.00000
255.00000
250.00000
398.00000
330.00000
418.00000
363.00000
379.00000
418.00000
414.00000
363 .00000
25000.00000
25000 00000
26625. 00000
22500. 00000
60000.00000
17500.00000
25830.00000
11500.00000
24000.00000
20000.00000
10650.00000
26250.00000
16848.00000
49500.00000
11865.00000
26000.00000
30000..00000
31000.00000
30000.00000
55166.00000
22000.00000
2000-. 00000
33490.00000
28000.00000
28215.00000
24539.00000
25616.00000
28215.00000
27945.00049
32715.00000
66.66667
66, 6667
71.00000
60.00000
82 -19178
46.66667
63.00000
30.66667
64.00000
90.00000
70 .52580
70.00000
67 39200
75.00000
70.20710
69.33333
60.00000
67.68559
80.00000
55.49899
86.27451
80.00000
84.14573
84.84848.
67.50000
67.60055
67.58839
67.50000
S7.50000
90.12397
26250.00000
26250n 00000
26250 00000
26250.00000
51100.00000
26250.00000
28700 00000
26625.00000
26625.00000
17750.00000
10721.00000
26625.00000
17750. AA000
46860.00000
11999 00000
26625.00000
270-00.00000
32976 00000
27000.00000
71568.00000
18360.00000
18000.00000
26656.00000
23760.00000
30096.00000
26136.00000
27289.00000
30096.00000
2908.00000
26499. 00000
163
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
905.00000
487.00000
330.00000
330 00000
375.00000
594.00000
401 .00000
388.00000
265.00000
523.00000
511.00000
325.00000
325.00000
612.00000
375.00000
360.00000
433.00000
368.00000
368.00000
426.00000
453.00000
375.00000
375.00000
416.00000
416.0000.4
151 .00000
265.00000
265.00000
375 00000
250.00000
66065.00000
43700.00000
23050, 0'4000
32000 00000
56430.00000
32000.00000
32877.00000
i6000.00000
83531 00000
90000.00000
22750.00000
23000 00000
52000.00000
27000.00000
22000.00000
41135.00000
34465;00000
34465.00000
47070.00000
43035.00000
29000.00000
37500.00000
39520.00000
39520:00000
10605.00000
15000.00000
13000.00000
30000 00000
19000.00000
73.00000
100.00000
?S 00000
V96 0.061
85.33333
95.00000
79.80050
84.73454
60.37736
1 ! .71511
176.12524
70.00000
79 . 76923
64.96732
72.00000
61.11111
95.00000
93.65489
93.65.489
110.49296
95.00000
74.66667
100.00000
'95.00000
,5 .0000
'70.23179
.56.60377
49.05660
S0.00000
76.00000
66065 00000
35551.00000
24090 00000
2 , ')9 .0 
27375.00000
43362.00000
29273.00000
28324.00000
19345 '0000
38179.00000
37303.00000
23725.00000
23725.00000
44676.00000
27375.00000
26280.00000
31609.00000
26864.00000
26864.00000
31098.00000
33522.00000
27750. 000
27750.00000
30784.00000
30734.00000
11174.00000
19610.00000
19610.00000
2?750.00000
18500.00000
164
28000.00000
34000 00000
25000.00000
650000.00000
64130.00000
11637.00000
30000.00000
66000.00000
44386.00000
74.66667
40.64667
76.92308
59.09091
110.00000
.85.56618
60.00000
176.00000
110.96500
27750.00000
??7!0.1000
24050.00000
814000.00000
43142.00000
10064.00000
27750.00000
28125.00000
30400.00000
109 OBSERVACIONES INCLUIDAS EN LA RECRESION
ESTADISTICAS 8ASICAS
VAR.NIU. NEDIA DES ESf
1 71.37963 1.97042
2 995.59259 5344.96779
3 40560.02778 ?8?8.355C6
4 74.69849 22.61604
5 70620.22222 374886.48422
VAR
3.88257183E+00
2.85686807E+07
6.2071321 7E +03
5.11485368E+02
1.40539876E+11
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74'. 00000
75.00000
76.00000
375.00000
375.0)000
325.00000
11000.00000
583.00000
136.00000
375.00000
375.00000
400.00000
CV
2.76049
536.86295
194.24384
30.27644
530.84863
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URBANIZACION LAS TAPIAS
UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES - MERIDA - VENEZUELA
FACULTAD DE ECONMIA
INSTITUTO DE ESTADISTICA AP YIAD  :ZMUrICN
PROCR'HP'IMPLEM.PR5F. Renoto del CantQ J 1979)
ATENCION CONSULTA PROF.: CESAI BRICENC
CONSULTANTE...............: GRACIELA FLORES
8888tSI3ts53ssttstatsassessasasesstantesISsses
ANALISIS DE REGRESIOH
I.*.*.*e*6*s*e+e*e*5
ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE LOS DATOS
£sTECLADO , 2wCASSETTE 3=LECTORA DE TARJETAS 4=DISCO
FORMA DE ENTRADA DE DATOS , CODIGO= 1
LOS DATOS SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS SE GUARARAN EN CASSETTE
PRIMER FILE= I
NU. DE VARIABLES OE ENTRADAn 3
2 VARIABLES SERAH AGREG.AL CJTO ORIGINAL POR TRANSFORMACION
I X( 1) X( 2) TX( 3) X( 4) XC 5)
1 75.00000 435.00000 47916:0000 110.15172. 32625.00000
2 75.00000 453.00000 45738.00000 k00.96689 33975.000
3 75.00000 435.00000 50094.00000 115.15862 32i25.00000
4 75.00000 410.00000 53300.00000 - 130.00000 30750.00000
5 75.00000 410.000c' 53300.00000 130.00000 30750.00000
6 75.00000 410.00000 53300.00000 130.00000 30750.00000
7 75.00000 53.00000 69255.00000 135.00000 38475 00000
8 75.00000 633.00000 85536.00000 135.12796 47475.*0000
9 75.00000 558.00000 75330.00000 135.00000 41850.00000
10 75.00000 527.00000 ~71145.00000 135.00000 39525.00000
168
75.00000
75.00000
75.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
76.00000
77.00000
77. 00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77. 00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
77.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78.00000
78. 00000
470 .00f00
466.00000
466.00000
513.00000
1000.00000
558.00000
513.00000
999.00000
510.00000
462.00000
843.00000
451.00000
2998.00000
29702.00000
610.00000
613.00000
1678.00000
628.00000
.692.00000
692.00000
782.00000
513.00000
450.00000
416.00000
213.00000
223.00000
8280.0000
1408.00000
1366.00000
587.00000
51700 00000
51304.00000
51304.00000
69304 00000
150044.00000
?2540.0000
69309.00000
89934 00000
68950.00000
69397.00000
118020.00000
72228.00000
459553 00000
2296208.00000
61015.00000
91957:00000
100680.00000'
94342 00000
69204.00000
69204. 00000
73239.00000
100000.00000
45540.00000
46265.00000
20000.00000
20000.00000
1879605.00000
112708.00000
204975.00000
460000.00000
110.00000
110.09442
110.09442
135.09552
150.04400
130.00000
135.10526
'90.02402
135.19608
150.20996
140.00000
160.15078
153.28652
80.00167
100.02459
150.01142
.60.00000
150.22611
100.00578
100.00578
100.04987
194.93177
101.20000
111.21394
-93.89671
69.68610
227.00543
90.04830
150.05490
783.64566
35250.00000
34950.00000
34950.00000
38988.00000
76000.00000
42408.00000
38988.00000
?5924.00000
38760.00000
35112.00000
64068.00000
34276.00000
227848.00000
2181352.00000
46970.00000
47201.00000
129206.00000
48356.00000
53284.00000
53284.00009
60214.00000
39501.00000
34650.00000
32032.00000
'6401.00000
17171.00000
.645840.00000
109824.00000
106548.00000
45786 00000
41 78.00000 917.00000 ?3413.00000
42 78.00000 764.00000 140886.00000
43 73.00000 915.00000 183120.00000
44 73.00000 637.0o 51003.00000
PRIMER FILE- I ULTIMO FILE- 44
44 OSSERVACICNES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESIGN
ESTADISTICAS
VAR.NUm. MEDIA
1 76.34091
2 15'02.70455
3 18292.5000
4 140.50373
5 114911.72727
C-ASICAS
DES EST
1.0948
4373.1.)726
105.04561
332936.95637
VAR
1.20465963E+00
1.9124067:E+07
1. 103 $5803E+04
1.10347017E+11
MATRIZ DE CORRELACION
X 1) X( 2) X( 3) X( 4)
0.041
0.170 0.901
0.247 -0.055 0.153
0.045 1.000 0.904 -0.054
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE= 3
TOLERANCIAs 0.00100
CO0CO METODO DE SELECCICH
OuSTEPUISE, I=FORJARD, 2=8ACKUARD, 3=MANUAL
*ETOD0 SELECCI0NwD0,CODIG0 3
VAR CODTG F CORR TOL F COEF!C ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 1.243 0.170 1.000
2 0 182.083 0.901 1.000
4 0 1.002 0.153 1.000
5 0 183.360 0.904 1.000
169
80 05780
184.40576
200.13115
3. 07535
71526 '0000 .
59592 00000
71370 00000
4?496 00o7;
CV
1. 43891
291 01577
74. 76091
289.73279
*OZ99,689z; a3LNvlsNo3
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T8982*9 (T0+31kZG068-8 )806-88 E80*rST 0 r
866,0 90c*o ZEZ** 0 1
IS3 S3833b v3how3a odvd biNou wnm
bONS3 3IJ303 d 101 H03 DIC03 dvA
Itoet'r*688? = OONVIS3 VONV3
01+3s669;*r ZT+38r6fi*,T zo, iuncIS38
zT+a6zooc,9 ZI+36ZOOS'9 T NOIS38334
ZT+3z9666-'i Et itliol
w 3 3s '15 3lN3nJ
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VARIABLE 5 SU TOLERANCIA ES PUY PEQUEHA
VARIABLE DEPENDIENTEw 3
TOLEPANCIA= 0.00006
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCION
OwSTEPWISE, inFORWARD, 2=BACKWARD, 3=MANUAL
HETODO SELECCIOHADO,CODIGOm 4
SELECCION DE PROCEDIMIENTO PARA REGRESION MULTIPLE
VARIABLE DEPEHDIENTE= 3
TOLERANCIA- 0.00001
CODIGO METODO DE SELECCIOH
OuSTEPWISE, 1=FORWARD, 2=BACKWARD. 3uMANUAL
METODD SELECCIONADO,CODIGOm 3
VAR CODIG F CtRR TOL F CCEFIC ERROR
HUM CONTR ENTR. PAPC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 1.243 0.170 1-.000
2 0 182.083 0.901 1.000
4 0 1.002 0.153 1.000
5 0 188.560 0 904 1.000
172
PASO RUN. I
VARIABLE 2 AGREGADA
a CUAM 0.81257
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA YARIANZA
FUENTE GL Sc CM F
TOTAL 43 ?.-9996?E+12 I
REGRESION I 6.50029E+12 6.50029E+12 182.08343
RESIDUAL .42 1.49938E+12 3.56995E+10
ERROR ESTAHDAR= 188943.18047 ( 1.889431805E+05)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F 2OEFIC ERROR
RUM CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER RECRES EST.
1 0 4.232 0.306 0.998
2 0 182.083 88.908( 8.89082541E+01) 6.58881
4 0 11.531 0.469 0.997
5 0 164.263 0.895 0.000
CONSTANTE 52689.66244
**********************a.****************************************************
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PASO NUM 2
VARIABLE 5 oGREGADA
I CUA= 0.9i256
TABLA DE ANALISIS DE LA YARIANZA
FUENTE GL C CM F
TOTAL 43 7 99967;+12
REGRESION 2 7 700:E-12 3 .3f ?E+12 327.07239
RESIDUAL 41 2.99492E+11 7.30467E+09
ERROR ESTANDAR= 85467.36797 ( 8 546736797E+04)
VAR CODIG F CORR TOL F CoEFIC ERROR
NUN CONTR ENTR. PARC REMOVER REGRES EST.
1 0 7.831 0.405 0.733
2 0 159.497 -4940.239(-4.94023876E+03) 392.40699
4 0 39.303 0.704 0.965
5 0 14. 263 66.059( 6.60594544E+0!) . 15424
CONSTANTE- 19005.72934
LFI5 TRPI RS
-
t2i30130-
216020-
2110-
41122
79222.4 -
1160130 to
32000R * *
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LRBANIZACION SAN ANTONIO
E1 DATOS'SERAN LISTADOS
LOS DATOS NO SE GUARDARAN EN CASSETTE
I
1
2
3
4
6
7
.8
9
10
11
12
- 13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
X( 1)
68.00000
68.00000
68.00000
68.00000
68.04000
68.00000
68.00000
68.00000
6;.0000
68.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00006
69.000010
69-00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
69.00000
X 2)
400.00000
540.00000
510.00000
510.00000
510.00000
1020.00000
400.00000
400.00000
540.0000
400.00000
540.00000
510.00000
600.00000
488 .00000
800.00000
3198.00000
600.00000
606.00000
600.00000
510.00000
510 0vs)00
510. 000 00
740.00000
583.00000
400 00000
X( 3)
20000.00000
72400.00000
26433.00000
26433.00000
26433.00000
69360.00000
26000.00000
28000.00000
291.52 -0 v.v
28000.00000
37800.00000
33150.00000
35000.00000
24000.00000
50000.00000
21919.00000
42000.00000
39000.00000
39000. 000)
30000 0 0
33150 006"0
48100.00000
34970.00000
20000 00000
X( 4)
.50.00000
.60.00000
51.82941
51.82941
51.82941
68.00000
65.00000
70 .00000
53.9859
70 .00000
70.00000
65.00000
58.33333
49 .18033
62.50000
55.07286
70.00000
65.00000
65.00000
58.82353
65.00000
63.72549
.65.00000
59.98285
90.00000
X( 5)
27200.00000
36720.00000
34680,.00000
34680.00000
34i80.00000
69360.00000
27200.00000
27200.00000
36720.00000
27200.00000
37260.09000
35190.00000
41400.00000
33672.00000
55200.00000
27462.00000
41400.00000
41400.00000
41400.00000
35190.00000
35190.00040
35190.00000
51060.00000
40227.00000
27600.00000
510.00000 30600.0000026 69 .001000 60.00000 35190.00000
176
600 00900 39000.00000
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
69 00000
69 00000
6 .00000
60.00000
69.00000
69.00000
70.00000
70.0*000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
70.0000
70.00000
70.00000
70.00000
71.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
400 6600o
943 00000
980 000)00
400,00000949.00
400 00000
51 0. 0000)
400 0000q
398 .00000
400.00000
510 .00000
510.00000
540.00000
540.00000
400.00000
566 .00000
416.00000
400 .0*000
540.00000
540.00000
510.00000
398.00000
510.00000
540 .00000
510.00000
600.00000
45000. 0000
50001.00000
32000.00000
66000.00000
17000.00000
40000.00100
48000.00000
32000.00000
29000.00000
40C00 00000
26000.:00000
35700. 00000
26222.00000
32400. 00000
43192.00000
32000.00000
31198.9 0000
33280.00000
32000.00000
27000.00000
34400.00000
25500.00000
32000.00000
35700.00000
40000.00000
3000.00000
50000. 00000
65.90000 41400.00000
7s 00066 27A60606060
42.41782 65057.00000
88.23529 35190.00000
62.50000 55200.00000
80.00000 27600.00000
69.54689 65481.00000
42.50000 27600.00000
78.'3137 35700.00000
.60.00000 56000.00000
80.00000 28000.00000
-72.86432 27860.00000
00.00000 35700.10000
.65.00000 28000.00000
70.00000 35700.00000
.51.41569 35700.00000
.60.00000 37800.00000
79.98519 37800.00000
.80.00400 28000.00000
.55.12014 39620.00000
.80.00000 29120.00000
.80.00000 28000.000,0
.50.00000 37890.00000
63.70370 37800.00000
50.00000 35700.00000
80.40201 28258.00000
70.00000 36720.00000
74.07407 38880.00000
74.50980 36720.00000
.83.33333 43200.00000
177
3400.00000
4250) 0000)
4500000000
5400 00000
4500.00000
75009.00000
50040.00000
32000.00000
50000.00000
43500.00000
36932.00000
40000.00000
66000.00000
36000.009000
51000 :000
30954. 00000
12000900000
120090.90000
90.00000
42 7111-
83.33333
83.33333
88.88889
105.88235
64.99133
88.40989
80.00000
83.33333
85.29412
.68.39259
87. 5982
81 .96721
69.54689
.60.0000
100.00000
'77.38500
300.00000
4320.00000
36720 00000
3880.00000
39420.00000
37230.00000
84242.00000
41318.00000
29200.00000
43800.0090
37230.00000
39420.00000
124100.00000
35624.00000
70226.00000
44409.00000
37740.09000
29600.00000
30000.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72.00000
72. 00000
73.00000
73.0000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73.00000
73 . 069004
73.0000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
74.00000
75. 09000
75. 00000
76 OBSERVACIONES INCLUIDAS EN LA REGRESION
ESTADISTICAS BASICAS
NEDIA
70.38158
554.68421 21
40672.6052G 2175
75.26687 3
39073.11842 1527
DES EST
1.96616
1.51064
9. 91454
9.46987
9. 31028
VAR
3.86578948E+00
4.47367523E+04
4 73476471E&o8
1.55787040E+03
2.33457323E+08
60 .00000
6t)( .tAAAA
510 .0000
540.1000)0
540 .00000
510.00000
1154.00000
566.00000
400.00000
600.0000
510.00000
540.00000
489.00000
949.00000
600.00000
510.00000
400.00000
400.00000
400.0000 300.00000 30000.00000
VAR. NUm
1
2
3
4
5
CV
2.79357
38. 13172
53. 49' 19
52.43990
39. 10440
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